Peace and Security beyond Military Power: The League of Nations and the Polish-Lithuanian Dispute (1920-1923) by Tessaris, Chiara




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
 requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 











 Based on the case study of the mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute from 1920 
to 1923, this dissertation explores the League of Nations’ emergence as an agency  of modern 
territorial and ethnic conflict resolution. It argues that in many respects, this organization 
departed from prewar traditional diplomacy  to establish a new, broader concept of security. 
At first the league tried simply to contain the Polish-Lithuanian conflict by appointing a 
Military Commission to assist these nations in fixing a final border. But the occupation of 
Vilna by Polish troops in October 1920 exacerbated Polish-Lithuanian relations, turning the 
initial border dispute into an ideological conflict over the ethnically mixed region of Vilna, 
claimed by the Poles on ethnic grounds while the Lithuanians considered it the historical 
capital of the modern Lithuanian state. The occupation spurred the league to greater 
involvement via administration of a plebiscite to decide the fate of the disputed territories. 
When this strategy failed, Geneva resorted to negotiating the so-called Hymans Plan, which 
aimed to create a Lithuanian federal state and establish political and economic cooperation 
between Poland and Lithuania. This analysis of the league’s mediation of this dispute walks 
the reader through the league’s organization of the first international peacekeeping operation, 
its handling of the challenges of open diplomacy, and its efforts to fulfill its ambitious 
mandate not just to prevent war but also to uproot its socioeconomic and ethnic causes. The 
Hymans Plan reflected this ambition as well as commitment to reconciling the tenets of 
balance of power and territorial status quo with the principle of self-determination and 
minorities’ protection when drawing new boundaries and creating new states.
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The Polish-Lithuanian Dispute, 1918–1920
In the wake of the Russian Empire’s disintegration and the great changes wrought by 
the First World War, the city  and region of Vilna became a battlefield between Poland and 
Lithuania. The Poles insisted the city was Polish in culture, basing their claims on the 
ethnographic principle, whereas the Lithuanians claimed it as their historical capital.1  The 
emancipation of the Russian Empire’s serfs in 1861 had lent the Lithuanian national 
movement its initial momentum. At first it consisted only of intellectuals, many of whom 
spoke Polish as well as Lithuanian, which was generally the language of the peasantry. As 
most of Lithuania’s landed nobility  were culturally Polish, national conflicts merged with 
social and economic disputes as Lithuanian nationalists called for land reform. A nationalist 
segment of the clergy sought to free the Church of Polish control, and Lithuanian scientific 
and cultural societies competed with their Polish counterparts.2
During the First World War, the Germans held the region until their military collapse 
in autumn 1918. On February 16, 1918, still under German occupation, the Lithuanian State 
Council in Vilna proclaimed Lithuania’s independence but had to retreat to Kaunas when the 
1
1  When Vilna was founded in the early fourteenth century, it  lay at the heart  of the original Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania Proper, a term designating the ethnographic nucleus of the Lithuanian nation. This 
area consisted of the principality of Samogitia, which coincided with the region of Kaunas, and of the 
two palatinates of Vilna and Trakai. The city was the capital of the Lithuanian Empire, which 
expanded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to include vast Ukrainian and Belarusian 
territories. In 1386 Lithuania and Poland formed a personal union that in 1569 became a federation 
between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. This political entity lasted until 
the third partition of Poland in 1795, when Russia annexed all Lithuania except the part on the left 
bank of the Niemen River, which was taken by Prussia. Lithuania Proper remained under Russia and 
was reorganized in a separate unit first called the Lithuanian Government  of Vilna and Grodno and 
then the Northwestern Province of Russia, of which Kaunas, Vilna, and Grodno formed three 
provinces, or governments, with the city of Vilna as their administrative center. Sarah Wambaugh, 
Plebiscites since the World War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1933) 2: 289–291. 
2  Alfred Eric Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question 1920–1928 (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1966), 5.
Bolshevik army entered the city in January 1919. Under the command of Josef Pilsudski, the 
Polish army assumed the offensive and successfully  drove the Bolsheviks back, entering 
Vilna on April 20, 1919, taking over the administration, and declaring inhabitants of the 
former Grand Duchy of Lithuania free to determine their internal, national, and religious 
affairs through representatives selected by universal, secret suffrage.3  The Lithuanian 
government vehemently protested, regarding this as a seizure of its capital. Some fighting 
took place between the Lithuanian and Polish armies, and the Allies in Paris tried to diffuse 
the situation by drawing several provisional demarcation lines that nevertheless did not bring 
peace to the region.4 Wishing to postpone the final fixing of Poland’s eastern frontier until the 
Russians could take part, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in Article 87 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, reserved the right to fix borders not specified in the treaty  at a later date. 
The question persisted, however, and the Polish delegation proposed separating the Vilna 
districts from Lithuania along ethnic lines and regulating the matter via plebiscite. On 
September 29, 1919, the Lithuanian nationalist leader Augustinas Voldemaras replied to the 
Supreme War Council that a plebiscite could not express the people’s will under the abnormal 
conditions of war and Polish occupation.5 
The Bolsheviks advanced on December 8, 1919, and the Supreme Council 
temporarily ended the unsettled state of the Polish frontier by fixing a provisional line and 
authorizing the Polish government to organize a provisional administration to its west. Called 
the Curzon line, in contradistinction to the Foch line and others the Paris Peace Conference 
had drawn for strategic purposes, it ran south from Russia’s western border, leaving the city 
2
3 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 302.
4  W. J. Brockenlabank, “The Vilna Dispute,” The American Journal of International Law 3 (June 
1926): 483.
5 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 303.
of Grodno and the entire Vilna district to the east and granting Poland some small bits of the 
territory claimed by Lithuania. The Allies regarded the Curzon line as baseline roughly 
defining a territory with an indisputably Polish ethnic minority. The Lithuanian government, 
having been neither consulted nor notified about its establishment, did not recognize the 
Curzon line. The line also failed to please the Poles, for Pilsudski advocated the creation of 
three buffer states between Poland and Russia: the Ukraine, Belorussia, and finally Lithuania, 
which would eventually  enter into a federal union with Poland.6 Himself a native of Vilna, 
Pilsudski aimed at restoring the Polish-Lithuanian union. 
Meanwhile, Polish circles were of two minds on the Lithuanian question (though they 
all considered Vilna a Polish city). The “federalists,” many from Lithuania themselves, 
envisioned a Lithuania established within its historical boundaries as a multinational Polish-
Lithuanian confederate state, in which Vilna would remain the capital of the Lithuanian state. 
Generally the federalists‘ base was in leftist groups in Poland, but the federalist idea, 
significantly, also drew considerable support from Polish landowners in the eastern territories 
of the Vilna region.7 The opposing tendency  was the annexationist view, represented by the 
leader of the National Democratic Party, Roman Dmowski, who insisted on founding a 
centralized Polish state that  included Vilna. The annexationists, who opposed any privileging 
of non-Polish nationalities within the Polish state, aimed to establish the ethnographically 
Lithuanian territory as an autonomous province of Poland.8  The National Democrats’ 
3
6 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 304.
7 Senn, The Great Powers, 12.
8 Ibid., 13.
annexationist plans were a major factor in the failure of the few tentative efforts at 
cooperation between Poles and Lithuanians in Vilna before the First World War.9 
 On July 12, 1920, the Soviet government and Lithuania signed the Treaty of Moscow, 
which recognized Lithuania’s independence, fixed a Lithuanian-Soviet borderline that  left 
Vilna and Grodno to Lithuania, and provided that states of Poland and Lithuania should 
themselves determine the border between them. A secret declaration—annexed to the treaty 
in view of the Polish occupation of part of Lithuania’s territory—authorized the Soviet 
government to use Lithuanian territory for military purposes in the war against Poland. 
Poland, meanwhile, refused to recognize the Soviet government’s right to dispose of Vilna 
and its territory on the grounds that on August 29, 1918, the Soviet government had 
abrogated all treaties relating to the partition of Poland. 
On July 15, 1920, the Supreme Council at Spa directed the Poles to withdraw behind 
the Curzon line. To win the Entente’s support against the Soviets, Warsaw promised to settle 
the Vilna question by amicable adjustment. On the same day, Lithuanian and Soviet forces 
occupied Vilna jointly, but the Polish counteroffensive pushed the Russians back and handed 
Vilna over to the Lithuanians in late August 1920.10 On September 5, the Polish Minster of 
Foreign Affairs, Eustachy Kajetan Sapieha, notified the Council of the League of Nations 
(hereafter the Council) that  a conflict had arisen between the Polish and Lithuanian troops. 
The note reported that the Lithuanian army was violating the neutrality  in the Polish-Russian 
war helping the Bolsheviks in the Suwalki region, to the west of the Curzon line. Warsaw 
therefore requested the league, under article 11 of the Covenant, to use every means of 
restraint with the Lithuanian government. 
4
9  Egidijus Motieka, “Lenku ir Lietuviu Gincas,” in Lietuviu Atgimimo Istorijos Studios (Vilnius: 
Saulabrolis, 1996), 250.
10 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 305.
The League of Nations and the Polish-Lithuanian Dispute 
 With the end of the Cold War and the unleashing of ethnic conflicts in Eastern and 
Central Europe, the European and international communities faced the challenge of handling 
territorial and ethnic conflicts. The difficulty  of reconciling self-determination with 
international security, and state sovereignty with protection of minority rights, called the 
value of international cooperation into question.11  This new geopolitical context sparked a 
revival of interest in the work of the League of Nations, created during the First World War to 
maintain world peace and settle territorial disputes. Since the late 1980s, political scientists, 
historians, and scholars of international relations have extensively  analyzed the league’s 
minority protection system but largely neglected its role in ethnic conflict  management, 
which is the focus of this study. 
 When the league began its work in 1920, it was still in the process of establishing its 
own agenda and procedures. The Covenant of the League of Nations spoke of “promoting 
international cooperation,” but this vague, general injunction as yet had no basis in practice. 
The Council of the League of Nations—which in its first year of existence met at twelve 
5
11 Susan Pedersen, “Back to the league,” The American Historical Book Review 112, no. 4 ( 2007): 
1091.
sessions in Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, and San Sebastian—laid the foundations of the 
organized methods by which the league was to work.12 
 The Polish-Lithuanian dispute, mediated from 1920 to 1923, was the league’s first 
experience with the intransigence and challenges inherent in territorial and ethnic conflict.13 
This study is therefore not only an analysis of how the League of Nations established itself as 
an agency of ethnic conflict management, but also an account of how it handled the 
challenges of new diplomacy in the early  stages of its own building process. It shows that this 
international organization was able to establish its own original agenda and modus operandi, 
and that in many respects it broke with prewar traditional diplomacy, becoming a forerunner 
of modern ethnic conflict management. 
 Even the most recent historiography has largely  neglected the league’s management 
of territorial disputes. One reason is that security is an area where revisionist argumentation 
about the league seems hard to sustain, given the general post-1939 conclusion that the 
6
12 The first steps included the framing of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice; 
the appointment of the Commission for the Study of Military, Naval and Air Questions, the Mandates 
Commission, and the High Commissariat for Refugees; and establishment of procedures for fulfilling 
the league’s obligations to protect minorities. League of Nations, Ten Years of World Cooperation 
(Geneva: Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930), 2. Some of these bodies were not new creations 
but postwar incarnations of earlier organizations. E.g., the League of Nations Health Organization 
expanded on the work of a prewar entity, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, founded in 
Paris in 1907 to oversee the quarantining of ships and ports infected with plague and cholera. Some of 
the prewar activities carried out by the International Bureau for the Suppression of Traffic in Women 
and Children (established in 1899) and other organizations became part of the agenda of the newly 
established International Labour Organization. One of the league’s most interesting affiliates was the 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, established in 1922 to promote cultural and 
intellectual exchanges among nations. This body was envisaged as a committee of intellectuals from 
all over the world who would represent “a small group of men and women” in each country “who 
have the means of influencing opinion,” as a British spokesman said. Akira Iriye, Global Community: 
The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 27–29.
13  Speaking strictly chronologically, the question of the ethnically Swedish Aaland Islands, held by 
Finland but  contested by Sweden, preceded the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. Unlike the latter, which 
was an intractable ethnic conflict, the territorial dispute over the islands was resolved when Finland 
withdrew its claim and the Swedish minority reached an agreement  with Sweden, which granted 
territorial autonomy. 
league failed spectacularly in its mission to maintain world peace.14  The underlying 
assumption of this dominant approach in postwar historiography is that responsibility  for 
success or failure in resolving territorial disputes rested entirely  with the league. Only 
recently  has Lorna Lloyd pointed out external limits that the league could not overcome.15 
Peaceful settlement of disputes, she argues, depends also on the climate in the given period 
and society: success hinges on general interest in stable, peaceful relations and the absence of 
a threatening revolutionary  power or grave fears about security in the international system. 
Nevertheless, the success-failure paradigm still prevails, even in some of the most revisionist 
studies. A justification for the league’s ineptitude at maintaining peace has been that the 
league was not meant to substitute great-power politics but only to help  states do together 
what they could not easily do alone.16 
 Given the emphasis on the league’s dependence on great-power politics and support, 
even the most recent revisionist studies have focused on continuities with the past, namely 
between the league and the Concert  of Europe. Reflecting a mainly state-centric perspective 
and evaluating the league’s work by considering what it meant to do versus how it was used 
by diplomats and politicians, these works inevitably conclude that international organizations 
are only instruments through which nation-states seek to influence international relations.17 
Gintautas Vilkelis follows this approach in the most recent and exhaustive Lithuanian work 
7
14 Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” 1093.
15 Lorna Lloyd, “The League of Nations and the Settlement Dispute,” World Affairs 157, no. 4 (1995): 
160. 
16 Frederick Samuel Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946  (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1986), 52. The league’s failure is often attributed also to its inadequate 
procedures. Gerhart  Niemeyer, “The Balance Sheet  to the league Experiment,” International 
Organization 6, no. 4 (1952): 537–558.
17  Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wihelm Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations: 
Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organization,” Contemporary European 
History 14, no. 4 (2004): 466.
on the league and the Polish-Lithuanian dispute in the interwar years.18  His study, a 
diplomatic history, accounts for both the negotiations conducted in Geneva and the 
diplomatic pressure exerted by the European great powers, namely Great Britain and France, 
to solve the conflict. Yet his conclusions are based on Lithuanian archival sources that do not 
offer insight into the league’s stance on the Polish-Lithuanian dispute.
 In her reevaluation of the early  1920s, Zara Steiner has pointed out that the league 
was hardly  powerless from the start, and that its impact was long-lasting, especially in the 
field of economic and intellectual cooperation.19  Still, regarding collective security  and 
foreign politics  she concludes that the league’s mechanism for conducting multinational 
diplomacy  depended on the willingness of states—particularly  the most powerful states—to 
use it.20  In Steiner’s opinion, the league did not represent a decisive break from the 
discredited prewar system of great-power politics. She agrees with those who have recently 
concluded that the league was at best a new version of the Concert of Europe that functioned 
efficiently in the early 1920s only because it enjoyed the support  of key political statesmen 
such as Austen Chamberlain, Aristide Briand, and Gustav Streseman, and because for a time, 
great-power interests coincided with those pursued by the league.21 
 The failure of international legalism, Stephen Wertheim argues, is another reason why 
the league served great-power politics instead of replacing it.22 Appreciation of an institution 
8
18 Vilkelis, Lietuvos ir Lenkijos Santykiai Tautu Sajungoje [Polish-Lithuanian Relations at  the League 
of Nations] (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2006).
19 Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 816.
20 Ibid., 299.
21 Richard S. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 
1924–29 (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: 
America, Britain and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006).
22Stephen Wertheim, “The League of Nations: A Retreat  from International Law?” Journal of Global 
Studies 7 (2012): 231. 
like the League of Nations, noted James Barros, depends first on realizing its limitations in a 
world dominated by  power. The league was a great power monopoly, as mirrored in its 
Council, which was intended to act as the organization’s executive body. Since the great 
powers were entitled to permanent representation, the league was in keeping with the 
historical experience of Europe, which from the Congress of Vienna to the eve of the First 
World War was dominated by the Concert of Europe, a euphemism for dictatorship of the 
great powers.23 Elsewhere, though, Martin Wight observes that “powers will continue to seek 
security without reference to justice, and to preserve their vital interests irrespective of 
common interests, but in the fraction that they may be deflected lies the difference between 
the jungle and the traditions of Europe.”24
 Without  overlooking the undeniable role of great-power politics and old diplomacy  in 
the management of the dispute at Geneva, this study focuses on the extent to which the 
league was able to deflect them to establish and pursue its own agenda. The possibility  of 
Soviet involvement in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, and the French and British interest in 
containing both Polish and German expansionism toward the Baltic states (considered a 
healthy barrier against communism), certainly played a role in the decisions made in Geneva 
regarding the dispute. Similarly, the Political Section of the League of Nations did not forbear 
to consider other Polish border conflicts—with Germany  over Upper Silesia and with 
9
23  James Barros, “The Greek-Bulgarian Incident  of 1925: The League of Nations and the Great 
Powers,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 108, no. 4 (1964): 377.
24  Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), 68. By 
“traditions of Europe” Wight means an attachment  to constitutionalism and the search for a golden 
mean. Tim Dunne, “Good Citizen Europe,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 21.
Czechoslovakia over Teschen Silesia—as factors that could influence Polish politics in 
Vilna.25 
 However, the study will also attend to many additional factors that came into play, 
shaping the league’s outlook and management of the dispute. In advocating the creation of 
the league, Woodrow Wilson and other supporters of the idea were neither starry-eyed 
idealists nor Machiavellian realists, but rather statesmen embarking in the difficult task of 
reconciling power politics and liberal ideas so as to underwrite a structure of international 
security that would be both stable and just.26 The league’s approach to the Polish-Lithuanian 
dispute reflected these ambitions, as Geneva’s orientation shifted constantly between tenets 
of international law, the balance of power, political considerations, and security concerns. 
The aim of this study is therefore to show how the League of Nations tried to reconcile all 
these often conflicting goals rather than pursuing any particular one of them.
 In her National Minorities and the European Nation-States system, Jennifer Jackson 
Preece concludes that the great powers saw the League of Nations primarily  as a collective 
security arrangement designed to ensure international peace and stability, and regarded 
10
25  During World War I, the Czechs and the Poles both claimed the area of Teschen Silesia for 
historical, ethnic, and economic reasons. The Conference of the Ambassadors temporarily ended the 
dispute in 1920 by assigning the city of Teschen to Poland and leaving the rest  of the Freistadt to 
Czechoslovakia, which greatly displeased the Czechs and was anything but favorable to the Poles. 
Felix Buttin, “The Polish-Czechoslovak Conflict over Teschen Silesia (1918–1920): A Case Study,” 
Perspectives: Review of International Affairs 25 (2005): 66. By contrast, the Upper Silesia case was 
negotiated concomitantly with the Polish-Lithuanian dispute by the League of Nations between 1921 
and 1922, after a plebiscite conducted under the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control on 
March 20, 1921, failed to settle the dispute. The Supreme Council placed the issue on the League of 
Nations’ agenda on August 12, 1921, and the league recommended that Germany and Poland sign a 
convention that would maintain Upper Silesia as a single economic unit and commit  both countries to 
temporarily relinquishing the territories the plebiscite had assigned them. The convention would last 
fifteen years, a transition period during which a special regime would knottier the economic life of the 
zone prior to Germany’s and Poland’s assumption of full sovereignty rights over the ceded territories. 
Joseph F. Harrington, “The League of Nations and the Upper-Silesian Boundary Dispute, 1921–
1922,” The Polish Review 23, no. 3 (1978): 90. Neither government accepted this settlement as final. 
Harry Rosenthal, “National Self-Determination: The Example of Upper Silesia,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 7, no. 3/4 (1972): 236. 
26  Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of ‘National-Self-Determination’: A 
Reconsideration,” Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 422.
minority treaties as relevant only insofar as they were a means to achieve this end. The 
overwhelming concern for international peace and stability was central to this minority 
protection system. As a result, the league’s management of minority issues was guided more 
by traditional statist tenets of international society—sovereignty, non-intervention, 
inviolability  of borders—than by any commitment to ideals of humanitarianism or national 
self-determination.27 More generally, Jackson Preece finds that since 1648, national minority 
rights have always been subordinate to the national interest and security within states, and to 
international peace and stability within the society of states.28 
 So has the conception of security remained unchanged since 1648? Did security have 
the same meaning in 1648 as in 1919 or the early 1990s? Certainly  not. It is the historian’s 
task to explain how and why this meaning changed over time. Moreover, analysis of the 
Polish-Lithuanian dispute allows investigation of not only the new conception of security that 
emerged in 1919, but also its implications for ethnic conflict management. 
 The new notion of security cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account the 
devastating impact of the First World War across the social spectrum of entire societies. 
While outlining his idea of a League of Nations in 1918, one of its founders, Jan Smuts, 
remarked: “The horrors and sufferings of this war have produced a temper in the peoples 
which must be reckoned with as the fundamental fact of the political situation in Europe 
today  and the feeling of grief, bitterness, disillusion, despair goes so deep  that even in the 
victorious Entente countries that feeling was stronger than the more superficial feeling of joy 
for victory and the prolonged horror through which all have passed is a far more real, abiding 
11
27  Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-State System (Oxford: 
Clarendon University Press, 1999), 89.
28 Ibid. 
and fundamental experience than the momentary joy of the moment.”29 And a year later at the 
Paris Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson commented: “I do not need to draw for you the 
picture of how the burden has been thrown back from the front upon the older men, upon the 
homes of the civilized world.”30 
 Though the Allies took pains in Paris to secure a postwar settlement free of conflicts 
with their own national interests, they also felt  responsible for avoiding further bloodshed and 
knew a lasting peace required more than just preserving the territorial status quo and balance 
of power among states. The 1919 peace treaties established the League of Nations to maintain 
peace and afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great 
and smaller states alike. It was expected to achieve this by transcending the narrow national 
interests of individual governments, adopting open diplomacy, and promoting self-
determination and principles of democracy and formal equality among nations.31 
 Yet the league was created not only to prevent conflicts and facilitate pacific 
settlement of international disputes, but  also to eliminate the underlying causes of war.32 
Robert Cecil, who represented South Africa and Britain at  the League of Nations, noted that 
the “products essential to the welfare and prosperity  of the mankind must by its (the league’s) 
agency be made available for all.” Gilbert Murray, when representing South Africa at the 
League, added that international arrangements were key to ensuring that “no man can prosper 
12
29   Jan Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (London: London Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1918), 13.
30  Woodrow Wilson, “Make This League of Nations a Vital Thing,” International Organization 10, 
no. 4 (1956): 525. Speech delivered at the Second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, Paris, 
January 25, 1919.
31 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 2.
32 League of Nations, Ten Years of World Cooperation  (Geneva: Secretariat of the League of Nations, 
1930), 49.
in another’s ruin.”33  Securing a stable peace meant addressing not only political but also 
economic and social pressures to keep them from jeopardizing international relations.34 This 
new international organization was therefore intended as more than just  an instrument for 
traditional diplomacy: its machinery had to function on the basis of “human ideals,” 
including principles of freedom and equality.35 This also implied full recognition, whenever 
possible, of the principle of self-determination of peoples. 
  In this respect the league departed from the Westphalian conception of security as 
based on the political principle of military balance between major powers. The goal of 
preserving the territorial status quo and balance of power now had to be reconciled with the 
new tenet of full recognition of national aspirations to self-determination as an essential 
condition of peace and stability. 
 As this study shows, the league’s approach to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute reflected 
this new, broader meaning of security. Moreover, this change in principles correspondingly 
altered methods for managing territorial disputes, allowing the league—at least, in its first 
years of activity—to diverge from traditional diplomacy, thereby establishing itself as a 
forerunner of modern ethnic conflict management entities.  
 For example, the league can be considered a predecessor of modern UN peacekeeping 
activities, even though its own activities predate the UN’s conceptualization.36  The modern 
13
33 Martyn Housden, “Securing the Lives of Ordinary People,” in Forgotten Pages of Baltic History: 
Diversity and Inclusion, ed. David J. Smith and Martyn Housden (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
2011), 96.
34 Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations called for fair and humane conditions of labor, 
justice for the native inhabitants of any given territory, measures against trafficking in people and 
drugs, and worldwide freedom of communication. Article 25 demanded improvements to world health 
and a fight against human suffering around the globe. Ibid., 97.
35 Ibid., 96.
36 Alan James, “The Peacekeeping Role of the League of Nations,” International Peacekeeping 6, no. 
1 (1999): 154. 
practice of international intervention distinguishes between peacekeeping and peace-building 
operations. Peacekeeping aims to provide immediate “security,” whereas political peace-
building helps countries make the difficult early transition from conflict to peace. 
Peacekeeping missions range from large military deployments to small observer forces, from 
complex, integrated missions to specialist police, rule-of-law, and other civilian operations. 
The more complex, long-term process of peace-building, however, strives to create the 
necessary  conditions for positive, sustainable peace by  comprehensively  addressing the deep-
rooted structural causes of violent conflict. Peace-building measures target core issues 
affecting the functioning of society and state.37  Obviously, nobody in 1920 used this 
terminology  or thought along these lines. Hence, I avoid anachronism by using this 
productive conceptual frame only  in this introduction, for two reasons. First, it helps to test 
whether the work of the League of Nations offers valuable lessons for today’s territorial and 
ethnic conflict management. This question is certainly worth asking, considering that, sadly, 
history is often a neglected teacher of life. Second, it clarifies that  in managing the Polish-
Lithuanian dispute, the league embarked on the operations to both keep and build peace that 
account for its modernity. 
 For analytical purposes, conflict management is divisible into three stages: 
prevention, containment, and termination. The first two stages are analyzed in chapter 1. The 
goal of conflict prevention is to forestall conflict situations and prevent the outbreak of 
hostilities and other forms of disruptive behavior.38  The league tried to do this when the 
border dispute between Poland and Lithuania first appeared on the agenda of the Council of 
the League of Nations on September 16, 1920. The Council decided to provide assistance 
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while the Polish and Lithuanian governments were conducting direct negotiations at 
Kalwarija. The league invited the contending parties to abstain from resuming hostilities, 
adopt the Curzon line as a provisional line of demarcation, and neutralize the Lithuanian 
territory disputed between Poland and the Soviets, leaving all the parties’ territorial rights 
expressly reserved.39  The league also appointed a Military Commission of five officers, 
presided over by French Colonel Pierre Chardigny, to supervise respect for convention on the 
site of the direct  negotiations. Another committee comprising the three council members 
Leon Bourgeois, Viscount Ishii, and Quinones de Leon was appointed to keep in close 
contact with the Military Commission and the Polish and Lithuanian governments.40 
 The deployment of international personnel in an impartial, nonthreatening role to help 
create or maintain calm between disputants was an innovation without precedent. In 1919, the 
Paris Peace Conference had established the Commission of Baltic Affairs to investigate the 
political and military situation in the Baltic,41 but its members had only managed to influence 
the decisions of their own government, which they were representing. By contrast, the 
league’s commissioners represented the League of Nations and were responsible not only  for 
implementing decisions made in Geneva but also for actively participating in the decision-
making process within the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
 When the Kalwarija negotiations failed, the Military  Commission proposed a new 
temporary demarcation line, which was accepted by the signatories to the Suwalki Agreement 
on October 7, 1920. Two days later, Polish General Lucien Zeligowski—pretending to act 
independently of Warsaw—entered the city of Vilna, established a military regime that 
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controlled the entire districts of Suwalki and Vilna, and claimed for them the right to 
determine their fate via plebiscite. 
 Zeligowski’s occupation set the League of Nations on a course of containment, a 
stage of conflict management that aims to deny victory  to the aggressor and prevent the 
conflict’s spread by  attempting to restore the status quo ante.42  The league undertook to 
organize and administer a plebiscite, on condition that Zeligowski’s troops withdrew. In this 
way it sought a territorial settlement that was at the same time a compromise between 
Poland’s expansionism and the principles of fairness, justice, and the self-determination of 
the contested territories. 
 Upon its arrival in the disputed territories in early October 1920, the Military 
Commission was of crucial assistance to the Secretariat in organizing the first international 
military contingent in history, charged with maintaining order during the plebiscite. Among 
European governments and the international public, the commission’s firsthand reports were 
key to dispelling fears of Soviet Russia’s possible involvement in the dispute. More 
importantly, they helped raise awareness in the Political Section that the dispute between 
Lithuania and Poland was more than a frontier problem that could be settled with a fair 
plebiscite. Major Keenan, the British military commissioner in Vilna, carefully  analyzed and 
reported on the ethnic, social, and economic roots of Polish-Lithuanian antagonism in the 
disputed territories. He concluded that a solution could not simply resolve the interstate 
tensions between Poland and Lithuania but must also defuse Polish and Lithuanian mutual 
intolerance and nationalizing policies, which were likely to increase in the disputed territories 
regardless of the plebiscite’s outcome. According to the league, this was no longer just a 
territorial dispute but also an ethnic conflict that would be solved only by granting equal 
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political, social, and cultural rights to Polish and Lithuanian minorities living in the disputed 
territories. 
 Given Poland’s refusal to withdraw Zeligowski’s troops and Lithuania’s opposition to 
the popular consultation, on March 3, 1921, the Council resolved to dismiss the plebiscite and 
‘invited the disputants to discuss a territorial and political settlement at a conference to be 
held at Brussels in April 1921, under the presidency of Paul Hymans. Keenan’s opinion, 
which the other commission members shared, was central to shaping the federalist  Hymans 
Plan.
 The first chapter ends with the plebiscite’s dismissal, which marked the beginning of 
conflict resolution, a stage aimed at  eliminating the source of conflict altogether through 
long-range political and economic strategies that alter or even transform the underlying 
dynamics of a conflict.43 As guarantor of international security, the league now regarded itself 
as responsible for more than simply preventing war between Poland and Lithuania. It also 
meant to address and end the underlying interethnic tensions in the disputed territories, taking 
their social and economic implications into account. 
 In this respect, as chapter 2 shows, Geneva’s understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian 
dispute differed from that of the Quai d’Orsay and Foreign Office. In 1920, Paris and London 
still clung to wartime views based on principles of balance of power and preservation of the 
territorial status quo. Lithuania was still considered part of the Russian and Polish question, 
and its absorption by one of its more powerful neighbors seemed only  a question of time. 
Thus, in this view, federation with Poland was the only  way to prevent Russian 
expansionism, German involvement in the region, and a Russian-Polish war. Lithuania’s 
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unwillingness to cede sovereignty was an impasse to be overcome by using “the proper 
phrasing,” as the French government remarked, to impose the inevitable on the Lithuanians. 
 In contrast, the league took Lithuanian self-determination seriously. Its experience of 
the plebiscite negotiation had led it to conclude that Lithuania’s willingness to enter into any 
political agreement with Poland hinged on substantial guarantees of sovereignty and self-
determination. Chapter 2 shows that Geneva’s commitment to this view impelled intensive 
diplomatic efforts to secure support for the league’s own plan in London and Paris, where 
Pilsudski and Sapieha were meantime working to bypass the league and obtain support for 
their project of federation. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the trajectory of the Hymans Plan—namely, the league’s own 
scheme to settle the dispute and Hymans’s strategy to negotiate a plan with the disputants at 
the Brussels conference in April and June 1921. The Hymans Plan envisioned a Lithuanian 
federal state consisting of two autonomous cantons of Kaunas and Vilna, organized much like 
Swiss cantons under a central government wielding the same powers as the federal 
government of Bern. Vilna would be the federal capital and Polish and Lithuanian the official 
languages, throughout the Lithuanian state. National minorities would be granted ample 
guarantees of education, religion, language, and the right of association. A Joint Council for 
Foreign Affairs, composed of three representatives appointed by each government, would 
decide matters of common interest by majority vote and coordinate foreign policy. The plan’s 
text, once approved by delegations from both countries, was subject to ratification by the 
national parliaments. Similarly, the draft envisioned the creation of an Economic Council 
tasked with drawing up and examining questions of economic interests. Finally, instead of 
federation between Poland and Lithuania, the Hymans Plan preferred to establish interstate 
cooperation through permanent conferences attended by representatives of the Polish and 
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Lithuanian General Staffs, who in peacetime would discuss a common plan of action and, in 
the event of war, a mobilization scheme for defense of the frontiers. 
 Hymans hoped that generous guarantees of Lithuania’s sovereignty and equality with 
Poland would facilitate cooperation and resolution of the Vilna dispute. However, the 
disputants saw the problem as going well beyond mere institution of formal equality. As 
revealed in this chapter’s analysis of the debate surrounding the Brussels negotiations of 
Vilna’s status, the two delegations were in fact contesting each other’s claims to statehood. 
For the Polish and Lithuanian delegates, the conflict over the city of Vilna stood for a deeper, 
more significant clash between the Lithuanian and Polish nation-building processes, which in 
turn reflected two different, conflicting imagined communities.44 The territory of Vilna was a 
bone of contention because both the Polish and the Lithuanian nation-building processes 
upheld it as a crucial symbolic and ideological element. 
  The goal of the Lithuanian delegation in Geneva, as at the Paris Peace Conference, 
was to muster support  for the creation of an independent Lithuanian state within ethnographic 
boundaries, and with Vilna as its historical capital. Simon Ashkenazy, the Polish delegate, 
was a fervent supporter of Pilsudski’s federalism, which aimed to restore the early modern 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by annexing Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian 
territories. But whereas the latter two served only  as buffers protecting Poland from Russia, 
inclusion of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania—with Vilna as its capital—was essential 
to creating a federation grounded in the historical legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.45  Thus, while Lithuania claimed Vilna on historical grounds, the Polish 
delegation instead claimed the right to self-determination for a territory that Poland 
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considered overwhelmingly Polish. Different federative solutions had been discussed in 
Lithuania before the First World War, but by 1914 they were dismissed as it  became 
increasingly  clear that the newly created Polish-Lithuanian federation would take the form of 
a Polish federal state with an autonomous Lithuanian province, rather than a confederation 
between equal states.46  The First World War and the German occupation exacerbated the 
conflict, nurturing polarization and intensifying the clash between Polish and Lithuanian 
nationalisms at the expense of any attempt to reconcile multinational coexistence.47  The 
Brussels conference therefore represented the two nations’ last significant chance to discuss 
federalism and to achieve, with the league’s help, what they had been unable to do alone. 
 The challenges Hymans faced in Brussels also explain, by contrast, why the league 
had found it relatively easy to reconcile the principle of self-determination with national and 
international security  in the dispute over the Aaland Islands. The latter lacked ideological 
significance comparable to what Vilna meant to Lithuanian politicians and Polish federalists; 
moreover, Finland and Sweden were not contesting each other’s existence.48
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  The debate at Brussels, which pitted historical rights against national self-
determination as the legitimizing principle for establishing territorial sovereignty and claims 
to statehood, well illustrates the implications of using the democratic but extremely  vague 
principle of self-determination to settle disputes. It  also invites exploration of how the league 
tackled the problems it entailed. This debate did not captivate the league and the disputants 
alone. It caught the interest of the international press and European statesmen who joined in, 
reflecting also the fascinating image of an age in search of new answers to problems 
previously  settled by secret treaties between state governments. No longer were things so 
simple, and if historical rights did not constitute a legitimate base for territorial claims—as 
Prime Minister Lloyd George remarked in an address to the House of Commons in 1921—
then what did, and who was to decide? Did national self-determination, for instance, mean 
national sovereign determination, which entitled each nationality to possession of its own 
sovereign state; or did it mean autonomy within the given state structure?49 
Here it is worth noting that scholarly works generally use the terms self-determination 
and self-government as synonyms.50 In other words, the important distinction between them 
has fallen away, though it was very  clear in the minds of the peacemakers and League of 
Nations officials, for whom the principle of self-determination applied only to nations 
claiming statehood. But the principle the Allies had publicized during the war—that “each 
people had the right to determine its own fate”—referred to self-government, namely, 
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acknowledgment that a population of a contested territory  had a right to declare which state it 
wanted to belong to.51 
  This study consistently  retains this distinction between self-determination and self-
government, which is relevant insofar as it  accounts for the league’s different  outlook on the 
claim, raised by Poland, that any  decision on the Vilna territory should be based on the 
wishes of the population concerned. In the league’s eyes, this was clearly a question of 
respecting the principle of self-government of the Vilna population, which at most would be 
allowed to decide which to join: Poland or Lithuania. Yet this study does not take for granted 
what Poland and Lithuania meant in 1920–1922. Without de jure recognition, Lithuania’s fate 
and borders were far from settled, and its nation-building process far from over. The same 
could be said of Poland, considering that Head of State Pilsudski and Foreign Minister 
Sapieha were fervent federalists whose vision of Poland differed completely  from that held 
by the rest of country and the National Democrat–dominated parliament. 
Evaluated against this background, the Vilna nationalities that opined on the dispute 
in petitions to the League of Nations were obviously asking for more than the right to decide 
for either Poland or Lithuania.52 Indeed, each group’s petition clearly  depicted the Poland and 
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Lithuania it  hoped to create, which typically  bore little or no resemblance to the then existing 
states. From these groups’ standpoint, the argument was therefore a matter of claiming self-
determination. The challenge for the league, then, was to decide who was to say  a people was 
a nation.53  Moreover, who would establish what constituted a legitimate claim to self-
determination, and on what grounds? 
The league neither shied away from these questions nor neglected the presence of 
national groups other than Lithuanians and Poles. Chapter 4 argues for evaluating the 
Hymans Plan as the league’s attempt to reconcile multinational diversity within a national 
state, an angle that in many  respects sheds new light on the significance of the league’s roles 
as international protector of minorities and guarantor of a new form of security. 
 Some commentators have concluded that political expediency often informed the 
league’s approach to minorities’ petitions.54  Others have stressed that  great power interests 
and security  took precedence over democratic principles of self-determination and 
humanitarian concerns.55 Although minority questions were undeniably  evaluated through the 
prism of security, these views do not do full justice to the League of Nations. Director of the 
Minorities Section Eric Colban defined minorities as the most important factor in potentially 
unstable frontier disputes. Yet he also pointed out that  the drawing of frontiers in 1919 had 
violated entire national communities’ rights to self-determination and self-government, 
forcing them to live in states they  had not chosen to belong to. Hence, the minority treaties 
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imposed on newly constituted states were intended not only to guarantee security but also to 
correct this injustice.56 
 The Hymans Plan and the Council’s amendments to the Finnish Autonomy Law of 
May 1920 reveal how the league tried to tackle, rather than avoid, the problem of reconciling 
security with the nationality principle. They represented two different ways to prevent the 
denationalization of national minorities and secure their protection and long-term national 
existence. For example, because the league did not dismiss Aalanders’ fears of losing their 
traditional cultural identity  under Finnish rule, the Council significantly strengthened the 
Autonomy Law by establishing Swedish instead of Finnish as the medium of instruction in 
Aaland primary and even technical schools, because “assimilation does not content us.”57
 It has been rightly pointed out  that the league’s procedures and strategies often proved 
very flexible.58  Concerning minorities of the Vilna region, the Hymans Plan reflected the 
same kind of consideration shown the Aalanders but took a different approach. Unlike in the 
Aaland Islands, the diverse ethnic composition of the Vilna region, where national identities 
were not yet fully  developed, raised the question of how to apply the principle of nationality 
to a population that, according to the military commissioners’ reports, had no definite 
national identity. Meanwhile, the Hymans Plan, based as it  was on the principle of respect  for 
ethnic diversity, suggested a settlement that granted Jewish, Belarusian Polish, and 
Lithuanian minorities more than international protection. To guarantee this, the Canton of 
Vilna would be organized on a basis similar to that laid out in the Swiss constitution, with 
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extensive cantonal autonomy in local executive and legislative institutions that  had the right 
to appoint canton officials. More significantly, by  granting the population of the Canton of 
Vilna proportional representation in a Central Diet, the Hymans Plan was also providing for 
political representation of Belarusian and Jewish minorities. 
 The plan therefore reflected the peacemakers’ belief that if, on the one hand, peace 
could exist only if national aspirations were met, then on the other hand it  was necessary to 
contain the nationalist claims that had caused the First World War. James Headlam-Morley, 
one of the architects of the minority protection system instituted in Paris, contended that the 
smaller nations of Europe had to be allowed free expression of their national sovereignty as a 
counterweight to the large, multinational empires of 1914. At the same time, the growth of 
very large units of government had to be avoided, and the league’s role was to guarantee the 
existence of small multinational states such as Belgium and Switzerland.59 
 One reason that the league’s diverse approaches to protecting multinationalism are 
greatly understudied and identified mainly with its minority treaties is that scholars insist that 
the peacemakers in Paris and the league’s officials considered minorities a threat to 
international order and therefore hoped they  would, in the long run, assimilate. This in turn 
explains why the generally established view is that the league was more concerned with the 
protection of minorities than with the development of their cultural identity.60 Recent studies 
have emphasized the importance of interwar Baltic experiments with cultural autonomy, 
comparing them with the league’s approach to the same problems. In 1899, the Austrian 
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Social Democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer offered a first formulation of cultural or non-
territorial autonomy, which the Baltic German Paul Schiemann later theorized on after the 
First World War.61 This political solution, which aimed to reconcile ethnic diversity  within a 
single democratic state framework by granting minorities extensive autonomy rights, 
represented an alternative means of allowing national minorities to express their cultural 
identity  when the principle of national self-determination could not apply.62 Thus understood, 
cultural autonomy has been largely  praised as an attempt to move beyond the league’s alleged 
atomist-centrist conception of nationhood, which upheld the unitary, culturally homogeneous 
nation-state as a benchmark.63  Moreover, some have argued that the league’s supervision 
system offered little practical defense against “nationalizing” practices of Central and Eastern 
European successor states.64 
 Similarly, cultural autonomy studies generally point out the league’s inability and 
unwillingness to appreciate and support cultural autonomy as a more democratic alternative 
form of minority protection. Carol Fink attributes the failure of the league minority’s 
protection system to Geneva’s lack of interest in outside improvement, among other reasons. 
She raises the question, in her opinion provocative but unanswerable, whether international 
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minority protection was a premature initiative in a world unprepared to embrace human rights 
and diminish state sovereignty, or simply a poorly conceived and executed idea.65 
 These conclusions are problematic in that they assume that national groups would 
have supported cultural autonomy and ultimately accepted living in the host  state willing to 
grant it. Perhaps this was true for Estonia, but it certainly  was not for, say, the Aalanders, who 
claimed to be joined to Sweden despite the Finnish government’s grant of autonomy. 
Similarly, in 1921 Kosovar Albanians appealed to the league, wishing to secede from Serbia 
and be joined to Albania.66 These few examples illustrate how not only states but minorities 
too could challenge the postwar settlement. This study therefore takes into account 
minorities’ attempts to manipulate the league’s system to advance their own political 
agendas. 
 Vilna-based Jewish and Belarusian political groups’ response to the Hymans Plan, 
described in chapter 4, is one more example that proves the peacemakers perfectly justified in 
expecting national groups to be content with nothing less than self-determination. In turn, and 
no less importantly, the fact that these groups were more interested in exploiting the league to 
advance their own claims to statehood than in supporting Lithuania’s offer to create a state 
where minorities enjoyed equality  through cultural autonomy also casts serious doubt on the 
assumption that cultural autonomy was an obvious, more democratic alternative that failed 
because it lacked the league’s support. On the contrary, a historical summary of Lithuanian-
minorities domestic relations shows that on the tortuous path that leads to the adoption of 
cultural autonomy, local minorities bear as much responsibility as the international 
community.
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 Lithuania was one of several postwar states that offered cultural autonomy. The role 
of minorities in the modern Lithuania, a major question with weighty  domestic and 
international implications, had been debated across the entire Lithuanian political spectrum 
since the emergence of the Lithuanian movement in the late 1880s. At the domestic level, 
Polish-Lithuanian antagonism and language conflict in the Catholic Church and schools 
dominated the debate. After the outbreak of the First  World War and the internationalization 
of the Vilna question in Paris, showing serious commitment to granting minorities extensive 
rights became instrumental in gaining their support for Lithuania’s claims over Vilna.67 The 
Lithuanian delegation maintained that whereas historical rights were crucial to establishing 
Lithuania’s rights to statehood, they were nevertheless not sufficient to establish legitimate 
sovereignty over the multiethnic region of Vilna, in which Lithuanians were only a minority. 
The latter therefore considered support from other Vilna nationalities the key  to gaining 
international backing of their territorial claims. Before the League of Nations, however, the 
Lithuanian delegation had championed cultural autonomy not only as a way to legitimize its 
claims over the multinational territory of Vilna, but also to prove itself worthy  of de jure 
recognition and admission to the league.  
 This study’s viewpoint therefore departs from the current evaluation of cultural 
autonomy, which emphasizes its domestic origins. Estonia, for example, regarded the new 
constitutional order as a means of staking a place in the “New Europe” that was expected to 
arise from the war. The commitment to cultural autonomy, which went beyond the league’s 
minimum requirement, was an attempt to show that far from being simply a testing ground 
for imported western models, Estonia was making its own indigenous contribution to the 
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reconstruction of Europe.68 Kari Alenius agrees that  this Baltic outlook on minorities was 
unquestionably a product of the Estonian domestic political situation and choices.69 The only 
existing monograph on Lithuanian cultural autonomy, Sarunas Liekis’s book A State within a 
State? Jewish National Autonomy in Lithuania 1918–1925, also emphasizes the domestic 
origins and importance of the cultural autonomy that Lithuanian politicians used to secure 
Jewish domestic and international support for Lithuanian claims to Vilna. As a consequence, 
Liekis holds, cultural autonomy remained mainly  a Jewish Lithuanian affair.70  Ezra 
Mendelsohn agrees with Liekis that in 1922, when it became clear that Vilna would remain 
under Polish control, Lithuania lost interest in the project. In Mendelsohn’s opinion this 
proves also that Jewish support was more important for Lithuanians in 1919–1920 than in 
1920–1924.71 The present study, however, argues that the significance of cultural autonomy 
in Lithuanian foreign politics was greater in 1920–1922, precisely in response to the League 
of Nations, which in turn also challenges the well-established opinion that newly constituted 
states consistently  opposed and resented the league’s minority  treaties as an infringement on 
their sovereignty.72 
 Chapter 4 evaluates the international dimension and significance of using cultural 
autonomy to respond to international discourse on minority rights and to the league’s role in 
protecting them. During negotiations over the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, cultural autonomy’s 
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significance in Lithuanian foreign politics grew in response to the novelty  of the league and 
its unique role as both international protector of minorities and administrator of sovereignty 
rights in the new Europe. To be sure, the politics of pressure and the practice of mobilizing 
and presenting claims via petitions and pamphlets predated the interwar period. In the 
Ottoman Empire, for instance, political and cultural associations and committees used public 
forums to impress the community of nations and prove to it that reformist demands were not 
only just but also legitimate, because the petitioners claimed to be rightful representatives of 
those in whose favor they spoke.73 Still, neither the importance of international norms nor the 
novelty of the league’s influence on states’ strategies to obtain international support for their 
agendas should be underestimated.74 The international community’s heavy influence on the 
debate over the treatment of ethnocultural minorities consisted not only in its diffusion of a 
set of ideals and models to which all states should aspire, but also in the codification of 
minimum standards below which no state should fall.75  The league conditioned new 
members’ admission on their meeting minimum standards of minority protection. This 
affected the way Lithuania shaped its claim to admission because it  was the claim’s context, 
more than its substance, that determined its legitimacy.76 After all, joining the community of 
states through the doctrine of international recognition was possible only when a state’s 
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increasing civilization brought it within the realm of law.77  After Napoleon’s defeat, the 
notion that world leadership  lay  with Europeans became fundamental to a new understanding 
of international order and to new techniques of an international rule that aimed to help 
preserve order among sovereign states. Its principles, as John Stuart Mill suggested, were 
explicitly stated as applying only to civilized states.78 
 The league’s attempt to reconcile minority protection, humanitarian help, and 
international security  is the main thread of chapter 5, which follows the aftermath of the 
Hymans Plan’s dismissal until Vilna’s assignment to Poland by the Conference of the 
Ambassadors in March 1923. The league was obviously unable to meet the Vilna groups’ 
often conflicting claims, yet it took very seriously  the humanitarian question and the threat 
that Polish violence against local populations posed to minorities’ security. This aroused still 
more concern in early September 1921, when it became clear that neither party  would agree 
to the Hymans Plan. Poland contested the outright ceding of Vilna to the Lithuanian federal 
state as a violation of its right to self-determination and refused to accept the plan. And on 
December 24, 1921, Kaunas informed the league that Lithuanian public opinion was forcing 
the government to reject the Hymans Plan, as well as the introduction of Polish as the official 
state language and the establishment of permanent conferences—all considered violations of 
Lithuanian sovereignty. Repudiation of the plan, therefore, reopened the question of how the 
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league could maintain peace in this corner of Europe. Once again, the Military Commission’s 
reports were vital to raising the Secretariat’s awareness that humanitarian and security 
measures were two sides of the same coin.  
 This also explains the league’s effort to persuade Lithuania to ratify  the Declaration 
on Minority Rights, which would have given the league the legal right to intervene in the 
region. On January  12, 1922, the Council acknowledged the mediation process was over and 
decided to withdraw the Military  Commission, which had worked in the disputed territories 
since October 4, 1920. The Conference of the Ambassadors ratified the status quo and on 
March 3, 1923, assigned Vilna to Poland.
 Several chapters also discuss the international press’s impact on the league’s 
decisions. The new postwar international order had to reflect the principle that political 
decisions and territorial changes were, at  least in theory, to be made without recourse to 
secret treaties, so the League of Nations was accountable to international public opinion. This 
study considers the international press’s influence on Geneva’s decision-making process and 
approach to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over the duration of the league’s mediation of the 
dispute. Here it  aims to account for how and to what extent the league valued international 
public opinion, not to exhaustively detail how the international press evaluated the league’s 
management of the dispute. Thus the analysis is based mainly on a selection of articles that 
its Political and Information Sections read and commented on. 
 With the advent of parliamentary democracy, domestic public opinion emerged as a 
powerful factor in the interwar conduct of foreign politics. For Viscount Cecil, like others 
who rejected the discredited alliance system and balance-of-power principle, the league was 
meant to create a public international arena that threw diplomacy open to public opinion. The 
league’s power resided in public opinion, and if this idea proved wrong, then the entire idea 
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was wrong and the state’s own citizenry, Cecil thought, would turn against it and force its 
government back onto the path cleared by the league.79 In a similar vein, Jan Christian Smuts, 
a major contributor to the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a then 
current member of the Imperial War Cabinet, argued that no superstate was proposed because 
states would have to be controlled by consent from below, not compulsion from above.80 
Before the Brussels conference opened in April 1921, the league’s Secretary-General Eric 
Drummond insisted on allowing the press into the negotiations because it could actively 
participate in settling the dispute by  exposing disputants’ decisions to the scrutiny and 
judgment of international public opinion. As Drummond himself acknowledged, this was 
certainly an innovation. The very idea of involving the press in the decision-making process 
and settlement of territorial disputes was entirely unprecedented and confronted the league 
with a dilemma: it could either use publicity to pressure the disputants, or ease the tension 
between them by preventing press interference. Open diplomacy entailed risks for the league 
itself—hence its officials’ constant attention to the response of the press. As this study shows, 
extensive discussions on preservation of the league’ s prestige did not keep the league from 
risking its own reputation by  proceeding to organize the international military contingent, 
even though this went against the British War Office’s and international public opinion, 
which emphasized the dangers of involvement in a conflict with Russia. Once again the 
military commissioners’ reports were key, for through them the league ascertained that  the 
“Bolshevik threat” was only a Lithuanian propaganda tool to prevent organization of the 
undesired plebiscite.
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 Since one of this study’s goals is to account for how each League of Nations body 
involved in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute worked, both alone and in collaboration with all the 
others, a cursory description of this very complex organization is warranted. Rather than 
thoroughly  describing the league’s many sections, the following information illuminates the 
specific few that are relevant to this work. 
 The main organs of the League of Nations were the General Assembly, the Council, 
and the Secretariat. The General Assembly (hereafter the Assembly), composed of 
representatives of all the member states, met once a year to decide the organization’s policy. 
The Council included four permanent members (Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) and four 
(later nine) others elected every three years by the Assembly. The Secretariat prepared the 
agenda and published reports on meetings. The Council’s main function was to settle 
international disputes. The numbers of permanent and nonpermanent members varied. 
Council meetings were held in ordinary session four times a year and in extraordinary 
sessions as needed. 
 As the annual conference of league member states, the Assembly voted on the budget, 
outlined work for the year to come, and reviewed what had been done the previous year. It 
could also be resorted to for the settlement of disputes. The Assembly regularly discussed 
matters over which the Council had the power of decision, but  the Council did not decide 
questions reserved to the Assembly’s competence, such as the admission of new members or 
management of league’s finances.81  Finally, the Secretariat, as the league’s civil service, 
worked under the secretary-general’s direction to help  the Assembly, the Council, and their 
committees and commissions prepare their work and implement their decisions. In the period 
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under study here, the secretary-general was Sir Eric Drummond, who served in this capacity 
from 1919 to 1933. 
 The work of the Secretariat was divided among several sections. As one of the 
original sections and the diplomatic service of the Secretariat, the Political Section began its 
work soon after the Treaty  of Versailles was ratified. Unlike other sections of the Secretariat, 
the proportion of diplomats on its staff was always high. Its task was to prepare, under the 
secretary-general’s direction, the political work of the Council, the Assembly, and committees 
of a political character. It  was mainly  entrusted with questions that affected disputes between 
states or touched on some special relation between a nonmember state and the league. It also 
handled questions affecting individual member states and, finally, the admission and 
withdrawal of states to and from the league. 
 From the outset, the Legal Section—one of the largest single services—fulfilled a 
double function: a general function of supplying legal aid and advice to the Assembly, the 
Council, their relevant committees, and the Secretariat; and a special function concerning the 
registration of every treaty  or international engagement entered into by any member of the 
league. The Minorities Section, for its part, was fully established in 1920, when the work of 
the Secretariat officially started. It was charged with handling two separate groups of 
questions: those relating to protection of minorities and population exchanges on the one 
hand, and to Danzig and the Territory of the Saar Basin, which were directly under the 
league’s administration, on the other. Further details on the complex machinery  of the 
league’s minority system are provided in the relevant chapters.82 
 Finally, some terminological remarks are necessary. The league always used the very 
general Polish-Lithuanian conflict or dispute to designate this border dispute (encompassing 
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various questions already  mentioned in this introduction), which turned into the task of 
organizing a plebiscite and ended with an attempt to negotiate a federalist  plan while 
protecting minorities. Whenever these differences are irrelevant, the league’s use of the term 
Polish-Lithuanian dispute is retained here. Meanwhile, an important  distinction maintained 
consistently throughout the chapters concerns Vilna region83, city of Vilna, and disputed 
territories, which are never used as synonyms because of the different meanings and 
ideological significance that each party, the league included, assigned these territories. Talks 
at the Brussels conference, for example, centered mainly, though not exclusively, around the 
city of Vilna as the bone of ideological contention between the disputants, even though the 
whole region’s fate was at stake as the Hymans plan acknowledged.
The distinction between the city and the region of Vilna is also important, because whereas 
the Poles claimed that the city was mainly  Polish with only small minorities of Jews and 
Lithuanians, the Lithuanians tenaciously insisted that the Poles had no right to claim the city 
because in the rest of the Vilna region Poles were only a minority  surrounded by substantial 
Belarusian and Lithuanian elements.84
 Though it  is safe to say  the Polish presence was strong in the city and very  weak in 
the rest of the region, where Belarusian and Lithuanian elements predominated, the real 
ethnic composition of the Vilna region remains an unsolved mystery  to this day. Only  two 
censuses were taken before 1920. Historians agree that the first, conducted by Russian 
authorities in 1897, is unreliable because, among other reasons, nationality was determined 
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following linguistic and religious criteria.85  The German census held in 1916, which gives 
very different figures, is likewise hard to trust.86  According to the German authorities, the 
population of Vilna city was 50 percent Polish, 43.50 percent Jewish, 2.6 percent Lithuanian, 
1.46 percent Russian, and 1.36  percent Belarusian.87 At the Paris Peace Conference as well 
as in Geneva, the Lithuanians and Poles based their claims on their respective interpretations 
of these censuses’ highly questionable data. According to Sarah Wambaugh, at Paris the 
Lithuanians tellingly  did not provide any  statistics on the city of Vilna. Following the Russian 
census of 1897, they claimed to represent 23.6 percent of the region’s population while the 
Jews accounted for 13.7 percent and the Belarusians, 46.1 percent; the Poles, however, made 
up only  10 percent. They submitted the same figures at Brussels on May 14, 1921. The Poles 
firmly contested these numbers, claiming that in the Russian census Lithuanians made up 
only 17 percent of the Vilna region’s population, while in the city they claimed that the Poles 
accounted for 56 percent, the Jews 36 percent, and the Lithuanians only 2.5 percent.88  
 Finally, disputed territories is used whenever other distinctions, indicated in due 
course, are not relevant. This term applies at once to the Vilna region and city, to the neutral 
zones89 established by the League of Nations, and to the Grodno, Suwalki, and Lida districts 
where the dispute brought before the league in September 1920 had originated. It should not 
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surprise that the latter are rarely  mentioned, considering that  after Zeligowski’s coup, they 
lost most of their importance, becoming only bargaining chips at the Brussels conference.
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN DISPUTE AND THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS
 Between September 6, 1920, and March 3, 1921, the League of Nations tried to 
contain the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, first by establishing a temporary demarcation line and 
assigning a military  commission to provide consultative assistance at the Polish and 
Lithuanian direct negotiations at Kalwarija, and then by resorting to negotiation and 
organization of a plebiscite after Zeligowski’s military occupation of Vilna in early October 
1920. 
 This chapter will further investigate the novelty  of the league’s approach to and 
management of the border dispute. Therefore its focus is the league’s strategy for overcoming 
the obstacles created by the disputants’ mutual intransigence, as well as the rationale and 
decision-making process that shaped that strategy. After all, until it took possession of its new 
and final headquarters in Geneva on November 1, 1920, the “league” was still mostly a 
virtual community of individuals provisionally based in London and confronted with the 
tremendous task of fulfilling the expectations of international public opinion by efficiently 
turning its covenant into reality. Hence, each decision to take action regarding the dispute 
implied also building the proper machinery to implement it. 
 Establishing the league’s authority as the new postwar agency created to maintain 
world peace and mediate international disputes was crucial to both its organization-building 
process and its approach to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. League officials followed press 
coverage of its work and indeed, could not ignore it; however, the league did not let 
international public opinion get in its way. As this chapter argues, the nature of the league’s 
authority was multidimensional; it implied more than simply saving face before the 
unforgiving judgment of international public opinion whenever the disputants acted in 
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defiance of the Council’s decisions. Establishing the international image of what in fact was 
mainly a British- and French-led organization was a pressing challenge, as the debate over 
organization of the military contingent for Vilna reveals. Hence, the great concern with 
prestige pertained largely  to establishing the league’s credentials in face of its obvious, 
discomfiting lack of Lithuanian and Polish loyalty and the Soviets’ interference in the 
dispute.
 
 On September 5, 1920, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Eustache Sapieha informed 
the League of Nations that the Lithuanian and Bolshevik governments had concluded an 
agreement authorizing the Red Army to dispose of Lithuanian territory for military operations 
against Poland and thus violating the principle of neutrality in the ongoing Russian-Polish 
war. Sapieha’s note also lamented that Lithuania had forced Polish troops out of the 
Augustowo and Seiny  districts, which had been “permanently granted to Poland by the 
Supreme Council on December 8, 1919” (emphasis added). Poland was ready to declare war 
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on Lithuania if, within the next few days, no agreement had been reached and Lithuanian 
troops had not completely evacuated Polish territory  and ceased to cooperate with the 
Bolsheviks.90  But whereas Sapieha emphasized the permanent nature of settlement, the 
Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers Concerning the Polish Provisional 
Eastern Frontiers91  of December 8, 1919, had expressly  but only  provisionally  reserved 
Poland’s rights to territories situated east of the demarcation line.92 
Figure 1: Map of Polish-Lithuanian Conflict in the Disputed Territories 1919-1920.  
Source: Lietuvos Istorijos Atlasas, Vilnius 2001, 41.
Firmly opposed to league interference in the dispute, Poland aimed instead to use the league 
to pressure Lithuania, which unlike Poland was not yet a member state of the league. For this 
reason, Sapieha’s note clearly indicated that his government did not expect the league to 
interfere in settlement of the frontiers and invited it only to uphold Poland’s rights and by  all 
means prevent the outbreak of war with Lithuania.93 To ensure that the league did not take the 
Polish request for intervention more seriously than desired, Sapieha also informally  warned 
the Under–Secretary-General of the League of Nations Dionisio Anzillotti that the ongoing 
Polish-Lithuanian direct negotiations at Kalwarija might yet succeed and thus make the 
league’s mediation superfluous.94 
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 The Lithuanians, for their part, were even less enthusiastic about the league’s 
involvement, which for them was only the lesser evil. They firmly  denied any collaboration 
with the Soviets and still hoped to persuade the British to host direct negotiations in London 
to resolve the quarrel with the Poles.95 Only after the British Foreign Office stated its wish 
that the matter be dealt with by the League of Nations, on September 12, did the Lithuanian 
government notify the Council that Augustinas Voldemaras had been appointed to represent 
Lithuania at the next session of the league’s Council.96
 Like the disputants, the league would gladly have been spared the trouble of 
involvement, but despite the disputants’ reluctance the Secretariat deemed it necessary  to act 
promptly because a diplomatic communication that appeared in the press on September 8, 
1920, conveyed so much about Poland’s policy that the league would look powerless or 
indifferent were the question not raised at the next Council session. Hence, after the Polish 
delegate confirmed that  Poland was still interested, both governments were invited to 
nominate representatives for the next Council session.97 
 Now that the league had decided to take action, the Council had to determine what 
was at stake. At the opening of the Ninth Session of the Council on September 17, 1920, Paul 
Hymans, former Foreign Minister of Belgium and rapporteur for the Polish-Lithuanian 
conflict, presented the question “as a territorial dispute in which no agreement exists defining 
the frontier between these two countries.”98  Drawing only on previous treaties and the 
diplomatic history of the dispute, he explained that in January  1920, the Allied military 
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missions had tried in vain to create a neutral zone along the so-called Curzon line established 
by the Allies on December 8, 1919. After Poland’s de facto recognition of Lithuania, the 
Bolsheviks had entered Vilna on July 15, 1920, and the Lithuanian army joined them to 
occupy  the city, cross the Curzon line, and take hold of the Augustowo and Suwalki districts. 
The Soviets had assigned these territories to Lithuania with the Treaty of Moscow on July 12, 
1920, although, Hymans remarked, the December 8 declaration on the Curzon line had 
expressly reserved Poland’s rights to territories east of the line of demarcation.99 
 Hymans’s presentation was based on a memorandum prepared by the Secretariat. 
Now the Council had to find out what exactly the parties expected from the league, for as the 
French delegate Leon Bourgeois remarked, “if the matter at stake is to delimit  the frontiers, 
then the league is not qualified to do so.”100 The Council also needed to learn more about the 
nature of the direct negotiations between the two countries at Kalwarija, also attended by 
representatives of the Allied Powers, as it was impossible for the league to subordinate itself 
to negotiations proceeding simultaneously elsewhere.101
 The two disputants had made very clear that the quarrel revolved around differing 
interpretations of the Curzon line’s significance and the Lithuanian-Soviet Treaty of Moscow, 
which the disputants obviously interpreted at their convenience to advance claims over the 
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disputed territories. The Polish delegate, Premier Ignacy Paderewski, explained that Poland 
wanted Lithuania to withdraw beyond the Curzon line, arguing that the Lithuanians’ claim 
was invalid because the Supreme Council had drawn this temporary border without 
informing the Lithuanian government.102 Moreover, Poland did not consider itself bound to 
the Lithuanian-Soviet Treaty of Moscow of July 12, 1920, and protested Lithuania’s violation 
of neutrality in the Polish-Russian war, which Voldemaras did not deny but rather justified by 
explaining that a clause of the Treaty of Moscow allowed the Soviet Army to use Lithuanian 
territory for military purposes.103 
 The Council overcame the impasse over conflicting interpretations of treaties and 
demarcation lines by  adopting a strategy  that  combined the “old diplomacy” tactic of holding 
private, informal conversations with the disputants while not in session with the opportunities 
offered by “open diplomacy.” Delegates were invited to submit written statements concerning 
the questions they wanted to bring before the Council, thus clarifying the positions they 
would take publicly, but they  were also invited to confer with Hymans on the same 
matters.104  This strategy proved successful, forcing Voldemaras to admit that by agreement 
with the Soviets, Lithuania’s territory had been divided into three zones to be evacuated by 
the agreed date. The first two had been evacuated in early September 1920, and the Soviet 
government had offered to complete evacuation of the still occupied third zone if Lithuania 
obtained the Polish withdrawal from the territory north of the Polish-Lithuanian border fixed 
by the treaty of July 1, 1920.105 Bourgeois seized upon this piece of information to impose a 
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cessation of all hostilities and maintain peace during Council’s deliberations as a conditio 
sine qua non of the league’s assent to mediate the dispute. This implied that Poland accepted 
the deal as long as Lithuania did too, and Voldemaras reassured Paderewski that “if the Soviet 
authorities did not keep their promises, Lithuania is, if necessary, prepared to compel them to 
do so by force.”106 
 This declaration, though illusory on the battlefield, had interesting repercussions at 
the negotiating table. It removed the impasse created by both parties’ intransigence, leaving 
Paderewski with no option but “to communicate with his government before continuing the 
conversation.” But it also created great anxiety for Voldemaras, once Hymans suggested that, 
given its importance, the statement should be included in the final document endorsing 
Lithuanian demands before the Council, meaning it  would be not only  formal but also public. 
Unsurprisingly, Voldemaras preferred that the record of it remain in the unpublished minutes 
of the Council meeting and consented to its inclusion it  in a formal document only if it were 
framed to clearly indicate that it was not directed against any neighbor of Lithuania in 
particular, and that  the latter was determined to defend its neutrality, if necessary  by force of 
arms, against any adversary attempting to violate it.107 
Thus the Council used the potential of embarrassment via open diplomacy to get 
Lithuania to agree to withdraw from territories west of the Curzon line and accept the line as 
a provisional frontier. Poland had reciprocally  consented to respect the neutrality of 
Lithuanian territory east of the line, provided that the Soviets also respected it. Both 
governments undertook to prevent all acts of hostilities between their troops, and Paderewski 
was entirely satisfied with a solution that “did not prejudice the frontier question and left 
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room for further discussion.”108  Before accepting it, Voldemaras demanded additional 
guarantees against  further violence and hinted that a private conversation with Paderewski 
might have settled the dispute. As he was reminded, however, under Article 17 of the 
covenant Lithuania had assumed the obligations of a league member and could not withdraw 
now, so a private arrangement with the Polish government was impossible.109
On September 20 the Council resolved that it was not the league’s duty  to settle the 
border dispute or any other questions at issue between Poland and Lithuania, noting that both 
parties had provisionally accepted the demarcation line of December 8, 1919, to prevent 
further clashes between their armies while the two governments were negotiating at 
Kalwarija.110 The Council offered to assist both parties, should they accept its resolutions, by 
appointing a commission to ensure strict observation of these obligations on the ground, 
nominating three of its members—the Commission of Three—to assist the Council while 
maintaining constant contact with the two governments.111 
Voldemaras warmly greeted the reading of this resolution at the final, and therefore 
public, Council session. Whereas war between Poland and Lithuania had seemed inevitable 
when the dispute was brought before the league, now he firmly  hoped that further hostilities 
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could be avoided and confirmed Lithuania’s commitment to settling the dispute.112  He 
acknowledged that “the merit of the success rests with Bourgeois’ rarely  found impartiality, 
which is necessary in any mediation and disposed Lithuania to take up a conciliatory attitude, 
thus giving the opportunity  to learn that it  is not enough that the aim of a nation should be 
founded on justice, but that it must need also be in harmony with the higher ends of 
humanity, which is the idea at the base of international solidarity.”113 As for Paderewski, he 
associated himself with the words of his colleague, “no longer his adversary,” stressing that it 
was Poland’s duty to set  a good example and avoid war with Lithuania, Poland’s small sister 
nation.114  The president of the Council remarked that these words, sealed by  a handshake 
accompanied by loud applause, would convince public opinion of the League of Nations’ 
growing moral authority.115  
  Unfortunately, events in the following days proved that peace was but an illusion. 
Even the Lithuanians’ acceptance of the Council’s resolution of September 20, 1920, on the 
same day could hardly  be considered a victory of the league, as their decision was based on 
fear of the steady advance deeper into Lithuanian territory  by the Polish army, which had 
reached the cities of Kalwarija and Orany east of the Curzon line.116 The Lithuanians were 
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caught in a double bind, needing the Polish army to protect them against  Soviet troops yet 
also relying on the league’s assistance to keep Poland’s military support from becoming a 
permanent territorial occupation and to prevent further clashes between the Lithuanian and 
Polish armies.117 
Consequently, the Lithuanian delegates abroad made ambiguous, self-contradictory 
declarations to the league. Their note of September 20 clearly indicated that the league was to 
help  them find only  a provisional settlement of the dispute, which betrayed their reluctance to 
commit to the league in view of their stubborn hope of settling the dispute in London with 
British help.118 But at the same time, Alfred Tyszkiewicz, the Lithuanian delegate in London, 
panicked and informed the league that war between Poland and Lithuania was imminent. 
Tyszkiewicz did not conceal his preoccupation with Poland’s aim to occupy Vilna before 
further discussions took place between the two governments.119  He hoped that, with the 
Military Commission’s assistance, the league could prevent a new conflict prompted by what 
“can be considered a declaration of war and stop Poland’s imperialist and annexationist 
policy toward Lithuania.”120  Hence, on behalf of his government on September 27, he 
submitted a request to immediately  convoke the Council under paragraphs 11 and 17 of the 
covenant to consider the situation created by Poland’s invasion of Lithuania.121 
Tyszkiewicz’s fears were aroused by the tone of the Polish reply to the Lithuanian 
government’s proposal to submit the whole matter to the League of Nations after, and 
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because of, the failure of the negotiations in Kalwarija. Warsaw had protested that Lithuania’s 
collaboration with the Soviets in defiance of the Polish ultimatum, the league’s 
recommendation, and Polish terms and conditions dictated in Kalwarija, gave Poland the 
right to any military measures it deemed necessary to protect its safety.122 The Poles clarified, 
in a note published in the newspaper L’Éclair, that any violation on their part of the 
demarcation line set by the Council was intended to last only until the Commission of the 
League of Nations began functioning.123 
Although Poland clearly  had not renounced its plans to advance further into 
Lithuanian territory, the league considered the real problem behind the whole issue to be the 
state of the Polish-Russian war, not the Polish violation of the demarcation line. Therefore the 
Political Section—after overcoming its initial disappointment at the Council’s delay in 
informing them about this note, which it had first read in the press124—decided not to worry 
about Poland’s temporary infringement of neutrality  because the note in L’Eclair specified 
that it  would not prejudice the possibility  of prospective negotiations and moreover the Poles 
were willing to accept the help of the league’s military  commissioners.125  This was good 
news, because it made Poland’s attitude toward the league look somewhat different from 
49
122 LNA, Council Documents, vol. 3068, Sapieha to Petras Klimas, Warsaw, September 21, 1920. 
123  LNA, Commentaires de la Presse, “Le Conflit  Polono-Lithuanienne,” L’Éclair, September 24, 
1920. The original text of the letter also remarked, “and will not prejudice the final settlement  of the 
dispute that  shall be solved through direct negotiations.” LNA, Council Documents, vol. 3068, 
Paderewski to Bourgeois, Paris, September 24, 1920.
124 Disappointed at having learned about the note from the press rather than first  receiving it  from the 
Council—a reflection of the lack of permanent headquarters and administrative offices—Mantoux 
remarked that “communication should be improved in the future.” LNA, 11/ S 4, Paul Mantoux to 
Hebert Fisher, September 25, 1920.
125  LNA, Commentaires de la Presse, “Le Conflit  Polono-Lithuanienne,” L’Éclair, September 24, 
1920. The original text of the letter also remarked, “and will not prejudice the final settlement  of the 
dispute that  shall be solved through direct negotiations.” LNA, Council Documents, vol. 3068, 
Paderewski to Bourgeois, Paris, September 24, 1920.
what the Secretariat had feared after hearing from Tyszkiewicz.126 For this reason, Director of 
the Political Section Paul Mantoux reassured the Lithuanian delegate that the league was 
ready  “to support Lithuania in so far as justice demands it.” In Mantoux’s opinion the 
Lithuanians had two solid reasons to be more concerned with the evacuation of the Soviet 
troops than with the presence of the Polish army on Lithuanian territory: first, the Poles had 
promised that their presence was only  temporary; and second, the Soviets’ failure to withdraw 
would become a pretext for further Polish military actions on Lithuanian territory.127 
The military  commissioners’ presence in the disputed territories guaranteed firsthand 
reports on the general situation and left the Secretariat free to deal with issues relevant to the 
league’s ongoing involvement in the dispute, which it considered more important. One was 
the minor but nevertheless complicated question of the legal status of Lithuania, which was 
not a member of the league. The Legal Section clarified that even if a nonmember state had, 
under Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, been invited to accept the 
obligations of membership, as Lithuania had been, that state still could not call a Council 
meeting under Article 11. Even if Article 17 made applicable Article 15, which gave any 
party  to a dispute the right to petition for a Council meeting by  giving notice to the secretary-
general, this right applied only in situations arising after a dispute was brought before the 
Council. Moreover, it did not grant nonmembers the right to bring disputes before the 
Council themselves.128  This left  Secretary-General Eric Drummond with the sole option of 
reassuring Tyszkiewicz “about the progress made so far by the Council in preparing the 
arrival of the Military Commission, already on their way” and of confirming that the league, 
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while waiting for the Commission of Three to decide whether it was necessary to summon 
the Council, was following the situation with the greatest interest.129 
Before the decision whether to bring the dispute before the next Council session, 
Drummond was awaiting word from the Commission of Three about the disputants’ attitudes, 
particularly whether they were seriously committed to following the Council resolution of 
September 20.130 Poland’s and Lithuania’s lack of allegiance to the league constantly called 
into question the latter’s role and duties—a major concern for the Secretariat, which needed 
to take a stand against Polish behavior yet avoid any risk of embarrassment to the league 
itself.131 The work of the Three was also instrumental in preparing the ground for the Military 
Commission, whose task was to negotiate an agreement to end the recurrent Polish violations 
of the temporary demarcation lines that might force an immediate Lithuanian-Soviet 
alliance.132  Before engaging the military commissioners, it was necessary to establish 
whether the disputants would acknowledge and respect them. The answer was far from 
obvious. Admittedly, each party had repeatedly  expressed its wish for assistance from the 
league’s Military Commission during the direct negotiations that had failed in Kalwarija, 
which had in the meantime resumed in Suwalki on September 30. Still, the league needed to 
learn more about the nature of these talks to ascertain that they were not so incompatible with
—or worse, contrary to—the Council’s recommendation that they  saddled the commission 
with duties beyond its sphere of competence.133  Moreover, and problematically, the 
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delegations had expressed contrasting opinions and expectations about the commissioners’ 
role and duties. Although Bourgeois clarified that “the Commission has merely a role of 
keeping peace,” Voldemaras hoped for a more effective protection of Lithuanian neutrality, 
and of the Lithuanian delegates en route to Suwalki.134  Paderewski instead hinted at the 
possibility that during the Bolshevik retreat the Polish army might disregard the presence of 
the commission and violate Lithuanian neutrality in the name of “vital strategic 
considerations.”135 
The Commission of Three failed to convince Warsaw that it was in Poland’s interests 
to honor its obligation to allow enough time for Lithuania to withdraw from Suwalki,136 and 
the Polish government appeared unconcerned by Bourgeois’s threat to expose it “to severe 
criticism before public opinion.”137  Keeping the Polish army in place to contain the 
Bolshevik advance seemed a higher priority at the moment.138  Yet regardless of the 
disputants’ ambivalent attitude and the failure of informal, open diplomacy, Drummond 
ultimately  decided to summon the Council, having heard from the Lithuanians that the 
Soviets had confirmed that Moscow would respect Lithuanian neutrality if the Poles did the 
same.139 
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In the meantime the military  commissioners managed to make a difference in 
Suwalki, where talks had proceeded very  slowly before their arrival. The Lithuanians were 
unwilling to negotiate and felt pressured by the steady Polish advance into Lithuanian 
territory.140 Once the commission finally  arrived on October 4, it helped both parties agree to 
temporary armistice.141 The Suwalki Agreement established a provisional demarcation line 
that coincided with the Curzon line from the German frontier to the Grodno district and then 
turned east, continuing along the Lida–Vilna railroad as far as Bastuny. This provisional 
settlement was to remain in force until the whole dispute was settled.142  Fulfilling the 
expectations of the Political Section, the Military Commission had managed to accommodate 
Paderewski’s and Voldemaras’s very different views about the area that should be neutralized. 
It had seconded Poland’s request that Grodno and Lida be excluded from the neutral zone and 
given outright to Poland, because “the Bolsheviks granted it to Lithuania only  on paper.”143 
As for Lithuania, although the Suwalki Agreement had denied Voldemaras’s request that the 
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neutral area include all the territory  north of the demarcation line established by the Treaty  of 
Moscow and east of the Curzon line, it  nevertheless implicitly  left the Vilna region on the 
Lithuanian side. 
Unfortunately, neither side was content with this settlement or willing to respect  it. 
The Polish delegation claimed the right to occupy all important points on the main roads from 
Russia to Lithuania “in order to secure the Polish left  flank,” but Tyszkiewicz complained 
that this indefinite statement and unjustified military operations were only creating additional 
unrest and offering the Bolsheviks a valuable pretext to move in from the north.144 And with 
the signing of the Polish-Russian armistice on October 5, the Lithuanians contended, the 
occupation of Orany and the Polish army’s advance toward Vilna were no longer justified by 
strategic necessity.145 Voldemaras therefore appealed to the league “not only on juridical, but 
further and above all, on purely humanitarian grounds, because this would be the sixth 
occupation and it  would cause infinite hardship to the population!” if the Poles entered 
Vilna.146 Their presence, his note continued, would expose a city  already devastated by the 
last Bolshevik withdrawal to terrible famine, not to mention the many more “equally  terrible 
evils” and the likely violence perpetrated against the Jewish population. Experience had 
shown that after the city’s liberation from the Bolsheviks, Lithuania, not Poland, was 
positioned to handle rationing in Vilna, as the countryside around the city  was devastated and 
deprived of essential means of transport.147 
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1.1 The Occupation of Vilna and the Plebiscite Plan
 On the afternoon of October 9, a day before the Suwalki Agreement was to formally  take 
effect, Polish General Lucien Zeligowski, commanding a Polish army division of 20,000 men 
known as the Lithuanian- Belarusian Division, advanced and occupied the district and city  of 
Vilna, where Zeligowski set up  the Government of Central Lithuania, a name chosen in hopes 
of a future federation of this territory  with Lithuania Propria or Kaunas-Lithuania, and 
Poland.148 
 For the League of Nations, Zeligowski’s coup meant greater involvement in the dispute and 
a change in tack. Containing the conflict now entailed more than simply assisting the 
disputants as they tried to solve their problems. On the contrary, new decisions were needed 
to prevent  Polish expansionism and find a way to restore the status quo ante, as the 
occupation exposed the league to the harsh judgment of international public opinion. 
  Though Warsaw publicly disowned the Polish general’s rebellion, Zeligowski was 
acting on direct orders of Poland’s Chief of State Jozef Pilsudski. Like Paderewski and the 
Polish League of Nations delegate Ashkenazy, Pilsudski was a federalist. However, the 
federalist plan to revive the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth met with 
constant resistance from the Polish parliament, where the dominant National Democrats 
instead favored annexation of all ethnically Polish territories of the former commonwealth. 
Therefore, to relieve himself from any any official responsibility, Pilsudski staged 
Zeligowski’s rebellious act as a free expression of the Polish volunteers serving in his 
55
148  Sarah Wambaugh remarks that  the Poles contended that Zeligowski had merely crossed the zone 
where the armistice had not yet been concluded but had not  crossed the armistice line that  ended in 
Bastuny, farther west of Vilna. However, any change in the status quo was an infringement  of the 
agreement. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment  for 
International Peace, 1933), 2: 308. 
division, who were all natives of the Vilna and Minsk regions.149 On October 9 Zeligowski 
issued an official radiogram to inform Poland, the United States, the League of Nations, and 
international public opinion at  large that Polish units stationed in Vilna had rebelled against 
the regular army to return the territory of Vilna to its rightful owners.150 The Polish general 
even petitioned Warsaw to release any natives of the region serving in the Polish army  and 
allow them to join Zeligowski’s troops and return to their homeland if they  wished.151 He also 
announced that for the sake of a peaceful solution to the dispute between Kaunas-Lithuania 
and Central Lithuania, he would resort to a plebiscite to elect  constituent assemblies in 
Kaunas and Vilna.152  
Publicly, the Polish government declared that the Vilna rebels’ call for the right to 
self-determination had put Poland, which was “undeniably  disappointed in the action of the 
general,” in the position of having to render Zeligowski all the assistance necessary in the 
event of being attacked.153  At Geneva, Ashkenazy explained that Warsaw could hardly  act 
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otherwise. Zeligowski was indeed a rebel, but he nevertheless enjoyed the support of the 
whole Polish nation, and 90 percent of his forces were natives of the contested territories, 
backed by large numbers of volunteers from Poland.154  Finally, Ashkenazy also hinted that 
Lithuania’s claims over Vilna were absurd from an ethnographic point of view because 
“Lithuania meant two things: there was the Ethnographic Lithuania, containing about two 
millions of inhabitants clustered around the town of Kaunas, and the Historic Lithuania that 
included Belarusian territories and Vilna, whose population was fifty two percent Polish with 
Jewish, Belarusian and Lithuanian minorities”; moreover, the Poles had strong feelings for 
the city of Vilna because it was the town of the great patriot Kosciusko.155League of Nations 
officials, meanwhile, saw immediate recognition of Lithuania’s independence, with Vilna as 
its capital, as the only way to contain Polish expansionism, as the corridor to the east of 
Lithuania reaching up to the Dvina on the Latvian border could breed new wars.156 It  was 
urgent to accomplish this while the situation was still fluid: “give it time to consolidate, and 
new difficulties will arise.”157 Fluid or not, the situation was complicated. Obviously, Warsaw 
would take no military action against Zeligowski.158  For member states of the league, 
however, applying Article 16 against Poland—as Kaunas immediately demanded “in the hope 
that the League will not be deceived by the sinister comedy of the so called Polish irregular 
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troops, whose reliance on Warsaw for instruction is documented”—would have meant going 
to war with Poland.159 
As Drummond once again reassured Tyszkiewicz that his request would be routed to 
the Council and that the present situation was being evaluated in light of the report of the 
Military Commission already headed to Vilna, the Political Section opted for a cautious 
strategy.160 Paul Mantoux considered it inappropriate to approach the Polish government after 
Zeligowski’s coup because Warsaw had already repudiated his act. It  was instead necessary, 
Mantoux said, to insist  on official, public disavowal of the general’s action and to ensure the 
complete evacuation from Lithuania of the official Polish army, whose presence was no 
longer justified now that the Polish-Russian armistice had been concluded.161 If not by force, 
this could be achieved by resort  to economic and financial sanctions. Poland’s heavy 
dependence on financial and economic support from the Great Powers made it possible, with 
the help of the Military Commission, to isolate the general and his troops by severing all 
communications and cutting off supplies of food, money, munitions, and clothing so that 
“Zeligowski’s isolation will allow the Lithuanian government to deal with him, or it  can be 
helped to do so.”162 Yet this road was never taken. The Political Section discussed the option 
only briefly and dismissed it  therewith, never mentioning it even informally  to the Polish 
delegate. 
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Geneva instead decided to resort  to publicity  and diplomatic mediation. The British 
Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, Herbert Fisher, and Eric Drummond insisted on warning 
Warsaw that “unless the irregular troops withdrew, the matter will be seriously  discussed in 
the next Council session, and given large publicity in the press.”163  The French delegate at 
Geneva, Leon Bourgeois, notified the press that “the League considered the occupation of 
Vilna a violation of Poland’s undertakings toward the League of Nations and that it  was the 
latter’s duty  to adopt all the necessary measures to bring the occupation to an end. If Vilna 
were not evacuated within a brief delay, the Council would be obliged to meet urgently to 
examine a situation, which could only be regarded as very serious.”164 The Council did meet, 
and at the opening of the Tenth Session on October 26, it remarked on “Zeligowski’s act that 
constitutes a violation of agreements entered into with the League of Nations and we feel 
bound to renew here this protest against the employment of force, although we have duly 
noted that the Polish government had publicly declined any  responsibility and involvement 
with Zeligowski, who acted as a rebel.”165 
 A Council resolution of October 28 recommended that the inhabitants of disputed 
territories east of the line fixed by  the Supreme Council on December 8, 1919, “may freely 
express their wishes on the subject of their attachment either to Poland or to the State of 
Lithuania, the seat  of whose government is at present at Kaunas.”166 The presence of Polish 
and Lithuanian military  troops in the plebiscite area was the most obvious obstacle to the free 
expression of the population’s wishes. The Council also considered it  its duty to determine 
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the bounds of this territory, the method of registering the plebiscite, and its date, and put 
roads and railroads both to and through the disputed territory  under full control of the league. 
A fair plebiscite required also withdrawal or disarmament of any  troops, of any nationality, 
which meant disbanding Zeligowski’s army and ensuring that Poland dissociated itself from 
Zeligowski by refraining from provisioning him and ceasing hostilities against Kaunas.167 
The contending parties had ten days to accept these recommendations; in the meantime, the 
Military Commission would see to prevention of further hostilities.168 
The league’s decision to follow this course of action was more a product of its will to 
keep  the de facto situation created by Zeligowski from causing further clashes between 
Poland and Lithuania than a serious commitment to solve a territorial dispute by gauging the 
wishes of the population concerned. Voldemaras too was underwhelmed by the plebiscite 
plan: even though he believed his government would not object to this proposal, he urged the 
league to address the more urgent duty of stopping the hostilities and the Polish military 
advance before deciding the destiny of the contested territories.169 Meanwhile the Council, 
making hay out of the fact that both governments consented to allowing the wishes of the 
population to decide the fate of the contested territories, and offered to administer and 
supervise the consultation, hoping that this would settle the question.170 
In principle the league had no reason to uphold the idea of a plebiscite. Regardless of 
the prominence the principle of self-determination had acquired in modern political thought 
after and because of the First World War, the league shared the same wariness of applying it 
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that had led the peacemakers in Versailles to exclude it from the final text of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations.171  Whereas the French Revolution had begotten the idea of a state 
whose legitimacy was based on nationalism and popular sovereignty rather than old dynastic 
rights, the ethnic homogeneity of Western European states led them to identify  the nation 
with the state.172 Such a merging was impossible in Central and Eastern Europe, where the 
birth of new states after the First World War and the collapse of three empires raised difficult 
questions of whether the nation should be understood in civic or ethnic terms and what 
groups were entitled to claim the right to self-determination. Far from having only theoretical 
bearing, a proper assessment of these questions was considered key to preventing secession 
and territorial fragmentation, and their dramatic consequences for international stability  and 
peace.173 
Hence, the postwar international system distinguished between the right to self-
determination and the principle of self-government of peoples.174  On the one hand, the 
nation-state became the uncontested normative grounding of political independence, which 
asserted that  every nation has a right to independent political control over a given territory 
and its people.175  On the other hand, the Wilsonian principle of self-government, first 
mentioned on May 27, 1916, meant that national aspirations must be respected in the sense 
that peoples could now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Far from 
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granting them the right to self-determination or independence, this statement merely 
emphasized that peoples must not be forced to live under foreign domination against their 
will.176 Regardless, it never became a right or a universal principle. Wilson wanted it to be 
institutionalized through the League of Nations as guarantor of its implementation and 
protection,177 but the Allies nevertheless dashed his hopes. Still bound to the secret treaties 
concluded before the war, they were unwilling to tarnish the league’s covenant by including 
this principle, which would raise expectations that could not be met and thus become a source 
of great embarrassment.178  The principle was also not universal, as both peacemakers in 
Versailles and League of Nations officials understood it as a corrective measure applicable 
only to nations or populations whose destiny had actually  been disturbed and had to be 
determined one way or another. No one seriously suggested that there should be a worldwide 
rupture of allegiances followed by plebiscites to settle new units of government. Thus the 
principle remained a political179 formula applied only where international stability and peace 
were at stake.180 
Even if the league’s original outlook on and approach to the plebiscite were 
indeterminate, its resolution of October 28 nevertheless departed from the views of both the 
British Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay. In May 1920 France had recognized Lithuania’s 
de facto independence and encouraged Warsaw to show moderation and fairness by 
respecting Lithuania’s frontier and its capital Vilna.181 Although disappointed by Zeligowski’s 
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act, Paris had reconsidered its stance in autumn of 1920 out of fear that the country  might  fall 
under Bolshevik or German influence. On November 6, 1920, in a confidential note to Hector 
de Panafieu, its representative in Geneva, the Quai d’Orsay  suggested that perhaps the best 
solution lay in the “creation of ties” (yet to be determined) between Poland and Lithuania and 
would respect Lithuania’s autonomy.182 
The Foreign Office, for its part, had initially  planned to demand that Pilsudski 
disavow Zeligowki’s action, but “we didn’t want to court a rebuff and therefore have decided 
to leave the matter in the hands of the League of Nations.”183 In any case, Lord Curzon saw 
the Vilna dispute, important  as it might seem, as but part of a wider problem; merely 
determining the status of Vilna ethnographically might produce temporary  and local 
tranquility but would leave the root of the matter untouched.184  The ultimate ownership  of 
Vilna had to be considered and evaluated in light of the more fundamental problem of the 
future status of the Polish-Lithuanian relationship. Lithuania had clearly  proven unable to 
permanently stand by itself, so its only alternatives were absorption into a larger and 
reconstituted Russia or some kind of “organic union” with Poland.185  The latter option 
seemed preferable considering the ethnographic of status of Vilna, which itself had a non-
Lithuanian majority that would have made its incorporation into Russia questionable. On the 
other hand, if Lithuania entered into some form of partnership  with Poland, its claim to Vilna 
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as its historical capital merited consideration, and the league would have the task of securing 
the necessary compromise between conflicting extreme demands on either side.186
Once again, the league’s procedures and strategies proved very  flexible.187  The 
controversy  between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands in 1920, mediated by the 
league just before the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, clearly  illustrates the league’s pragmatic, 
flexible approach.188  After the Bolshevik revolution, Finland proclaimed its independence 
from Russia, and the Aaland Islands, whose inhabitants were almost entirely Swedish, 
claimed the right to secede from Finland and be reunited with Sweden.189 The Commission of 
Jurists, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to investigate the applicability of 
the principle of self-determination, observed that in the absence of express provisions in 
international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory  was essentially an attribute of 
the sovereignty  of every state, because positive international law did not recognize the right 
of national groups as such to separate themselves from the state they were part of simply by 
expressing a wish, any more than it  recognized other states’ right to claim such separation.190 
Nonetheless, regarding the rights of peoples to determine their political fate, the Commission 
of Jurists acknowledged that in some circumstances, age-old traditions or a common 
language and civilization may  become a basis of new aspirations surfacing among certain 
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sections of the nation and producing effects that must be taken into account in the interests of 
the internal and external peace of nations.191 
In Vilna the league adopted a similarly flexible approach, alternating between 
containing the burdens involved in the organization of the plebiscite and respecting the firm 
commitment to the conditions of fairness the Council had established in response to the 
endless difficulties created by  Polish unwillingness to withdraw from Vilna and Lithuanian 
reluctance to accept the plebiscite. The league’s technical approach to the organization of the 
plebiscite did not depart from past practice. On the contrary, the consultation had to take 
account of previous plebiscites, held in the nineteenth century and in 1914, without 
disregarding the clauses of the peace treaties concluded after the war. The commission in 
charge of plebiscite study and preparation needed to work “on practical rather than historical 
and academic information on the current situation of the contested territories, where no 
official census of the population was available and the majority of inhabitants were largely 
illiterate.”192 
Similarly, the Political Section was determined to make the consultation as rapid and 
smooth as possible. The Council resolution of October 28 deliberately  adopted the term 
“popular consultation” as opposed to “plebiscite,” which usually  indicates a secret vote, 
because experience had shown that the latter procedure, while seemingly fairer, was also 
more likely to be manipulated and the final results thus falsified.193  Without denying the 
advantage of a rapid consultation, President of the Military Commission Pierre Chardigny 
and Secretary-General Eric Drummond believed that the voting should be by direct and secret 
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ballot.194  The Political Section preferred instead a rapid consultation largely based on the 
opinion of plebiscite commissioners appointed by the league to fulfill the task. This seemed 
more practical, as it would spare the league from having to set up to administer the territory 
and offered greater guarantees against any interference or falsification of votes—“a huge 
relief, considering the inadequacy of our means and the negative experience of previous 
plebiscite commissions.”195 
 The idea of a secret  ballot was ultimately dropped because, among other reasons, it  
had previously proven a cause of great delay that either party, in the current Vilna case, could 
exploit for inappropriate propaganda at the expense of the local population. If this was true 
for the countryside, it was even more necessary in the city  of Vilna, where the plebiscite’s 
organization had to be based on careful scrutiny of local conditions that only civil 
commissioners with previous experience of this kind could carry out.196  The Military 
Commission insisted on the importance of distinguishing between countryside and cities and 
accounting for their economic importance as well as their geographical and demographic 
relevance. The commissioners therefore suggested reorganizing the countryside into a dozen 
districts, each supervised by a sub-commission of three members, including a Lithuanian and 
a Polish representative approved by the commission, who had the right to make their own 
observations and to register the results as a whole.197  The commission thus welcomed the 
Polish suggestion to charge numerous commissioners, assisted by a Polish and a Lithuanian 
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delegate, with summoning popular meetings in large and small towns and in villages, where 
people could spontaneously  and immediately vote in favor of either country. This strategy 
seemed to offer the best guarantees against difficulties, abuses, and “displays of racial 
antagonism.”198  Fairness also meant taking special measures to protect the votes of the 
illiterate in the cities. With this in mind, the Military Commission undertook to prevent unfair 
campaigning and dangerous agitation by placing main roads and railroads under its full 
control and enforcing the complete evacuation of any troops from the plebiscite area 
immediately before and during the consultation.199 
 The most intractable obstacle to organizing the plebiscite, however, remained the 
Polish and Lithuanian unwillingness to cooperate. Poland obviously  wanted a plebiscite free 
of the league’s interference; thus, though it had formally consented to the plebiscite to be held 
on November 7, it resorted to multifarious pretexts to justify its foot-dragging in withdrawing 
from Vilna. Lithuanian violence perpetrated against the Polish population in Vilna justified 
the presence of Polish troops, which at  best could be transformed into local militias.200 On the 
other hand, progressive demobilization of Zeligowski’s army before the plebiscite remained 
an option, especially if the Allied contingent arrived and occupied Vilna.201  In either case, 
Warsaw claimed that as natives of the disputed territory, Zeligowski’s soldiers had the right to 
take part in the popular expression of opinion.202 
67
198  LNA, Councils Documents, vol. 3069, Ashkenazy and Paderewski to Leon Bourgeois, November 
7, 1920, in Memorandum of the Secretary General, November 12, 1920, pp. 2–3. 
199  LNA, 11/ S 4, Note sur l’Organisation d’une Consultation Populaire dans la Région des Vilna, 
Paris, November 3, 1920. 
200  LNA, 27/ R 1706, Minutes of the Council, Ninth Meeting of the Tenth Session of the Council, 
Brussels, October 26, 1920, p. 47 and LNA, Council Documents, vol. 3069, Ashkenazy and 
Paderewski to Leon Bourgeois, November 7, 1920, in Memorandum of the Secretary General, 
November 12, 1920, pp. 2–3.
201 LNA, 11/ S 4, Telegram from Chardigny to League of Nations, Warsaw, November 10, 1920.
202  LNA, Collection Des Documents Relatifs au Differend Entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, vol. 475, 
Ashkenazy to President of the League, Warsaw, November 26, 1920.
 The Lithuanians too substantially complicated the negotiations with their 
unwillingness to fully  commit to the league, torn as they were between the hope that the latter 
would defend them against Polish expansionism and the stubborn conviction that under 
British mediation they had better chances of achieving their goals. Tyszkiewicz, who was far 
from enthusiastic about the plebiscite plan, insisted his government had accepted the league’s 
mediation only  because it  hoped to win the latter’s support before the Supreme Council in its 
quest for the de jure recognition that Kaunas considered key to defeating Poland’s 
annexationist plans and that also might break the deadlock in the current dispute.203 
Bourgeois saw the Lithuanian fears as irrelevant, “because by  undertaking the mediation of 
the dispute, the Council had accepted Lithuania on an equal footing with Poland, which will 
represent a guarantee of equal and impartial treatment of both countries, regardless of their 
juridical status.”204 
 The Lithuanians, however—confronted with Polish regular troops’ steady march on 
Kaunas “with the clear purpose of occupying the city and crushing Lithuanian 
independence”—were more interested in military  guarantees against Poland than in 
negotiating with it on an equal footing.205  According to the Lithuanian government, 
Lithuanian and Polish troops had clashed 120 km from Kaunas in Valkininkai, where Polish 
troops had looted the town and arrested and deported two local priests in open violation of 
the demarcation line fixed by the league’s  Military Commission and accepted by  the Poles in 
Suwalki. With the firm intention of dispelling Polish claims, Kaunas reported that two-thirds 
of Zeligowski’s troops arrested by the Lithuanian authorities on the Vilna-Kaunas front were 
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natives of Congress Poland and one was Galician, so these clearly were not  locals, and that 
moreover, Lithuanians from the Memel territory were voluntarily  enlisting in the Lithuanian 
army in significant numbers.206  The British Military  Commissioner Major A. M. Keenan 
confirmed that considerable ongoing additions to Zeligowski’s army had brought his forces 
up to 40,000 men. Equipped with airplanes and armored trains, they  were often hard to 
distinguish from the Polish regular troops stationed in the south of the disputed territories. 
Lithuanians were still holding their ground, but Zeligowski was considered strong enough to 
capture Kaunas, and even though Commissioner Keenan had no direct evidence as to whether 
such a move would be made, several reports indicated that this operation was being 
contemplated.207 
 In early November Warsaw had ordered Zeligowski to desist from the offensive 
against Kaunas, but this news failed to change the Lithuanians’ attitude toward the 
plebiscite.208 Kaunas had, via its chargé d’affairs in London, only  informally confirmed that 
in principle it  was willing to accept the plebiscite but needed clarifications regarding the 
method of the consultation. Voldemaras was in the meantime issuing ambiguous declarations; 
finally, he confirmed the acceptance of the plebiscite with reservations that his government 
would soon relate to the league.209 The league evaluated these replies, and upon Chardigny’s 
suggestion, the Political Section decided that  Poland might leave a small number of Polish 
regular forces on the ground until final ratification of the Soviet-Polish peace talks, as a 
precaution against a renewed hostilities between Poland and Soviet Russia.210 If Zeligowski’s 
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militias consisted of locals with the right  to vote, then they could be disarmed during the 
consultation.211 
 The Lithuanians’ request that the plebiscite area include Seiny, which lay  to the east of 
the Curzon line, was rejected because the Council had established that the consultation would 
be held only in the territories west of that line. Furthermore, under the Suwalki Agreement, 
which was only  a temporarily settlement, the Lithuanians had no permanent rights to any part 
of territory  that either part had temporarily renounced. Finally, Drummond reminded 
Voldemaras, if the two parties could not reach agreement, it was for the Council—not the 
Lithuanians—to decide the extent of the plebiscite area.212 
 The Poles, meanwhile, requested that the plebiscite area extend to the east of the 
border established by the Treaty  of Moscow and to the west of the Curzon line, in conformity 
with the league’s view. In addition, they  claimed rights to the district of Kaunas, which in 
places had a mixed but predominantly Polish population.213 Grodno, which was strategically 
crucial to Polish interests, was to be excluded in exchange for part of the territories west of 
the Foch line, which could be granted to Lithuania immediately. Chardigny regarded this last 
request as worth considering.214  Following a principle of reciprocity, it would have been 
possible to extend the plebiscite to the territories currently occupied by Polish regular troops, 
but not to the eastern territories the Treaty of Riga had allotted Poland.215 Finally, since the 
Curzon line did not extend to the Vilna district, which had been brought to the league’s notice 
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only because of Zeligowski’s occupation, the Political Section proposed adoption of the 
temporary Foch line established between Poland and Lithuania in 1919, which ran 30 km to 
the north of Vilna, and the borders of the Treaty of Moscow as the southern demarcation line, 
a suggestion of Chardigny’s that both delegations accepted.216 
1.2 The League’s First Peacekeeping Operation
 Despite the failure to convince Warsaw to withdraw Zeligowski’s troops and Kaunas’s 
uncooperative stance, the Eleventh Session of the Council proceeded with the plebiscite plan 
between November 14 and December 18, 1920. The Council resolution of October 28, 1920, 
made no reference to the creation of an international contingent to assist the Military 
Commission, already  on the spot, but it was an obvious corollary.217  This in turn explains 
why, insofar as international personnel in an impartial, nonthreatening role are intended to 
help  create or maintain calm between disputants, or produce and implement a settlement of 
their problem, a thread of organizational continuity links the League of Nations and United 
Nations.218 In this respect the international mission to Vilna was the forerunner of the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations of the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the time, though, 
establishing and organizing the work of this international mission was an unprecedented 
challenge for the league.219 
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 For the disputants, the league’s willingness to organize and administer the plebiscite 
represented an opportunity that the Great Powers had not been willing to grant. In late 
October 1920, Lord Curzon, on behalf of the Foreign Office, had expressed skepticism about 
the viability of the plebiscite plan, mentioning several practical objections “which are almost 
insuperable.” The plebiscite could only  be held if the Allied Powers, which in practice meant 
England and France, were to occupy and administer the Vilna region for a protracted period. 
Moreover, in his opinion it was impossible to send Allied troops, qualified officials were hard 
to find, and it would be necessary  to provide or at least advance money to cover the expense 
of occupation and administration, and finally to assume the responsibility  of feeding Vilna, 
which was not self-supporting.220
 These were exactly the kind of problems the Council tried to tackle, and 
unsurprisingly the question of defining the nature, scope, and organization of this mission 
spurred lively  debate within the Council.221 The discussion, dominated almost exclusively  by 
the French and British delegates, respectively Arthur James Balfour and Leon Bourgeois, 
under the presidency of Paul Hymans and with the discreet but attentive participation of Eric 
Drummond, turned not only on technicalities but also on more important questions 
concerning the league’s image and the establishment of its authority in the eyes of 
international public opinion.222  For this reason the question of the size of the military 
contingent sent in Vilna, for example, was discussed in relation of the image and scope of an 
operation that needed to be international in all respects.
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 Having himself evaluated the situation in the disputed territories, Chardigny had 
requested 1,800 men and hoped they would arrive no later than December 1.223  Thus the 
Council had to establish the size of the regiments contributed by each participating 
government and fix the date of their dispatch.224 The French initially suggested that  Britain, 
France, and Spain each send a contingent of 300 men, with Belgium supplying the remainder, 
but Eric Drummond insisted on giving the mission an international character and therefore 
also urged the participation of Dutch, Swedish, and Norwegian contingents.225 
 Balfour added that not only  the composition of the military  forces, but also the 
machinery  needed to coordinate the work among national governments and league bodies 
should be international. Here the Spanish representative Quinones de Leon, who rarely 
contributed to the debate, remarked that  in his opinion, not as a Spanish delegate but as a 
member of the Council of the League of Nations, it  was important  to avoid creating a 
contingent that would give the impression of being an inter-allied commission. Although he 
did not believe his government would object to this eventuality, he hinted that it  might  very 
well disappoint  international public opinion.226 Consequently, both the option of an Anglo-
French Entente coordinating the two Military General Staffs, which Bourgeois supported, and 
that of a purely British leadership, preferred by Hymans, were abandoned.227 
 The best  option was to use British troops deployed in Silesia and still based in 
Danzig, as they could be sent directly to Vilna, but this required the immediate establishment 
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of an administrative body with clear and well-defined duties to improve “the unsatisfactory 
way in which the league has conducted its activities since we were in Brussels.”228  The 
British War Office, for example, was confused as to whom they should refer questions about 
the expedition’s logistics and organization, information needed before the start of the 
demobilization of Danzig scheduled for November 23, 1920.229
 The Council decided to honor Chardigny’s request and finally agreed to increase the 
contingent from 1,000, as initially planned, to 1,800 men. As for the personnel to be 
employed, Balfour’s suggestion to send civil officers with previous experience and preferably 
those who had been employed in the Silesian area, was, on Bourgeois’s insistence, eliminated 
from the final resolution.230  It  was instead decided to appoint civil commissioners—the 
Plebiscite Commission—who would decide the territory of the plebiscite area if the 
contending parties failed to reach agreement. They would also help the Military Commission 
organize and administer the plebiscite.231 
 The lengthy debate over the distribution of power and duties between the Military  and 
Plebiscite Commissions reflected the Council members’ different assessments of the problem 
and of the league’s role. Bourgeois, Hymans, and the Italian League of Nations delegate 
Carlo Schanzer suggested subordinating the Plebiscite Commission to Chardigny’s authority 
to avoid any possible conflict of authority. Their opinion relied largely on their trust in the 
league’s prestige, so they saw the authority  of military commissioners acting as 
representatives of the League of Nations as greater than, and therefore not comparable with, 
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that of any national police force. Also, the military commissioners had already earned the 
respect of Polish and Lithuanian military officers, so subordinating them to the Plebiscite 
Commission now would have been extremely detrimental.232  These council members thus 
held that the league’s role as mediator in the execution of this plebiscite, which had not been 
decided by a treaty but by two belligerent countries, compelled the Council to find the most 
authoritative personnel.233 
 On the other hand, Balfour and Drummond were inclined to relieve the two 
commissions of excessive pressure by keeping them independent of one another. In their 
view, the current situation was no different from any already observed in cases of heated 
English elections, during which the police kept  order while civilian authorities took charge of 
the voting. Moreover, it was quite unrealistic to expect a single man to bear the challenges 
and tremendous burden of commanding an international force while at the same time 
supervising the organization of votes.234 
 This fruitful exchange of views led to adoption of a resolution honoring both parties, 
whereby the Plebiscite Commission would be responsible for the administration of the 
elections while Chardigny  retained the right  to make the final decision, should the 
commissioners’ opinions conflict.235  The Council decided also to appoint Civil 
Commissioners236 whose first task was to ascertain whether the two governments could reach 
agreement on the plebiscite’s procedure and territorial extent, and if the two could not, to 
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decide on these matters themselves. It was crucial for them to stay  constantly informed on the 
political situation of the disputed territory and to keep  in touch with the Polish and Lithuanian 
governments. Finally, after ascertaining the authenticity and regularity  of the voting, the 
commission was to submit a joint  report of the results with its own recommendations to 
facilitate the Council’s work in the final allotment of the disputed territory. Overall, the 
international personnel were simply to perform police duties, and if any fighting broke out 
between the contending parties, the Military  Commission was authorized to petition the 
Council to withdraw the military contingent.237 
 The Council’s efforts were rewarded with a positive response from the governments 
invited to send a contingent. By December 6, the Council had successfully completed the 
organization of the international contingent, and the President of the Council announced that 
the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish governments had each agreed to furnish one hundred 
men and four or five officers, that a Greek contingent of fifty men would join them, and that 
the Dutch parliament was still discussing its participation.238 
 The greatest difficulties, Chardigny warned the Council, seemed to emanate from the 
Lithuanian side, whose excessive concern with formalities and lack of confidence were likely 
to delay the plebiscite.239 The Lithuanians were preoccupied with Zeligowski’s advance into 
their territory. On November 17, Zeligowski’s troops had conquered the villages of Gedroize 
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and Schirwinty 40 km north of Vilna, throwing Kaunas into a panic.240 The Council’s request 
to demobilize Lithuanian troops struck Kaunas as even more unfair and untimely.241 Hence, 
instead of following the league’s recommendation, the Lithuanian representative at Paris, 
Oscar Milosz, requested once again that Article 16 be applied against Poland and notified the 
league that Warsaw had augmented Zeligowski’s forces from two to fifteen divisions since 
the start of the occupation.242 
 These events represented a setback for the Council, which instead of proceeding with 
negotiations found itself mired in managing a series of Voldemaras’s endless arguments and 
pretexts for delaying the organization of the plebiscite. The Lithuanian delegate’s request for 
public discussion of Warsaw’s collaboration with Zeligowski and the violation of the Suwalki 
Agreement before the Assembly of the League of Nations, as had been possible for Armenia, 
was easily  dismissed.243 It  was explained that once a dispute was presented before the league, 
there was a fourteen-day deadline for making such requests, and Voldemaras had missed it. 
Moreover, regardless of the fact that “the case of Armenia was different,” only a member of 
the League of Nations could question the interpretation of a matter, which could be placed on 
the Assembly’s agenda only after being approved by a majority vote.244 
  Voldemaras therefore changed tack and reminded the Council that in the notes sent to 
the Council, his government had accepted the plebiscite but reserved the right “to make a 
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subsequent declaration as to the engagements to which it had subscribed.”245  This time he 
claimed that despite the partial acceptance, Kaunas deeply resented putting territories “that  it 
considers simply and purely Lithuanian” under plebiscite.246  Although he did not explain 
what “purely Lithuanian” meant regarding such ethnically  mixed lands, he nevertheless 
argued at length that the population of the disputed territories was not ready to express a free 
and objective vote for many reasons.247 Zeligowski’s regime was very popular there, but only 
because the tsarist authorities had suppressed any form of cultural life since 1865, leaving the 
largely illiterate population particularly vulnerable to the current aggressive, systematic 
propaganda of Polish priests. The latter only  further confused the faithful, who were not yet 
capable of distinguishing their confessional affiliation from their national identity  and thus 
were inclined to define themselves as Catholic rather than Polish or Lithuanian. When they 
sought the priests’ advice of on this matter, the latter, taking advantage of their authority and 
influence, would threaten damnation awaiting all souls who voted for Lithuania.248 
 In Voldemaras’s opinion Kaunas could rightfully object to the plebiscite on legal 
grounds as well, because the Treaty of Moscow had implicitly  acknowledged the owner of 
the contested territories by  granting them to Lithuania. Moreover, in the same treaty Moscow 
had renounced all claims to the territories Poland and Lithuania were disputing, leaving 
settlement of the matter entirely to them.249  To explain why, then, Kaunas had consented to 
negotiate a dispute that the Lithuanian-Soviet  treaty had already settled, Voldemaras 
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reminded the Council that this decision was based on the Polish interpretation of the meaning 
of Soviet neutrality in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. In September 1920, when the dispute 
was first brought before the Council at Brussels, the Polish delegate Ashkenazy had reassured 
Lithuania that the preliminary  Polish-Soviet peace talks in Riga confirmed and included this 
clause. Ashkenazy  had nevertheless also added that his government regarded Moscow’s 
neutrality as immediately abrogating any Lithuanian right the Treaty of Moscow had 
established to the contested territories.250  Lithuania had therefore agreed to negotiate with 
Poland under the auspices of the League of Nations, because on the one hand the Poles were 
contesting their rights, but on the other hand Moscow had guaranteed its neutrality. 
 This scenario, Voldemaras continued, had recently  changed radically and 
unexpectedly on November 26, 1920, when the Soviets informed Lithuania that they firmly 
disagreed with the Poles’ interpretation of the Treaty of Moscow, and that to the contrary, the 
Russian delegation in Riga had on several occasions confirmed its commitment to all the 
treaties already  concluded, including the one signed with Lithuania on July  12, 1920. The 
Soviets, he explained, would therefore consider the presence of an international detachment a 
violation of the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty, which could lead to action against Lithuania, as the 
concentration of Soviet troops on the Russo-Polish frontier confirmed.251 
 For several reasons, however, the league was able to neutralize Voldemaras’s multiple 
attempts to buy  time and hamper the plebiscite plan. After many formal and informal 
meetings with him, several league officials finally concluded that Voldemaras’s views did not 
always conform with those of his government, and that contrary  to his arguments to the 
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league, Kaunas was not in principle against the holding of the plebiscite.252  In fact, the 
Lithuanian government had only posed some conditions: that  after Zeligowski’s withdrawal 
from the Vilna district the plebiscite be postponed for eight  months—two devoted to 
organizing the voting, three more to drawing up and revising the electoral lists, and the rest to 
campaigning —and that the voting in Vilna be administered by a local committee of five 
Polish and five Lithuanian delegates assisted by the Plebiscite Commission.253 
 The good news that a protocol for the cessation of hostilities had been signed in 
Kaunas on November 29 was one more reason to dismiss Voldemaras’s ploys. The Council 
was informed that with the Military  Commission’s assistance, the Polish representative 
Michez Kossakowski, Ignace Jonynas, and Chief of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army 
Constantin Kleschtschinski had agreed to establish a neutral zone, which Kossakowski 
guaranteed that both Zeligowski and Warsaw would respect. The temporary  cease-fire was 
soon to be followed by the surrender of all prisoners of war.254 The Secretariat  knew that  the 
Lithuanian public greatly resented this armistice because it considered the commission 
incapable of stopping Zeligowski’s offensive, and that Kaunas was only accepting it in the 
hope that it would hasten and facilitate Zeligowski’s withdrawal.255  
 For Geneva, however, it was good news—the more so because the Military 
Commission’s report also dispelled Voldemaras’s claim about Zeligowski’s popularity  in 
Vilna. According to the commissioners, locals in the Vilna region were very anxious and 
disappointed at not having received the support they expected from Poland. Food shortages 
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and unemployment, not to mention all the requisitions imposed by the occupiers, had only 
increased the unrest. Zeligowski’s troops lacked warm clothing, had little ammunition, and 
were not very disciplined. In the end, the mobilization he had ordered was unpopular and its 
outcome, poor.256 
 In face of the difficulties created by Voldemaras, the league’s ability to remain firmly 
committed to the plebiscite plan was due to intense collaboration between the Secretariat, the 
Council, and the Military Commission. Admittedly, Voldemaras’s attitude and pretexts had 
done more to irritate the Council than to hamper its work. Geneva, however, did not 
underestimate Lithuanian reluctance to accept the plebiscite plan, because this ambiguity 
called into question the whole purpose of the league’s involvement in the dispute and could 
have serious implications for its prestige.257  The decision to supervise and administer the 
plebiscite had in fact deepened the league’s involvement in what was no longer only a border 
dispute, but  the organization of a popular consultation. This in turn highlighted the question 
of Russian neutrality and Lithuania’s ambiguous attitude toward the Soviets. 
 Only Lithuania’s firm loyalty  to the league would have made taking the risk with the 
Soviets worthwhile.258 As far as the Council was concerned, however, the Lithuanians clearly 
wanted to break their engagements with the league and, far from having merely “discovered 
all these absurdities about the meaning of the treaties,” were probably hoping to gain more 
from an allegedly imminent Soviet-Polish war than from a democratic expression of votes. 
On the other hand, Balfour and Bourgeois concurred that whereas admittedly the plebiscite 
could not be forced on Lithuania against its will, Lithuania’s responsibility for this failure 
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needed to be emphasized immediately before the plebiscite began. Even if this scenario still 
represented a serious check to the prestige of the league, “the damage would be even greater 
if we should begin to carry it through to be defeated in the middle.”259  More cautious in 
attitude and averse to putting too much pressure on Lithuania, Eric Drummond pointed out 
that after all Lithuanians could still object that they  were only  asking for more time, a request 
that in his opinion deserved consideration.260 He agreed with Chardigny that proceeding with 
the consultation regardless of Lithuanian opposition would have implied taking sides, a fact 
that Polish propaganda would immediately exploit to the detriment of fairness and equitable 
conditions. This impasse could be overcome by simply heavily publicizing Lithuania’s 
responsibility for the difficulties incurred by the league.261 
 It was also necessary to avoid giving the impression that the league’s final decision on 
the plebiscite depended on the Soviets’ moods and Lithuanian wiles. Hymans suggested 
asking Kaunas to ascertain the Soviets’ position and report back to the Council. This strategy 
would at once give the impression Voldemaras was in charge of solving the problem and 
spare the league from having to approach Moscow directly. Thus freed, the Council could 
take the matter into its own hands by proceeding with the organization of the plebiscite, 
relying on the reports of the Military and Plebiscite Commissions to ascertain the real nature 
of Soviet-Lithuanian relations. The Council’s final decision, then, would be based on the 





261  LNA, Collection Des Documents Relatifs au Differend Entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, vol. 474, 
Telegram from Chardigny to Geneva, Warsaw, December 14, 1920.
262  LNA, 27/ R 1407, Secret  Sessions of the Council, Eleventh Session of the Council, Verbatim 
Report, Geneva, December 6, 1920, pp. 43–46.
This course of action was finally adopted. From the Military  Commission’s report, the 
Secretariat was able to establish that  the Soviet threat was only a fine piece of Lithuanian 
propaganda. Chardigny reported that the Poles were confident of a positive outcome in the 
plebiscite, but Lithuanians who feared an unfavorable result and believed the region was not 
ready  for a plebiscite were contriving to delay, or even better, prevent it. Far from plotting 
with Moscow, Kaunas was only taking advantage of the Bolshevik menace. The government 
was not unanimous in its thinking, and its members’ attitudes on this matter were unclear. 
Some feared the Soviets, but others trusted them more than Poles because in the past  they  had 
already granted Vilna to Lithuania. In sum, Lithuanians were still torn between the fear that 
Vilna might fall into Soviet hands and the desire to leave the question in suspense in the 
vague hope that unforeseen events might enable them to gain Vilna in the future.263 
Chardigny  therefore suggested obtaining from the Lithuanian government a definite and 
official declaration that, in conformity with the last clause of the preliminaries of Riga, the 
settlement between Poland and Lithuania was a matter of exclusive concern between these 
two states. This statement, and the fact that the nations participating in the military  mission 
had always observed strict neutrality  toward the Soviets, could prevent any quarrel between 
the league and Moscow.264 
Paul Denis from the Political Section concurred and followed this strategy to deal 
with a new note received from the Lithuanian government. Referring to correspondence 
between Adolf Joffe, president of the Russian delegation at the Peace Conference in Riga, 
and the Polish representative, Moscow stressed that it could not ignore the situation created in 
Vilna. Not only were Zeligowski’s troops regular forces of the Polish army, but they were 
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also occupying a territory  that had become a meeting point for various anti-Soviet elements 
from the other Baltic states. Moscow would therefore hold Poland responsible for any 
disturbance in what it  considered its territory. Finally, the Soviets protested the dispatch to 
Vilna of armed detachments from various foreign states, ostensibly  on the recommendation of 
a “League-of-Nations” that the Soviet Republics did not recognize and whose presence was 
doubtless liable to encourage the preparation of new hostile activity against them.265 
According to Denis, however, nothing in the letter confirmed Voldemaras’s 
declarations about the Soviet government’s position or implied that  the latter had reproached 
the Poles for being in Vilna or the Lithuanians for tolerating the presence of foreign troops on 
their territory.266  On the contrary, he considered the note a clear statement of the Soviet 
outlook on the League of Nations’ intervention in the Lithuanian-Polish dispute and thus 
believed it would be sufficient that Poland reassure Moscow “of the purely  humanitarian 
scope of the plebiscite commission’s work” of supplying food to the populations of these 
war-devastated regions, while the international force was entrusted with police duties only.267 
Denis emphasized the need to leave the Council entirely outside the dispute between Poland 
and the Soviets by avoiding any kind of interference in the negotiations at Riga.268 
The Council therefore decided to dispatch the international force, requesting Kaunas 
to give formal and official notification of its acceptance of the plebiscite, whose form and 
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territory would be determined by the Council, to be held after the evaluation of the 
Commission of Three already  on its way to Warsaw. The Council, determined to rebuff any 
further attempts by  the Lithuanians to impede its work, decided to interpret any  further 
condition put forward now as a refusal to carry out obligations already undertaken.269 It was 
agreed that the Three Commissioners Bourgeois, Ishii, and Quinones de Leon would continue 
to assist the Council and the Military Commission until the next Council session by helping 
the disputants decide which territories should be included in the plebiscite area.270  Poland 
was urged to confirm its willingness “to collaborate in disarming, disbanding or withdrawing 
its troops”271  because the league refused to use its moral authority to sanction a plebiscite 
carried out in conditions unsatisfactory to all the interested parties.272 
The work of the Commission of Three became even more important upon the failure 
of direct talks between Lithuania and Poland that had meantime resumed in Warsaw on 
December 13. The Lithuanian delegation at Warsaw had insisted on continuing the discussion 
on the territories to include in the plebiscite area under the league’s guidance.  It  also 
submitted a general plan that envisioned Poland’s de jure recognition of a Lithuanian state 
whose eastern and southern boundaries coincided in principle with those established by the 
Treaty of Moscow and the Curzon line respectively, as well as the evacuation of Lithuanian 
territory. Kaunas promised to refrain from allowing foreign troops to use its territory against 
Poland and to sign an economic agreement granting Poland free access to the sea, large-scale 
administrative decentralization, equality of language, and freedom of cultural development in 
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the disputed territories.273  The Polish delegation declared the scheme worthy of 
consideration, but Zeligowski’s order for a general mobilization in the Vilna region, which 
according to the Military Commission had found little response among the hostile population, 
certainly did not help the negotiations.274  Poland rejected the Lithuanian proposal of 
December 20, and on December 31 the Polish and Lithuanian delegations notified Chardigny 
that the direct negotiations had failed. Unable to draw up a schema for the territory to put 
under plebiscite, they asked for the assistance of the league’s Plebiscite Commission.275
1.3 The Dismissal of the Plebiscite 
 From December 1920 to March 3, 1921, when the Council finally dismissed the 
whole plan, the Secretariat stubbornly continued to organize the plebiscite despite constant 
difficulties. Soviet Russia was interfering once again with the work of the league, and the 
disputants remained unwilling to abide by the Council’s recommendations. Moreover, the 
Secretariat was working in defiance of international public opinion, which was hostile to the 
organization of a mission that could draw Europe into another war. 
 Even as the league successfully  organized the international contingent and secured the 
support of the states involved in the operation, Polish-Lithuanian relations worsened and 
Zeligowski’s forces increased its strength in Vilna, to the dismay of the Military 
Commission.276 On January 8, 1921, the Polish Central Lithuanian Department of National 
86
273  LNA, Collection Des Documents Relatifs au Differend Entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, vol. 474, 
Telegram Chardigny, Warsaw, December 21, 1920.
274  LNA, Collection Des Documents Relatifs au Differend Entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, vol. 474, 
Chardigny to Bourgeois, December 31, 1921.
275 Ibid., doc. 31, Chardigny to Bourgeois, Warsaw, January 4, 1929.
276 Ibid., doc. 30, Chardigny to Bourgeois, Warsaw, December 31, 1920.
Defense suspended the mobilization, leaving the new levies of troops at  home and sending 
two annual levies on leave until April 1, 1921. The Secretariat was willing to accept this 
move as strong evidence that Pilsudski was finally  carrying out the Council’s 
recommendations.277 Chardigny, however, had little faith and cautioned against intervention 
by the Council before his commission was able to verify  that the department’s orders had 
been carried through.278  Earlier in January 1921, fearing a possible Bolshevik invasion, 
Chardigny  had held that a Polish division should be kept in the plebiscite area until the very 
last moment, and that it would be “impolitique” to send the League of Nations’ contingent 
before Poland had clearly confirmed its intention to withdraw Zeligowski’s troops. Now, 
though, he was resolved not to make any concessions to the Poles.279 Not only  was Warsaw 
responsible for the ongoing difficulties and delays in removing and demobilizing Zeligowski, 
but the Polish press had just announced that he would organize the election of a Constituent 
Assembly in Central Lithuania by mid February.280  Chardigny was immediately instructed 
“to inform the Polish government that we formally request  to oppose, by  every means in its 
power, the carrying out of this project, because the Council cannot allow an election to be 
organized by Zeligowski on the territory that he is illegally occupying at the very moment 
when the League of Nations is preparing for the plebiscite that  will decided its fate.”281  The 
league requested a reduction of Zeligowski’s forces from more than 30,000 to 15,000 men 
and the immediate demobilization of all troops called up since October 10, 1920.282 Warsaw 
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needed to be reminded that once Zeligowski’s army had been disowned, his presence could 
hardly  represent an important factor in Poland’s defense system, and that in any case the 
Military Commission and the international contingent were to help replace those irregular 
troops with local police.283 
 The task seemed to have been accomplished on February  4, when the Commission of 
Three obtained Sapieha’s promise that the demobilization would begin as soon as the Council 
communicated the date of the contingent’s arrival in Vilna, but the actual evacuation could 
start only once the contingent was present in Vilna. In fact, Warsaw claimed that it wanted to 
honor Zeligowski’s request for guarantees that the local population would not  be exposed to 
any retaliation by  the Lithuanian army replacing the demobilizing forces. Sapieha expressed 
his worries over the influence of the Soviet representative at Kaunas, Pavel Axelrod, and 
about Lithuania’s dilatory policy, which could bring about another war. Yet he also reassured 
Bourgeois that it  was in Warsaw’s interests that Zeligowski withdraw, allowing the conduct 
of a plebiscite that, he remarked, “Poland is sure to win.”284  The Political Section 
nevertheless saw the situation as rather delicate because the Poles, who were obviously more 
advantageously  positioned, were vigilant and cautious, and their politics was completely 
dominated by the plebiscite in Silesia. It was difficult  to anticipate the results, and the anxiety 
caused by this waiting was hardly  surprising. To get through the plebiscite under the most 
favorable conditions, the Poles were clearly interested in doing everything possible to 
influence the electorate, such as concluding the negotiations with the Soviets by  mid 
February.285
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 The Commission of Three managed a partial success. On January 31, 1921, the 
Lithuanians finally  accepted the plebiscite under conditions acceptable to the Secretariat and 
the three commissioners.286  Kaunas accepted the popular consultation on condition that 
measures needed “if the plebiscite is to be fair and equitable” be respected. The vote had to 
definitively settle the fate of the territory, whose population had to be guaranteed free 
expression of will and protection should Zeligowski’s troops return. The appointment of an 
impartial Plebiscite Commission was essential because of “the Polish violent propaganda 
conducted for two years by every possible means, whereas the Lithuanians have been 
prevented from making their influence felt.” For the same reason, only states not directly 
involved in the Lithuanian-Polish dispute should send their troops to Vilna.287  The 
Lithuanians also claimed that fairness required conferral of de jure recognition before, not 
after the plebiscite was over, because “it was obvious that after seven years of war and 
incessant disturbance in these areas, the population is very desirous of stability  and peace and 
many are afraid, not without reason, to entrust themselves and their future to a state which 
has not been recognized and whose territory may at any time become an object of dispute and 
war.”288 
 The Commission of Three and the Political Section agreed in principle with Kaunas’s 
requests, though they considered them a source of new problems. Not only  would carrying 
out the plebiscite on Lithuanian terms require a complete change of the current situation in 
Central Lithuania, for example, enforcing the withdrawal of Zeligowski’s troops and ensuring 
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the depolonization of the administration, but more importantly it  would also entail addressing 
the Soviets’ attitude and the legal status of the Lithuanian state.289 Determined not to let this 
last question hinder the plan, however, the league decided to change its stance toward 
Lithuania’s de jure recognition. On January 26, 1921, the Supreme Council had decided to 
grant Latvia and Estonia de jure recognition, but the final decision regarding Lithuania had 
been postponed to the league-mediated settlement of the dispute. At that time Bourgeois had 
carelessly taken note of the news and forwarded it to Chardigny, leaving to his judgment 
“what use you will make of this information.”290  Meanwhile, the military commissioners’ 
response was drawing greater attention because the postponement had made a painful 
impression in political circles and on public opinion in Kaunas, where it  was ascribed to 
Polish intrigues rather than the decision of the Great Powers.291 
The situation had been so tense that the government thought it best  to avoid public 
parliamentary  debate on the plebiscite. After it had composed its reply to the league with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it deliberately ignored the Military Commission by forwarding 
its decisions directly to the Council president. According to Chardigny, German influence 
was fueling this hostile reaction, intended to provoke a rupture with the League of Nations by 
bringing about a ministerial crisis.292 Therefore, after endless pretexts and various complaints 
against the Military Commission and the Council’s decisions, Bourgeois finally 
acknowledged that this discontent and “excitement of national feelings among the 
Lithuanians” could prove as great an obstacle as the danger of Bolshevik intervention.293 He 
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suggested the Council rectify  this situation by notifying the Allied Powers that  Lithuania had 
finally accepted the Council’s recommendation, and by explaining to the Lithuanians that the 
uncertain status of their borders and their hesitation in replying to the league had caused the 
delay.294  It was instead impossible to honor Lithuanian objections to the presence of the 
international contingent because “it  is hard to see how the League can otherwise proceed to 
evacuate the territory  and organize the plebiscite.”295 On the contrary, what now claimed and 
deserved the Council’s attention was the evacuation of the plebiscite area before, during, and 
after the consultation, as well as securing Soviet neutrality.296 
 Unlike in December of the previous year, the Soviets’ attitude was no longer only  a 
matter of Lithuanian propaganda. On the contrary, Chardigny had recently  reported that 
several factors—such as the several hundred militants arrested in Kaunas at the end of 
December; the recall of Axelrod, now replaced by the new Soviet representative at Kaunas, 
Adolf Joffe; and the anti-Bolshevik disposition of the army and the population overall—
could be regarded as evidence of Bolshevik propaganda’s failure in Lithuania.297  That the 
Lithuanians were negotiating with Moscow even as they  used the Bolshevik threat  to their 
advantage was certainly not helping. Furthermore, because the question of the disputants’ 
loyalty to the league remained open, the league risked being exposed to ridicule.298  
 Yet beyond matters of principle and prestige lay the even more urgent issue of 
ensuring that the states manning the international contingent did not find themselves at war 
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with Soviet Russia or Zeligowski.299  On January  30, 1921, Soviet Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs Georgi Chicherin had informed the Lithuanian government in a note that his 
government still opposed the arrival of an international contingent in Vilna.300 In theory, the 
league had good reason to be concerned. Absent firsthand information on the progress of the 
Soviet-Polish peace talks still ongoing at Riga, it  was crucial to find out whether, in his note, 
Chicherin was seriously  repudiating the commitment previously undertaken in Riga to 
observe neutrality in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, an “assumption upon which we have 
based our line of action.”301  Moreover, before making any decision, the Council had to 
ascertain whether any existing treaty ratified Moscow’s rights over the contested territory or 
acknowledged Polish sovereignty, which would deprive Moscow of any right to interfere in 
this area.302 
 In practice, though, Geneva was not particularly intimated by the “Soviet threat.” The 
Political Section held that any fresh outbreak of hostilities between Poland and Russia would 
happen for reasons other than the League of Nations, which would only be used as a pretext. 
In fact, unless Russia wanted to go to war with Poland, this pretext was unlikely to be 
followed up  with concrete measures—rather, the Soviets would reframe their threats as 
disappointment, as had happened in the case of the Aaland Islands when the Russians’ protest 
had not prevented the league from agreeing to mediate between Sweden and Finland.303 
According to the director of the Political Section, the Soviets’ real goal was to block the 
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league’s way to Eastern Europe through intimidation, and yielding to this threat would 
greatly damage the prestige of this organization. So even if the possibility of a war did not 
seem real, the most serious consequences morally  would still arise from inaction on Geneva’s 
part.304  Therefore the league was taking on the challenge, a stance whose essence and 
significance Der Bund, the leading progressive newspaper in Bern, captured in its entirety: 
“The Vilna question brings two principles into open conflict: the centralized dictatorship, as 
embodied in Moscow, and the democratic freedom of the peoples to determine themselves to 
what state they are to belong; and the upholder of this latter principle in Vilna is the League 
of Nations, which Switzerland herself joined through a popular vote.”305 
 Consequently, as far the Secretariat was concerned, even if a solution to the Vilna 
question was clearly out of reach unless its relation with the Russian question was brought 
before the Council, the whole conundrum boiled down to simply avoiding giving Kaunas and 
Moscow the impression that the latter’s presence represented an obstacle to the regular work 
of the Council, before which only two parties were involved in the dispute. Indeed, it  was 
simply  inadmissible to give a third party a voice on the rights of the beneficiary  of the 
plebiscite.306
Domestic public opinion in the countries involved in the Vilna military expedition, however, 
regarded the possibility of Soviet involvement with greater trepidation. Having no official 
relations with Zeligowski, the league was unable to offer the participating states any 
guarantees of his reaction to the arrival of the contingent. All Drummond could do to dispel 
the Dutch government’s fears was to notify  it  that “Zeligowski’s attitude toward the Military 
Commission already on the spot gives us hope that  he will not  oppose the measures of the 
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Council.”307 And whereas the Swedish and Norwegian troops were ready to sail, the Danish 
contingent had not been mustered because of the uncertainty about the Soviets’ outlook.308 
For the same reasons, the Dutch socialist newspaper Het Volk suggested the parliament 
reconsider and evaluate, independently from the government, “whether this might not be too 
dangerous an adventure.”309  Sweden’s Dagens Nyheter was instead concerned with the 
expenses of the plebiscitary force, which amounted to 2,000 crowns a day and which the 
league was supposed to reimburse after reclaiming the sum from Poland and Lithuania.310 
The Times instead reproached the league for letting the Soviets succeed in their 
attempt to sabotage the international mission, because “the most important point is that the 
League has demanded the removal of the troops and of their commander Zeligowski as the 
first step toward the plebiscite and that this demand has not yet been complied with.”311 
Failing to make use of its most important and effective weapon, the mobilization of public 
opinion, the league had proved unable to either accomplish its task or prevent the semiofficial 
Polish press from misleading its public by depicting its government as a mostly  correct actor 
and the Lithuanians as naughty  boys, argued The Times. Hence, the league’s inability to 
enforce the withdrawal had also delayed arrival of the international contingent while the 
participating countries became more and more preoccupied with the possibility of a Soviet 
intervention: 
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Plain facts like these ought to be made public as soon as they are apparent, so 
that the world may judge and approve or condemn, because it is simply 
inevitable that  nations pursued their interests with whatever means are available 
to them. The League of Nations officials had been too reluctant to admit that the 
combined authority of the nations whom they represented is being practically 
flouted by one nation, but certainly to adopt such attitude is to invite liberties, 
because unless public opinion is behind it, the diplomatic action of the League 
is weaker than that of its weakest member.312
Regardless of negative international public opinion, and against the advice of the military 
commissioners, in early February the Political Section still hoped that Zeligowski could be 
forced to withdraw and that therefore the Poles must at all costs include in the Treaty  of Riga 
a clause that left the Soviets out of any border dispute between Poland and Lithuania.313 
 As for the Commission of Three and Political Section, Sapieha’s promises and the 
Lithuanian note of January 31 were enough to proceed, because “both Lithuania and Poland 
had accepted the plebiscite and their requests for a rapid and fair consultation respectively 
were not incompatible.” The league decided to accept  the Polish suggestion to rely on a local 
administration, seeing this as crucial because, among other reasons, it  was acceptable to 
Lithuania, whereas the latter’s request for protection against Zeligowski’s troops during and 
after the consultation was absolutely pointless. The Three explained to the Lithuanians that 
they  had no right to assume that the Poles would react violently if they lost the plebiscite, and 
that even if they did, the conflict would be between Poland and the League of Nations.314 
Mantoux therefore instructed Chardigny to prepare to replace the Polish administration and to 
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draw up a plan for rapid demobilization Zeligowski’s troops to facilitate and speed their 
evacuation upon the arrival of the international contingent. Rather optimistically, he remarked 
that Sapieha’s promise confirmed a change of attitude and represented “a great step 
forward.”315 
 The Military Commission, for its part, was far less optimistic in this regard. Not only 
was Marshal Pilsudski, “who directs in fact  the policy of the government and the question of 
Vilna,” himself the principal obstacle to the demobilization,316  but  the commissioners had 
also been unable to duly  prepare for the international contingent’s arrival. Instead they had 
encountered countless difficulties and were still waiting for a definite reply from the Polish 
General Staff about the requested reduction of forces by February  20. The Poles were 
unlikely to carry out this preliminary, unconditionally imposed upon them, before March 10, 
and since it  was essential to the dispatch of the international contingent, Chardigny regarded 
any further pretext for delay as tantamount to a refusal. Furthermore, the military 
commissioners suggested, the remainder of Zeligowski’s forces should be removed or 
demobilized within the time limits set by the commission, and placed under its temporary 
control. The need for repairs to the barracks also necessitated a delayed arrival of the 
contingent.317 
 The Secretariat, however, did not see this delay  as an option and instead chose a 
different strategy. Banking on Sapieha’s and Pilsudski’s good faith seemed the best way to 
compel them to keep their promises and act accordingly. Avoiding delays and changed plans 
was key  to keeping Warsaw from changing it mind, so the contingent remained scheduled to 
96
315 LNA, 11/ S 5, Mantoux to Chardigny, Paris, February 9, 1921.
316  LNA, Collection Des Documents Relatifs au Differend Entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, vol. 474, 
doc. 44, Chardigny to Bourgeois, Vilna, February 10, 1921.
317 Ibid.
arrive on March 10, 1921.318  Consequently  Chardigny once again received the unoriginal 
order to end the Polish government’s hesitation by firmly insisting on prompt execution of 
the demobilization slated for February  20, and to provide the Council with a detailed 
evacuation plan, because the detachment would not arrive unless everything had been 
properly  prepared.319  The Military Commission protested again that  1,400 men no longer 
seemed enough to efficiently police the entire area. In addition, the lack of an official census 
as well as other “local difficulties” necessitated a delay  of six to eight months after the 
Council’s approval of the plan, to guarantee a fair and free consultation.320 
  The Poles, Lithuanians, and Soviets were not the only troublemakers hindering the 
international mission to Vilna. News that the Swiss government was considering denying the 
league permission to send troops through its territory represented a further setback. The 
Swiss Federal Council had objected to the league’s troops’ using its territory to reach Vilna, 
as this, in light of the hostile and uncertain Soviet attitude, would openly violate 
Switzerland’s neutrality and special position under the London Protocol of 1920.321 Closely 
monitored by the league, the lively  debate this decision sparked in the Swiss and international 
press reflected conflicting views on the significance of the Soviet question as well as the 
Swiss challenge to the league’s authority and its implications for the future of the 
organization. The socialist press in Bern was mostly alone in warning against heeding 
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Russia’s threat, which was only an attempt to make things awkward for the League of 
Nations, as it was hardly  credible that “Moscow should feel threatened by the presence of a 
few hundred troops in the plebiscite district. What the Russian rulers should be really afraid 
of is the example of a popular referendum.”322 At the other end of the opinion spectrum, those 
more inclined to take the Soviets seriously sided with the Federal Council. The Gazette de 
Lausanne found the Federal Council’s hesitation perfectly justified because it  was based on 
careful consideration of the Soviet  attitude rather than ignorance of the problem, as the 
Secretariat of the league had hinted.323  In fact, the Zuricher Post explained that “Russia’s 
attitude toward the League’s troops is clearly  shown, and one can see to what consequences it 
would lead if Switzerland were, without any  definite obligation, to allow the transport of 
these troops through its territory.”324  
Beyond the Soviet question, the Basler Nachrighten hinted that the league was 
violating the sovereign right of state, because after all, the reason for choosing Switzerland as 
the route for the Vilna troops was unclear; moreover, the more harmless the function of these 
contingents, the less persuasive was the accusation of erring against international solidarity. 
Hence the newspaper concluded that “the suitability of the Confederacy  is being put to test, 
and for that reason we consider that the only thing for the Federal Council to do is to hold 
firm.”325  Meanwhile, the Geneva-based Observer found it  “inadmissible that the Swiss 
Federal Council decided on a matter upon which only the League of Nations had the right to 
decide,”326 and The Times further fleshed out the consequences of challenging this authority: 
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“What is to happen in the future when Switzerland disagrees with a League measure on the 
grounds of her terms of membership? May  not the Swiss government one day find distasteful 
the presence on Swiss soil of a political organization whose activities impair Switzerland’s 
‘neutrality’ or ‘special position’? Is it wise for the League to make headquarters in a country 
whose obligations are so difficult to define?”327
 Even if questioning the league’s authority irritated Bourgeois so deeply that he 
threatened to apply Article 7 of the covenant, which gave the Council the right to change the 
seat of the league at any time, league officials saw Geneva’s suitability  as the home of the 
League of Nations as less relevant than the observations of the Morning Post.328 This British 
newspaper ascribed Switzerland’s attitude to the influence of pro-Bolshevik Swiss socialists 
and the pro-German party, which had double its own influence by propagandizing against the 
league:329  “The worst about the Swiss declaration is that it is not based on Switzerland’s 
special position under the London Protocol, but on a question of expediency. If the Swiss 
attitude were dictated merely by a nervous apprehension of risking neutrality it  would be 
more possible to sympathize with it, but by a coincidence which is at least worth examination 
it tallies very exactly with the opinions of the Soviet Government of Russia and with the aims 
of the friends of Germany.”330 
 In the meantime, Marshal Foch, in charge of assisting the work of the Military 
Commission, was dealing with the more practical problems created by the Swiss’s 
“outrageous attitude,” which forced the military commissioners to choose between the two 
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evils of traveling through Italy or through Germany. The first route was longer but feasible, 
so the second was immediately dropped because it would put Geneva in the awkward 
position of owing Germany a favor.331 
 Despite the difficulties encountered so far, the league had never wavered in its pursuit 
of the plebiscite plan. Now, though, the sudden interruption of the Soviet-Polish negotiations 
at Riga made the Soviet menace more tangible and serious; therefore, the risks and the 
responsibilities weighed more heavily  on the Council.332  Richard Haking, Britain’s high 
commissioner in Danzig and a military  expert consulted by Drummond, held that neither the 
Allies nor the league should be involved in an enterprise so dubious as military occupation of 
Vilna without first ensuring that the serious risk was worthwhile. The Soviets could quite 
easily and conveniently advance as far as Vilna, thereby  greatly  enhancing their country’s 
declining prestige by  displaying considerable force with minor military effort. The Allies, on 
the contrary, had everything to lose from doing the same, even though the possibility  of a 
Soviet invasion of the Baltic States was admittedly remote. In fact, the arrival of the 
international contingent would probably cause war to break out between Russia and Poland, 
placing the Allies in the highly awkward position of being saved from disaster by Poland
—“assuming, of course, that  the latter would be capable or willing to do so, which is 
doubtful, considering the locality of Vilna and its distance from the heart of Poland.” Clearly, 
no experienced commander would advise the dispatch of a small military  force, consisting of 
soldiers of two or three different  nationalities, to a locality  within easy  reach of a vastly 
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superior force whose intentions were known to be hostile, where it would be difficult to either 
reinforce or withdraw it.333 
 Finding himself once again at the nexus of different views, Drummond concluded that 
the plebiscite plan had to be abandoned, because alongside the Poles’ and Lithuanians’ 
unaccommodating attitudes, the length of Zeligowski’s occupation had made it impossible to 
hold the plebiscite both under the fair conditions required by the Council, and before a further 
delay of at least six more months as the military commissioners suggested. Governments that 
had agreed to employ their troops for no more than four or six weeks were unlikely to 
welcome this change of program. Secretary-General Drummond then suggested the 
alternative plan of organizing a conference between the two parties under the chairmanship of 
a prominent member of the Council, perhaps in Brussels under the presidency  of Paul 
Hymans. Considering the two parties’ prejudice, this new approach—along with the choice of 
a neutral location like Belgium—was more likely  to succeed if it were entirely removed from 
British and French influence.334 
 The league decided to follow Drummond with determination and confidence, because 
its authority was at stake and the prestige of the Council risked great diminishment in the 
eyes of not only the Lithuanians and Poles who might question this abrupt  change of policy, 
but also the enemies and the supporters of the League of the Nations. To avoid any 
embarrassment of the league, the military commissioners were charged with formulating a 
plan that they  knew to be unacceptable to both delegations, leaving the Poles and Lithuanians 
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completely responsible for the dismissal of the plebiscite and the Council free to point out 
their refusal to abide by its conditions.335 
 Predictably, everything went as planned at the opening of the twelfth Session of the 
Council. The Polish delegate once again objected that “withdrawing must be done with 
caution to prevent the whole nation from siding with Zeligowski that Poland consider a ‘rebel 
and a patriot.’ The population in the occupied territories having no desire to be united to 
Lithuania, a fact that the plebiscite is soon to prove, will also resent this decision.”336 Kaunas, 
on the other hand, claimed “indisputable rights” over all territories granted by the Treaty of 
Moscow to which Poland had no rights, because the decision of the Supreme Council in 1919 
had been only temporary. Moreover, if a plebiscite had to be held, it should include the 
Suwalki region west of the Curzon line and the Bialystok region south of the Lithuanian 
border as defined by the Treaty of Moscow. In accounting for their positions, the Lithuanians 
confirmed the Political Section’s  impression that “they seemed to base their claims more on 
historical considerations rather than on the will of the population concerned.”337 Accordingly, 
Grodno and Vilna were to be excluded, because historically Grodno had never belonged to 
Poland and at  the moment it still had no significant Polish minority. It  had always been part 
of the historical Lithuanian state, inhabited “by a branch of the Lithuanian race” that  had 
recently  had on several occasions expressed its wish to belong to Lithuania. The Vileika and 
Disna districts had to be included for the same reasons. As for Vilna, “it was only ‘just and 
necessary’ that  given its crucial importance as the historical capital of Lithuania and therefore 
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its national, religious and political significance for the state, its territory be granted to 
Lithuania without plebiscite.”338 
 A Council resolution of March 3, 1921, took note “of the obstacles created by both 
parties to the speedy  organization of the plebiscite” and invited them to consider a simpler, 
more effective procedure of direct negotiation on equal terms, to be conducted in Brussels 
within one month under the presidency of Paul Hymans, in order to arrive at an agreement 
that should settle all territorial, economic, and military  disputes between the two countries. 
Should the Polish government accept this recommendation, it would be expected to regain 
control over Zeligowski and his troops, ensuring the immediate reduction of his strength to 
one regular division of, at most, 15,000 men and that the troops occupying the disputed zone 
would not be reinforced. Lithuania had to withdraw its troops to their normal station in the 
country’s interior, leaving no more than two divisions at the demarcation line and 
contributing to improvement of the economic situation in the occupied territory by supplying 
food and seed, to be distributed under the supervision of the Military Commission. Until the 
final agreement was signed, no elections were to be conducted in the disputed territory 
without the permission of the president of the Brussels Conference.339 
 From September 6, 1920, to March 3, 1921, the league tried to contain the 
Lithuanian-Polish conflict amidst difficulties involving not only the disputants’ intransigence 
but also Soviet interference. These challenges had important implications for an organization 
under the constant scrutiny of international public opinion. Nonetheless, the League of 
Nations was able to make brave, independent decisions to uphold its commitment to organize 
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the plebiscite plan. Tellingly, only when Chicherin’s note of January 30, 1921, made the 
Soviet threat a reality did the league decide to renounce the plebiscite plan for various 
reasons. Until the Soviet note the league had not wavered, despite international public 
opinion’s lack of support for sending an international military  mission. In this regard, the 
league had managed to maintain a firm, independent line of action because the Military 
Commission’s reports allowed the Secretariat to discern between Lithuanian propaganda and 
the real risk that  the Vilna mission might degenerate into a war with Soviet Russia and 
Poland. 
 The league had also acted independently of the powers that, by the time the plebiscite 
was organized, had already  concluded that this was not the kind of dispute that a plebiscite 
would settle. Admittedly, the league’s arrival at the same conclusion after spending copious 
time and effort trying to organize a plebiscite that nobody  really  wanted might seem a rather 
clumsy mistake on the part of the league. Still, the experience gained during the plebiscite 
proved that it had not been a waste of time. As the next chapter will show, the lessons the 
league learned in those six months gave Geneva a fresh outlook on the problem that once 
again departed from the French and British official view while also reflecting a more 
insightful understanding of the disputants and their problems. 
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CHAPTER 2: BETWEEN NEW AND OLD DIPLOMACY 
 The Council resolution of March 3, 1921, acknowledged the impossibility of solving 
the dispute between Poland and Lithuania through a plebiscite and ushered in a new stage in 
the mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. Too much was at stake for the league to leave 
the disputants to their own devices, even though they lacked loyalty to Geneva and remained 
mutually  intransigent. The Military  Commission had successfully  dispelled the fears that 
Soviet Russia might use the dispute as a pretext to intervene, but league officials still saw this 
quarrel as a potential threat to European peace that must not be ignored. Thus, between 
March and the opening of the Brussels conference in late April 1921, the Secretariat had to 
reshape its outlook and strategy  to solve the dispute. This chapter therefore analyzes how the 
league understood the problem and how it came to formulate its own solution, the so-called 
Hymans Plan. The details and the significance of the Hymans Plan, and the Polish and 
Lithuanian response to it, are discussed in the next chapter. This chapter aims instead to show 
that the league, far from depending on London and Paris to be effective, on the contrary 
managed to secure British and French support for a plan of its own that reflected a new, 
original way  to evaluate and manage territorial disputes between states. Analysis of how 
Geneva handled the challenges of open diplomacy—namely, the international press’s impact 
on its policy, Polish and Lithuanian attempts to bypass the league by obtaining French and 
British support through traditional diplomatic channels, and finally the league’s own quest to 
establish its credentials at the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay—will explain this 
originality and is the object of this chapter. 
2.1 Facing the Challenges: International Public Opinion and Traditional Diplomacy
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 The Polish-Lithuanian dispute received generous coverage in the European press for 
many reasons. The primary question was who was responsible for the failure of the 
plebiscite: the league, or the contending parties. Those who saw the league as a panacea for 
all quarrels had to watch the Swiss refuse to give passage to the international contingent out 
of fear of conflict.340 They also had to admit that “a League which is to establish peace of the 
world could not even establish peace in Vilna,”341  as the The Morning Post evaluated the 
plebiscite’s dismissal in an article entitled the “Vilna Comedy.” A telegram by Lithuanian 
Prime Minister Antanas Smetona published in the Frankfurter Zeitung was similarly blunt, 
noting that “it is obvious that the Brussels Conference on Vilna will be unsuccessful, because 
the league will not be able to enforce the withdrawal of Zeligowski.”342   
 Le Petit Parisian instead noted more optimistically that for the first time, two nations 
on the verge of war had appealed to an international tribunal. This was reason to hope that a 
new spirit was animating the two states. Undoubtedly, “the League’s new way to conduct 
diplomacy  based on direct and honest talks between men of good will that had at heart the 
fate of their country and of humankind has given excellent results and their goodwill has 
prevented further bloodshed.”343  Further, “if we consider the decision of the Council the 
result of the application of the principle of self-determination to solve a dispute,” the Dutch 
newspaper De Masbode argued, “then the responsibility  of the failure does not rest 
completely with the League.”344  On the contrary, according to De Masbode, the very 
difficulty of organizing the plebiscite only proved how little known this principle was among 
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nations, and how important was the work needed to improve this situation. Moreover, even if 
the league had dismissed the plebiscite to avoid conflict with a nonmember state that 
remained a formidable military power—namely, Soviet Russia—it could still not be blamed 
for the failure. The responsibility lay instead with Polish and Lithuanian reluctance to 
collaborate, which was even more regrettable considering that the former was a founding 
state of the league and the latter had appealed for admission. These two countries had not 
recognized the effort the league had put into trying to act impartially.345 
 The British press too commented on the disputants’ reaction and expressed great 
concern “at the resolution of a meeting of Vilna representatives of various parties that had 
decided to continue to support General Zeligowski in opposition to the arbitrary whims of the 
League of Nations.”346  Les Dernières Nouvelles, for its part, was more concerned with the 
attitude of the Poles in Brussels, “where one must hope that the delegation does not try to 
impose their idea to revive the Polish-Lithuanian union of the XVIth century.”347  The 
Lithuanians considered such a union a threat to their independence, and given their deep 
distrust of Poland, they could hardly be expected to accept this offer. The two nations’ 
differences over Vilna were as profound as those dividing Poland and Soviet Russia over the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian territories, so “the League was the only hope, because this situation 
was very different from D’Annunzio’s occupation of Fiume.”348 
  The Times agreed that  Vilna stood for more than a simple frontier dispute, which was 
also why the Polish-Lithuanian conflict attracted the attention of the press. The situation was 
far more complicated; drawing borders would have not solved the problem or guaranteed 
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peaceful coexistence between these two countries because “if Vilna, the most appropriate 
capital for Lithuania, is left to Poland, the Lithuanians will consider themselves robbed of 
their birthright and will remain Poland’s bitterest enemies. If Vilna is given to Lithuania, the 
Lithuanian Poles, who are the largest section of the population, and the most highly 
developed socially, will refuse to allow themselves to be placed against their will in the hands 
of the Kaunas government, which they hate and despise. In either case, there will be 
troubles.”349  
Further complicating the situation was the inability to revive the old Polish-
Lithuanian federation, which “most Poles regard as impracticable and Lithuanians greatly 
resent.” Moreover, most  Poles in Poland and in Vilna were intolerant of any suggestion that 
left Vilna somehow connected with Lithuania. Yet, only  a settlement that satisfied “the acute 
national sensibilities of the two peoples and paved the way to neighborly relations by 
providing intimate political and economic guarantees between the two countries could be 
successful.”350 The necessary compromise solution had to be facilitated via the diplomacy  of 
the Great Powers, because “the Lithuanians must be shaken in their conviction that they  are 
the natural and rightful inheritors of the territory and traditions of Lithuanian Grand Dukes of 
the XIVth and XVth centuries and the Poles must  be induced to admit that there are other 
possible alternatives to the incorporation of Vilna in Poland.”351 
 The ideological quarrel between the disputants and the league’s fitness for the task 
were not the only questions at stake. International public opinion as well as European 
diplomatic and political circles evaluated the Polish-Lithuanian dispute also through the lens 
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of Poland’s persistent and successful attempts to revise the Versailles settlement. This in turn 
also provoked heated debate on what constituted a legitimate basis for territorial claims, in 
which France and Britain engaged in a tense exchange of opinions. 
 On May 14, Lloyd George spoke at the House of Commons about the Silesian 
question, “which is a problem of peace in Europe.” By raising an insurrection and trying to 
establish a fait accompli, he protested, the Polish General Wojciech Korfanty  had defied the 
Peace Conference’s decision to place Silesia, contested between Germany and Poland, under 
plebiscite. This act  was even more deplorable considering that the Treaty of Versailles “was 
the charter of Polish freedom,” Lloyd George remarked, “and the reason why Poland is the 
last country  that should complain about it and should have instead respected every comma of 
it.”352 
 As for Poland’s disavowal of its many generals’ actions, it had happened once too 
often to be credible.353 The example of Vilna reconfirmed that even if the Poles claimed to 
have no responsibility, “they are still there,” violating a settlement to which the United States, 
France, Italy, and Britain were parties.354 And Poland’s good faith was doubtful, considering 
the cross-border movement of Polish officers and arms.355  In Lloyd George’s opinion, by 
resorting to forcible removal of Signor D’Annunzio and his men from Fiume the Italian 
government had shown that it felt  that  the honor of a great nation was involved. Yet, he 
added, more than honor was at stake. Adherence to the Versailles Treaty  meant that 
international security was guaranteed.356  Hence there were only  two ways to deal with the 
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situation: “either the Allies ought to insist upon the treaty being respected, or they ought to 
allow the Germans to do it, … because fair play is what Britain stands for and … and 
whatever happens we cannot accept a fait accompli.”357 
! Lloyd George also argued that historical rights were not a good reason to threaten the 
Versailles settlement. True, Silesia had been Polish not for a hundred but six hundred years, 
but if you go a little beyond, we were French and France was English, and 
therefore you cannot go back six hundred years and begin to claim. There is a 
limit to absolute title of races in these problems. The old lawyers – in the 
interests they had not doubt of justice – justice developing very often in a bill 
of costs, traced abstracts of title to very remote origins. The common sense of 
the community at  last cut that down and they  had come somewhere within 
reasonable reach of modern times. The same thing applies to all these remote 
claims to property and Poland has certainly no rights to Silesia historically. 
The only claim that Poland could have either to Silesia as a whole or to part of 
it, is the fact that there is an overwhelming Polish population that has settled 
there quite recently.”358 
As for The Times, it spared no bitter words in describing these attempts to undermine the 
basis of the Treaty of Versailles, to which Poland owed its resurrection and without which it 
could not  defend its newly  recovered independence.359 Moreover, “violence can no more be 
tolerated by the Allies in this instance than could the lawlessness of D’Annunzio at Fiume or 
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of Zeligowski at Vilna. Undeviating adherence to this principle by all the Allies, is 
indispensable to maintain cordial relations between them.”360 The Korfanty  insurrection and 
the divergent views of it in Paris and in London created a situation that, The Times feared, 
“might easily  develop into a crisis affecting Anglo-French relations and the application of the 
Treaty of Versailles.”361 
 The French press found Lloyd George’s speech so disturbing that Prime Minister 
Aristide Briand took the unusual step of summoning representatives of the foreign press to 
the Quai d’Orsay to present his view on the situation to their readers.362 Le Temps fiercely 
criticized the British prime minister for favoring Upper Silesia’s annexation to Germany, 
“which is encouraging German militaristic and reactionary circles to take a move that would 
endanger European peace.”363 A large section of its article supported Poland’s historical and 
ethnographic rights over Upper Silesia, providing plenty of information that  “Lloyd George 
could easily  find in any library.”364 Prussian statistics proved that 80 percent of the population 
spoke Polish. Moreover, history showed that  not just Upper Silesia but the whole of Silesia 
had been Polish for centuries, which explained why “Frederick II in 1740 had to fight for 
eighteen months to be able to achieve the annexation of Upper Silesia to Prussia, which 
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Lloyd George that if “it is not for Poland herself to see that justice is done, obviously this 
principle applies also to Germany.”366 
 Concerned about the evaluation of its work, the league closely followed the debate in 
the press. The Times’s criticism of the league’s scant use of publicity regarding the presence 
of Polish troops in Vilna had strongly impressed the Secretariat.367  The advocacy of loyal 
supporters such as for example Reginald Berkley, a member of the League of Nations Union, 
was of little help.  Berkley  rebuked The Times because “the fault does not lie with the 
League.”368  Full information about the dispute had been circulated for publication; if 
something had not been published it was probably because the newspaper editors did not 
consider it of sufficient public interest.369  The seemingly ignorant Times correspondent, 
although stationed in Warsaw, had omitted to inform the public that the Polish government 
had undertaken to remove Zeligowski’s force from Vilna before the arrival of the 
international military  contingent, that a Civil Commission was to take over the civil 
administration, and finally, that both of them would have continued functioning until the 
territory was handed over to the party that prevailed.370 Berkley nevertheless agreed with The 
Times that “plain facts like these ought to be made public as soon as they are apparent” and 
therefore exhorted the newspapers’ editors to reserve even more space than was already 
allotted for publicizing important political problems.371 
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 Unlike Berkley, Henry Cummings of the league’s Information Section did not argue 
with British criticism, choosing instead to take immediate action. He sent off the preliminary 
notes on the Council meeting to all the League of Nations Unions, the Foreign Office press 
bureaus, and selected European newspapers. Even if they did not publish this material, they 
might still find it useful once the Council’s decisions were made known.372  Cummings 
believed that The Times’s article clearly indicated the importance of frank, prompt publication 
of information on the question, especially because the Polish and Lithuanian press bureaus in 
the various world capitals were distributing tendentious versions of daily  developments. The 
Council had to develop a bolder policy on publicity in this respect.373 
 The press’s interest in the upcoming talks at Brussels had to be encouraged for several 
other reasons. The presence of journalists could be useful, because the more aware the 
disputants were that their conflict had attracted the attention of Western Europe, the less 
inclined they would be to solve it  without considering western public opinion.374 This view 
reflected one of the league’s founding principles, which it existed to promote. After all, Lord 
Cecil himself had pointed out, to those who despised the idea of a league without political 
and military  power to enforce sanctions, that the league’s power resided in public opinion, 
and that if this proved wrong, then the entire idea was wrong.375 
 The secretary-general shared this faith and suggested that the press be not only duly 
informed but also admitted to the proceedings of the conference. He hoped that  Hymans 
agreed on the question of publicity, because “it is the only method of making both parties 
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reasonable and if both or either party doesn’t, the Press will make it clear on whom the onus 
of a failure rests, saving the League’s prestige.”376  Drummond, aware that open diplomacy 
“represents an innovation,” did not underestimate how important the rather thankless task 
Hymans had accepted was to the league’s reputation. Yet “in the circumstances of the present 
case”, he remarked, “the effect might be very beneficial, because admitting certain selected 
men from the Press is the best chance of securing a settlement.”377 
 Within the Political Section, however, many  held a different  view, suggesting greater 
caution with the press because of the disputants’ hostile attitude and the league’s being “left 
to  its own devices, because we cannot rely  on the support of Western Europe.”378 Whereas 
withholding information from the press, and thus leaving public opinion in suspense about 
the negotiations, might run counter to the league’s interests, it  was also crucial to create a 
congenial atmosphere in which the parties could freely express themselves without fear of the 
feelings and reactions their views might stir up  among their respective publics. Publicity 
should therefore be extremely limited, especially at the opening of the conference.379 
 The Secretariat finally decided to adopt a far less generous attitude than the one 
Drummond advocated. Upon Hymans’s suggestion, and with his help, Mantoux and Denis 
prepared a summary  of the nature and evolution of the dispute for the use of journalists and 
representatives of the telegraphic agency in Brussels. They had agreed that “in our interaction 
with the press, we have let them understand that they cannot expect daily  reports on the talks, 
and the journalists I have met with seem to have understood the problem.”380 The press was 
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finally informed that negotiations between the Lithuanian delegation, headed by Lithuanian 
Minister of Finance Ernestas Galvanauskas, and the Polish delegation, headed by Count 
Wladyslaw Sobanski, would open in Brussels on April 20 under the presidency of Paul 
Hymans, “whose role is not to mediate nor arbitrate the dispute, but only to assist the 
discussion of the issues at stake and to facilitate reconciliation of the two countries in the 
interest of European peace.”381 
 As an organization in its early years of activity, the League of Nations faced a real 
quandary. International public opinion was testing Geneva’s commitment to open diplomacy 
while the disputants were instead trying to bypass the league by using traditional diplomatic 
channels. Even before the opening of the negotiations at Brussels, nobody doubted that the 
greatest real challenge in settling the dispute was convincing the two governments rather than 
the delegations.382 Drummond did not conceal his concern about what at the moment seemed 
quite poor prospects for success.383  The Lithuanians were still hoping for a conference in 
London because the British were suspected of being pro-Lithuanian, although for this same 
reason Poland was unlikely  to accept.384 The Poles too had given Hymans very little reason to 
hope for the best.385  As of March 10, 1921, Zeligowski’s forces had been considerably 
augmented to a strength of 19,600 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.386  Regrettably, Warsaw had 
been unable to secure the submission of Zeligowski’s army to the Polish high commissioner 
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because postponement of the plebiscite option had diminished the urgency of troop 
reductions in Vilna.387 
 Both governments had accepted the invitation to attend the Brussels conference under 
the presidency of Hymans, but the Polish delegation was also using several telegrams from 
the Vilna region, “written in Polish” and petitioning for Vilna’s annexation to Poland, as a 
pretext to warn the league388 that Warsaw was entering into direct negotiations in Brussels, 
but without renouncing in principle the idea of a plebiscite or dismissing the requests of the 
Vilna Poles.389  Either a plebiscite or the negotiations would do, because they would 
inevitably result “in the confirmation of the fundamentally Polish character of the Vilna 
district, the mother of so many generations of the greatest  Polish citizens, the country of 
Kosciuszko and Mickiewicz, Poland’s greatest national hero and poet.”390 
 Poland’s formal response to the Council on March 19 nevertheless reassured the 
league that no elections would be held in Central Lithuania before Poland had exhausted all 
the means in its power to amicably settle the dispute in Brussels. Otherwise, the Polish 
government would honor the Central Lithuanian population’s request to freely  express its 
wishes.391 Notwithstanding this declaration, Pilsudski, Sapieha, and Ashkenazy were hardly 
eager to let a plebiscite decide the matter. They believed instead that for various reasons, they 
needed French and British support to help their federalist plan succeed. These powers’ 
support would in turn, they hoped, help to secure political victory over the Polish Diet, where 
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the stance that Vilna was an inseparable part of Polish national territory had come to 
predominate.392   None of them wanted to take a chance on supporting a program that ran 
counter to the wishes of the Polish Diet and did not enjoy the support of Polish public 
opinion.393  Finally, a plan endorsed by  these powers would be easier to impose on the 
Lithuanians.394
 Ashkenazy feared that Minister Wincenty  Witos might resign during the negotiations 
in Brussels, opening a very long ministerial crisis.395 Sapieha therefore was trying to delay 
the opening of conference in Brussels while working his way into the Foreign Office through 
Max Muller, the British ambassador in Warsaw. Sapieha’s federalist  crusade was not reserved 
to the British: through private and separate meetings, he also engaged the Italian 
representative Francesco Tommasini and the French ambassador, Hector Andre de Panafieu. 
Sapieha hoped they would confidentially  forward his federalist draft  outline to their 
respective governments. He asked each of them to be as discreet as possible because his 
“strictly  confidential” draft outlined the conditions that were maximally acceptable to the 
Polish government and thus was “of a nature that could arouse criticism from certain Polish 
political parties.396  The goal was therefore to win British and French support so that, in 
reviewing it at Brussels, Hymans and later the Council of the League of Nations would 
consider it the official view of the powers rather than a Polish initiative.397 
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 Sapieha met with Muller on March 21 to present  his plan.398 As an ardent federalist, 
he saw only two solutions: a small independent Lithuania, strictly ethnographic, with Kaunas 
as capital; or alternatively a “historical” Lithuania with Vilna as its capital but federated with 
Poland. Of these two alternatives the second was ideal, but in this case he would not be 
satisfied with anything short of a substantial federation, so any other arrangement in the way 
of “ententes,” “alliance,” loose links, and “similar camouflage” was totally unacceptable.399 
Federation meant a personal union practically indistinguishable in character from that which 
formerly regulated relations between Austria and Hungary. Poland and Lithuania would 
constitute a single sovereign state united under one chief of state, though each state would 
have its own Diet, independent internal and financial administrations, and army. A common 
council would conduct their foreign policy, and its representation had to be unitary, with 
Lithuanians and Poles having equal rights in such representation. Finally, to protect the Polish 
population, the Vilna region would be granted autonomy, following again the parallel of 
Hungary, which had handled the Croatian case similarly.400 
 Even though Sapieha’s draft referred to the creation of the “Confederation of 
Lithuania and Poland” or the “United States of Poland and Lithuania,” it established a 
permanent federal union meant to survive Europe’s recurrent political instability. The 
“Confederation” was a simple federation based on the principle of equality between the 
nations and between the large minority groups living in Lithuania.401  This would have 
prevented any future conflict, “such as the one that has recently provoked Polish 
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irredentism,” and offered sufficient guarantees for the development of cultural and political 
life. The first part of the document outlined the nature of the federal ties; the second dealt 
with the structure of the Lithuanian state. The draft envisioned a federation with a common 
president, elected for a two-year term by a commission of delegates from the two national 
parliaments and by an assembly  composed of all members of the Lithuanian parliament and 
an equal number of Poles elected by  the Polish Diet. In addition to the president, the 
executive powers rested in common ministers of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and 
general staff, while matters of economic interest would be discussed and decided by  a 
common department, whose head, like the three ministers, was answerable to the delegations 
of the two countries.402  Delegates appointed by each republic’s national parliament would 
separately  discuss matters of common interest; these commissions would meet alternatively 
in Poland and Lithuania. 
 As for the Lithuanian state, the draft saw Vilna as its capital and all nationalities as 
equal before the law. Its territory was to be divided into two cantons along the 1919 Foch 
line, each with its own local diet and administration to legislate all matters not falling within 
the competence of the Federal and Lithuanian state, such as local government, finance, public 
education, and police. Lithuania would have its own national parliament, elected by universal 
suffrage in ways to be determined but based on the principle of proportional representation. 
The parliament would legislate on matters of finance, trade and industry, and communication, 
except for questions of common interest to the Confederation, such as justice, postal and 
telegraphic services, national minorities, agriculture, and labor law.403 
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! On April 15, 1921, Muller, Tommasini and de Panafieu met to discuss Sapieha’s 
draft.404 They found it “a typical Polish production, verbose and inconclusive, and prefaced 
by an ex parte statement of the Polish government’s side of the case so discursive and 
prejudiced that its perusal cannot fail to produce irritation in the mind of the reader and thus 
exercise precisely the opposite effect to that which Sapieha has in mind, namely  securing 
“our governments’ support for a scheme to solve the Vilna question on the basis of 
federation.”405 
 Tommasini, de Panafieu, and Muller finally  met also with Sapieha to discuss their 
revised draft, which transformed his complete and personal union of Poland and Lithuania 
into a real confederation in which each country retained substantial independence and 
equality. They  saw a more moderate scheme for federation as having a better chance of 
acceptance, “either in its present form or with such modifications as may appear necessary to 
render it in every respect equitable to both parties.”406  The ambassadors reached their 
conclusions by reasoning along the classical principles of balance of power and preservation 
of the territorial status quo, hewing to pragmatic considerations. In the long run, some system 
of federation with Poland would prove the only possible safeguard against Lithuania’s 
absorption by either Russia or Germany, whose expansionism had to be contained.407  
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 On the other hand, though imposing federalism admittedly could seem at first sight to 
violate Lithuania’s right to self-determination, in the ambassadors’ opinion the Lithuanians 
had to be realistic.408 At present they controlled only the Kaunas canton, while the canton of 
Vilna, “rightly or wrongly, is in the hands of what are to all intents and purposes Polish 
troops.” Since neither Lithuania nor any other government was likely to be both willing and 
able to remove those troops and hand Vilna over to the Lithuanians, the latter could gain 
Vilna only by  paying the price the Poles demanded, namely, federation and the autonomy of 
the canton of Vilna.409 The ambassadors therefore firmly believed that they had to reconcile 
themselves with the Polish government’s conditions and secure the Lithuanians’ acceptance 
of them to prevent an impasse whose avoidance was in everyone’s interests. If the Brussels 
conference failed to settle the dispute, Poland would remain in de facto possession of Vilna, 
Lithuania would fall increasingly under the influence of either Russia or Germany, and the 
League of Nations, having shown itself powerless to settle the dispute, would suffer a 
corresponding loss of prestige.410 
   Although initially  Muller disagreed with the clause of one president “elected for 
several years by the two national Diets reunited,” which gave Poland an obvious advantage 
over Lithuania, he nevertheless concurred with Tommasini and de Panafieu that the idea of 
having two separate chiefs of state combined with a system of federation that coordinated 
their foreign policy was unprecedented and impracticable. For this reason, they finally  opted 
for a formula that envisioned the creation of joint  delegations or an assembly  of 
representatives chosen in equal numbers from the Polish and Lithuanian diets respectively. 





supreme command should be necessarily  in Polish hands and more clearly  stated the method 
of election and of the functions of the two delegations. The most radical alteration of the 
original document concerned the composition of Lithuania’s national legislative body. The 
quite unacceptable Polish suggestion that it be composed of delegations from the principal 
diets was substituted with proposal for a National Lithuanian Diet elected by direct universal 
suffrage or a system of proportional representation. After some demur, Sapieha accepted this 
modification.411 
 Finally, in response to Sapieha’s request that Hymans endorse this draft as a basis for 
the discussions in Brussels, the three ambassadors informed him that they could not take the 
initiative before informing their own governments about their drafted version, which, if 
approved, could be submitted to Hymans.412 Sapieha, however, had already sent his own draft 
to Paris and London without previously  informing either Hymans or the Polish ambassador in 
Brussels. The Quai d’Orsay and the Foreign Office greatly  resented Sapieha’s manners but 
supported the ambassadors’ revised scheme for a kind of mild federation between Poland and 
Lithuania.413  Bearing in mind the Lithuanians’ reluctance to enter a federation with their 
neighbor, the British and French governments were ready to offer Lithuania a bit more 
leeway and respect for her sovereignty rights. But their consideration was more apparent than 
real, as the main issue was to render the inevitable evil of having to federate with Poland 
more palatable to the Lithuanians. 
 The French believed that geographical proximity, more than history, justified a union 
that was necessary  and in the interests of Poland and Lithuania as well as European peace. 
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Since federation did not imply sacrificing Lithuania’s equality with Poland, they suggested 
bypassing terminological issues that could hamper the negotiations. It seemed appropriate to 
adopt the term “Union Convention” because “union” was more general and “convention” 
emphasized that both nations were equal, “which should appease Lithuanians, whose fears 
are, in this regard, excessive.”414  To guarantee Lithuanian rights, the Union Convention 
should retain the project  of the three ministers, because their role was crucial and the system 
of delegations seemed the best guarantee of Lithuania’s equal footing in the decision-making 
process.415  Lithuania’s concern about being drawn into an international conflict caused by 
Poland’s own political agenda required careful consideration and serious guarantees. Along 
with the delegation system, both parliaments had to have veto power and the right  to appeal 
to the Council of the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice in case of 
conflict—provided that Poland had not provoked it  in pursuit of its own interests, in which 
case Lithuania was not  expected to help. Vilna was the capital of Lithuania and the seat of the 
National Assembly, but the Vilna region and the rest of Lithuania were reorganized as Swiss 
cantons.416 Similarly, Memel would be granted to Lithuania with special guarantees of free 
access to the sea. This condition was obviously to be added as a corollary to the agreement 
after its ratification.417 
 The Foreign Office essentially thought along the same lines. The two countries’ 
embittered relations after two years of perpetual strife clearly indicated that the Brussels 
conference was unlikely to lead anywhere unless the two parties were willing to make 
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concessions.418  Then again, although London had for some time been disposed to favor a 
solution along federative lines, “public opinion in Lithuania is evidently  not ripe for this, and 
the name ‘federation’ should therefore be avoided in any  attempt to fix the relations between 
the two countries.”419  Any initial difficulty could be easily  overcome with a simple mutual 
recognition that the disputants stood in a special relationship to one another; thusly 
acknowledging that  they belonged to the same political orbit might pave the way for a fuller 
measure of federation in the future.420 To effect this, some means would have to be devised to 
ensure that the two countries conducted their foreign policy either in common or in harmony, 
but at the same time Lithuania would need some safeguard against being drawn into a 
conflict involving purely Polish interests. Such a safeguard of Lithuania’s rights could be 
achieved via an agreement guaranteed by  the League of Nations. Based on this 
understanding, London favored designating Vilna the capital of Lithuania and the seat of the 
Lithuanian National Assembly—subject to Lithuania conceding some form of autonomy to 
the Vilna area—and assigning Memel to Lithuania. In return, Lithuania should submit to the 
arrangements it had made under the Treaty  of Moscow, enter into a commercial treaty  with 
Poland on corresponding basis, and grant it unimpeded transit to the sea.421 
 Despite agreeing about federalism, the powers were divided on the issue of 
Lithuania’s de jure recognition, which was still pending. In December 1920, Britain had 
voted against the three Baltic states’ admission to the League of Nations. This reflected the 
Allied Powers’ decision to accord recognition only after it was clear that the Bolsheviks were 
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in fact capable of consolidating their power over Russia. The defeat of the White troops under 
Peter von Wrangel in the Crimea in late 1920 finally convinced London and Paris that 
Bolshevik power would endure, and Latvia and Estonia were granted de jure recognition on 
January 26, 1921.422 
 Lithuania’s recognition, however, was postponed and subordinated to the settlement 
of the border dispute with Poland.423 In March 1921, Paris still believed that even if Soviet 
Russia was no longer problem, the threat of non-recognition could still be used to pressure 
the Lithuanians. Considering the Lithuanian public’s hostile opinion of federation with 
Poland, granting de jure recognition now would radicalize the intransigence of residents who 
opposed the Brussels negotiations.424 Hence, although Briand had reassured the Lithuanian 
representative Milosz that he would support Lithuania’s recognition at the next meeting of the 
Supreme Council, he also considered it contingent on reaching agreement in Brussels.425 The 
Foreign Office, meanwhile, strongly disagreed; since the end of March 1921 it  had informally 
encouraged Poland to grant de jure recognition. A month later this step  seemed even more 
necessary  due to “the increasing tension and agitation in Vilna among Polish chauvinists and 
landlords to cut the Lithuanian knot by force. With Vilna practically  under Warsaw 
administration and the little or no prestige of the League in those parts, there seems nothing 
to check the collision between Polish and Lithuanian forces facing one another on either side 
of the neutral zone expect mutual fear.”426 
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 Sapieha’s reply that he would consider taking this step before the opening of the 
Brussels conference and had agreed “to meet Lithuania as an equal in Brussels” seemed to 
have created space for a modification of the powers’ stance.427  Admittedly, granting 
recognition could be used as part of the bargain, but London preferred fair play and remarked 
that “if it were conceded on its own merits it might create a favorable atmosphere for the 
impending negotiations, and Lithuania might more easily be brought into line.”428 
 Hymans too agreed that de jure recognition could be one of the means to pressure 
Lithuania.429 The league, however, saw this problem as much more than an opportunity for 
traditional diplomatic ploys. At the First Plenary  Assembly of the League of Nations on 
November 15, 1920, discussion of the admission of Lithuania, as well as the other Baltic 
States and Georgia, immediately revealed that this question had serious implications for 
European security and peace, and the league’s role as its guarantor. Article 10 of the league’s 
covenant bound all member states to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing 
independence of all its members in case of aggression or threat.430 Admitting these states, 
which were “in proximity to a country  that was in the grip of anarchy,” would have put the 
league at risk of war with Soviet Russia.431 The Canadian delegate Newton Wesley Rowell 
suggested it was more prudent to avoid risk and postpone their admission until the Legal 
Section gave its opinion. Lord Cecil responded that  the efforts of Georgia and the Baltic 
States to acquire stability could not be dismissed so lightly and proposed a compromise 
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solution that admitted them without the assurance of the protection given under article 10.432 
This solution seemed rather impractical to the French representative Rene Viviani, who 
remarked that not only  was it highly questionable that any state would agree to be admitted 
on this condition, but the solution was also dangerous. Making this exception would create a 
precedent that could one day be used against another article of the covenant.433 
! The candidacy of the Baltic and Caucasian states also posed the problem of deciding 
and establishing the league’s own legitimate sphere of action relative to the right of sovereign 
states to determine these matters. As had been the case in the negotiations between Poland 
and Lithuania on the plebiscite, the league was once again challenged with the double task of 
establishing its own machinery and authority  to make the decisions, and carrying out the 
duties it had been created to fulfill. After all, if the powers had not granted recognition yet, 
did the league have the right to overstep their authority? 
 The Assembly created a Fifth Committee to study general problems involved in the 
admission of new states and to provide guidance to the subcommittees that examined each 
application, taking into consideration the state’s recognition status (de jure or de facto), the 
stability  of its government and frontiers, and the extent to which its international obligations 
conformed with the league’s prescriptions in regards to armaments.434 The examination found 
that the three Baltic states had succeeded in establishing democratic and independent 
governments and had obtained de jure recognition from Soviet Russia and de facto 
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recognition from other states. They possessed adequate territories and populations, and their 
borders were defined, with the exception of Lithuania, whose territorial dispute with Poland 
was in the process of being settled by  a plebiscite organized by the league. But apart from 
meeting these criteria, there remained the dilemma of whether the league should proceed with 
admission or act “more strictly  in accordance with legal practice and wait until they  have 
received de jure recognition by  the States members of the League.”435  Lord Cecil and the 
Canadian delegate Newton Wesley Rowell advocated a strong league independent of the 
powers’ influence, in contrast to what some recent articles in the press suggested, but 
members of the Fifth Committee generally agreed that  the league should not risk conflict 
with the powers, and that neither the committee nor the Assembly should second-guess their 
decision on this matter.436   
It was therefore decided to postpone the admission of the Baltic states and permit 
Latvia and Estonia to cooperate in the Technical Organizations of the League of Nations on 
Matters of General Interest in the meantime.437 This privilege was accorded to Lithuania only 
after several members of the Council, including Bourgeois, Balfour, and Quinones de Leon, 
had been consulted and confirmed that  “the attitude taken by Lithuania in the dispute before 
the League does not call for any special treatment.”438 
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2.2 Establishing New Diplomacy and The Quest for Alternatives
 Unlike the ambassadors and the powers, the league formulated its outlook on the 
dispute only  after launching a thorough evaluation of various possible scenarios in light of a 
wealth of information unavailable to the Quai d’Orsay and the Foreign Office. The Hymans 
Plan and the strategy to be followed at the upcoming negotiations resulted from close 
collaboration between the Secretariat  and the Military Commission. Hymans had several 
meetings with the military commissioners, Chardigny, General Alfred Burt, Pedro Saura, and 
two members of the Political Section- Mantoux and Denis- to discuss the best  approach to the 
entire dispute.439  Their perspective on the problem, and consequently the solution they 
envisioned, differed from those of London and Paris as well as Ashkenazy  and Sapieha’s plan 
for federation of Poland and Lithuania. 
! Experience gained during the negotiation of the plebiscite led the league to conclude 
that admitting both parties to the negotiations on equal footing would not be enough to 
neutralize Lithuania’s fears for its independence and sovereignty. The small state’s 
independence needed to be not only  formal but also substantially guaranteed. As far as the 
league was concerned, the respect of the principle of self-determination was therefore neither 
a question of terminology nor of political expedience but one of substance. Hymans therefore 
revised the scheme of the three ambassadors approved by the powers dissolving any  trace of 
federal ties between the two countries to replace them with “what it is not federation but 
something very close to it.”440 It was more appropriate to leave as much room as possible to 
the disputants to discuss and decide the kind of close ties they were expected to enter, 
“because only  a general agreement between Lithuania and Poland that respects the 
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sovereignty of both states, will resolve the Vilna question, by granting the contested territory 
to Lithuania while establishing at the same time a regime that in the short run will guarantee 
the protection of all the rights of the Polish population and will secure the development of 
their cultural life in the future.”441
 The Military  Commission crucially influenced the Hymans draft, which in turn 
accounts for the historical originality and modernity the league exhibited in negotiating what 
today  are called ethnic conflicts. Although international treaties had addressed the treatment 
of minority  groups well before the Congress of Westphalia in 1648, the laws of the sovereign 
and the treaty stipulations pertaining to such communities prevailed over the rights of 
subjects of other religious affiliations. These groups’ worthiness of such rights did not derive 
from their humanity or from natural law but rather lay at the discretion of the sovereign.442 
 Before the league it  was unprecedented to settle disputes over ethnically  mixed 
territories on the basis of, among other factors, the historical development of state-minority 
relations, or minorities’ “feeling” about their linguistic, national, and religious identity  or 
political preference for one state or another. The international Commission of Jurists 
appointed by the Council to study the Aalanders’ petitions in 1920 attended to each of these 
aspects of the general problem.443 The general premise of this approach was that the crucial 
components of postwar international order and stability  included not only minorities’ national 
identity, if any, but also their general mood and well-being.444  In this respect the Polish-
Lithuanian conflict resembled the Aaland Islands case, and the Military Commission’s reports 
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on the dynamics of interethnic relations between Polish and Lithuanian minorities were 
crucial to the drafting of Hymans’s scheme and to the Secretariat’s view and strategy.
 In late 1920, when the organization of the plebiscite was still under discussion, the 
Political Section had planned to withdraw the international contingent immediately  after the 
consultation, on the assumption that the plebiscite would settle the dispute between Poland 
and Lithuania once and for all.445 Yet  the military commissioners had warned Geneva of the 
improbability that the plebiscite, regardless of its outcome, would represent a definitive 
solution.446 There were no guarantees in this respect, because on the one hand, the plebiscite 
under the league was to have been held against the will of the Lithuanians, who had always 
favored the approach of direct negotiations that might have granted them Vilna without 
public consultation, while the Poles, on the other hand, saw the plebiscite as an opportunity  to 
legalize their unfair annexation. Given the circumstances, it was hard to predict how the loser 
would react or anticipate how its disappointment would be manifested.447 
 The highly mixed ethnic composition and national identity  of the contested territories 
was one more reason why, in the commissioners’ opinion, the plebiscite alone could not 
provide a lasting and perfect solution without further stipulations upon its completion. The 
British military commissioner, Major Keenan, commented extensively  on the strong 
influence the Poles wielded in the disputed territories and on their success in Polonizing the 
population. Some villages were very mixed, but as a rule they were either pure Lithuanian or 
Polish. Belarusian-speaking peasants had mixed themselves up among both but were, 
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generally  speaking, inclined toward Lithuania. The inhabitants of some villages Keenan had 
visited did not possess a clear national identity. They  spoke Polish and Lithuanian equally 
well; that is, the younger generation spoke Polish while the older was perfectly  bilingual. 
Deeper questioning about their ancestors generally  revealed that they had spoken only 
Lithuanian. The residents of pure Polish villages at the moment wanted nothing other than 
union with Poland, but  Keenan was convinced that thorough investigation would also prove 
them to be Polonized Lithuanians.448  It was not uncommon to come across a pure Polish 
village surrounded by villages inhabited by Lithuanians, or a Lithuanian village surrounded 
by Polish villages, and the general impression was that numerous inhabitants had not yet 
discovered their nationality. The Mariampol district, where now Lithuanians claimed to be 
the majority, had years ago been Polish until the peasants found their nationality: 
The Polonization of the Vilna region has been checked for now, and whether it 
can be revised, rests entirely with the Poles themselves, but one thing I am 
certain of is that  any aggressive policy will spoil their chances. Therefore, in 
my opinion a Polish or Lithuanian administration of such a mixed district, 
without equal rights of language etc... to each nationality, will not be 
satisfactory and will not be a peaceful solution. If the town and district of 
Vilna are placed under Poland or under Polish administration, there will never 
be peace between Lithuania and Poland. If, on the other hand, the town and 
district fall to Lithuanians, it is likely  that if they are given free hand, they will 
try to Lithuanize the district, and one would see Poland up in arms against 
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Lithuania sooner or later. In short, if one can give Poles and Lithuanians in 
Lithuania equal rights, and by some means induce the Lithuanians to modify 
their agrarian policy, there is some prospect of co-operation in the future. 
Otherwise Lithuania will act just like the Latvians and the Estonians who got 
rid of the German Balts by introducing such radical agrarian acts, which 
practically deprived the landowners of all their property.449 
 Keenan feared that such an outcome would, within a year or two, impede the 
economic reconstruction of the Baltic states. In Lithuania the landowners were Polish, or at 
least they spoke Polish and identified themselves as Poles. The Lithuanians were indeed 
applying a similar agrarian reform act  that  was bound to harm the economic state of the 
country  and increase enmity between Lithuanians and Poles. The Lithuanians would find it 
difficult to oust Polish landowners in the same way the Estonians and Latvians had expelled 
the Germans, and attempting such a step  on a large scale was likely to provoke war with 
Poland: “The Poles will continue to polonize, the Lithuanians will redouble their efforts to 
Lithuanize, but possibly  the much hoped for federation would be accomplished in the course 
of several years. There is nothing to prevent it, as far as I can see, if Poland acts like a 
neighbor and instead of driving the Lithuanians, leads them.”450
 Once the Secretariat grasped the origins of the disputants’ enmity, it proceeded to 
evaluate different scenarios to break Lithuanian and Polish resistance and find possible allies. 
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“esprit politique” seemed the chief obstacle before the talks began.452 Clearly, Warsaw’s goal 
was to produce a deadlock by imposing federation on Lithuania in exchange for Vilna, “but in 
Brussels we are determined to guard ourselves against  this strategy.”453 Geneva nevertheless 
agreed to postpone the opening of the negotiations because Sapieha still hoped that with 
Pilsudski’s help  he could convince Zeligowski’s supporters in the Polish Diet  to settle for a 
more moderate solution and renounce Vilna. The Poles also feared that reopening the Riga 
talks in early  May would give the Bolsheviks a pretext  to interfere, and that even if nobody 
expected the negotiations to end in a few days, it might still be possible to obtain a formal 
guarantee of neutrality from Moscow.454  Obviously, however, this request—which seemed 
reasonable to Hymans—was problematic because “public opinion might be led to think that 
Poland is trying to postpone the talks indefinitely.”455  The Political Section, far from 
reassuring Ashkenazy, warned him against this tactic, as the Lithuanians could respond in 
kind by preparing a counterproposal favorable to them in hopes of British support.456 In the 
meantime, Hymans was to inform the press of Poland’s commitment to finding a solution to 
the Polish-Lithuanian dispute and also relay that the talks, scheduled for April 18, would then 
reopen on May  3 to allow both governments to take all needed steps to ensure the 
negotiations’ successful outcome.457 
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 Geneva had also concluded that insistence on Zeligowski’s withdrawal would 
compromise any possibility for further negotiation.458 Unfortunately, it was also clear that the 
Lithuanians were unlikely to consent to enter negotiations on terms less favorable than those 
promised by the Council resolution of March 3, 1921, which recommended the reduction of 
Zeligowski’s forces.459  In addition, Kaunas expected the Poles to respect also the Suwalki 
Agreement of October 7, 1920. Finally, Lithuania also claimed also the right to control, in 
conjunction with the Military Commission, the distribution of food supplies, whereas Poland 
objected to this because the commission’s powers should not go beyond military duties.460 
 Different ways to bring them to reason were discussed. In Hymans’s view, direct 
negotiations were absolutely necessary  “as they represent the last chance to settle the 
dispute,”461  though they need not necessarily take place in Brussels under Hymans’ 
presidency. Paul Denis instead suggested that whereas there remained a remote possibility  of 
finding an agreement, organizing a general conference with Czech Prime Minister Edvard 
Benes’s support and the participation of Russia’s neighbors, as Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania 
would exert greater pressure on Poland than would the western powers.462 Gerald Hequerty 
Furtado Abraham at the Political Section found the idea attractive, especially  considering that 
the British Arbitration Commission463 had just succeeded in establishing a demarcation line 
between Lithuania and Latvia that both countries accepted. 
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 Still, certain practical problems had to be taken into account if Denis’s suggestion was 
to be seriously  considered.464 Besides the more obvious issues of organizing the logistics and 
justifying the purpose of this initiative, Latvia was exceedingly unlikely  to support this option 
right after the league had refused to grant  it admission. Moreover, psychologically  it was 
necessary  to avoid showing any hesitation now, as entering negotiations without conviction 
would prove fatal. On the contrary, Hymans’s task was to show unwavering determination, 
giving both parties the impression that he would not release them unless an agreement was 
reached. Finally, Benes’s participation entailed the risk that his presence would hamper the 
negotiations with the Poles, who probably were still disappointed at losing the city  of 
Freistadt in the Polish-Czech Teschen dispute, not to mention the very  low likelihood that 
Benes would run the risk of getting involved in negotiations in which he had no direct 
interest.465 
 A second option was to rely on London and Paris for diplomatic assistance.466 
However, the league was keeping close watch on the intensive exchange of correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay, which “instead of helping is only 
encouraging both parties to cling to their own positions.”467  Determined to play  an active 
role, the Political Section believed that “even if nothing can be done to prevent decisions 
from being made in London and Paris, what we can do, is to make sure that we are present 
when that  time comes and that our view prevails.”468 To be sure, it was important to secure 
French and British support. For this reason, Mantoux and Chardigny were sent to the Quai 
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d’Orsay  while Military Commissioner General Burt  approached the Foreign Office. Yet the 
league’s delegates were instructed to wait until Hymans had elaborated a more detailed 
program before asking for any specific help, and it would be extremely  dangerous to decide 
on a more detailed approach before having heard the disputants.469  Meantime, before the 
conference opened, Hymans would discuss his work with the French and British 
ambassadors, but  considering that “he is certainly more authoritative than the members of the 
Commission or the representatives of the Secretariat,” he was also instructed to pay his own 
visits to the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay.470 Hymans started his diplomatic tour in 
mid-April.471 From Paris he was glad to report that Bourgeois “is proving his loyalty to the 
League by avoiding discussing any  of the questions raised by Sapieha and Ashkenazy.”472 In 
a long conversation with Hymans, Bourgeois had promised that the French government 
would support his plan, “which seems the fairest.”473 The Quai d’Orsay  officially confirmed 
his words after a meeting between Briand, Mantoux, and Hymans on May 18. 
 The Foreign Office, for its part, was very flexible and ready to support the three 
ambassadors’ scheme if the parties were willing to accept it and able to reach an 
understanding. In any case, even given the likelihood of having to make further concessions 
to Poland, the British would not support anything that  went beyond the Hymans Plan on the 
Lithuanian side or the three ministers’ scheme on the Polish side.474 
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 Having finally secured British and French support for its plan, the Secretariat  resisted 
the temptation to use British support for a plan more favorable to Poland to pressure Kaunas 
and thus facilitate the negotiations.475  League officials saw it as their duty to guarantee 
fairness and protection to Lithuania, whose fate still hung in the balance because, as the 
disheartened Ernestas Galvanauskas (who had replaced Voldemaras as the Lithuanian 
delegate at Geneva) admitted, Soviet Russia was still a possible threat.476 
 As this chapter has argued, in many ways the league represented an alternative to 
Great Power politics and a new way to manage territorial disputes. When Hymans presented 
his plan to the Poles and Lithuanians in Brussels in mid-May 1921, he had already fully 
secured British and French support, which meant they would not interfere with the league’s 
work.477 The latter was finally ready  and free to negotiate a complex, multifaceted political 
and territorial settlement based on greater respect for Lithuanian self-determination than 
France and Britain were willing to show, committed as they were to principles of balance of 
power and maintenance of territorial status quo. This was possible also because the Military 
Commission’s firsthand information on interethnic relations in the disputed territories, and on 
their dangerous implications for current and future Polish and Lithuanian nationalizing 
policies, allowed the Secretariat  to think of security in broader terms than those followed in 
Paris and London.  
 Geneva’s agreement with the powers that diplomatic recognition of Lithuania and its 
admission to the league should be postponed until after the Brussels conference admittedly 
seems a poor alternative to the discredited prewar alliance system and principle of balance of 
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power. In April 1921, The Manchester Guardian did not spare its criticism “against what the 
Lithuanians must see as a travesty of justice to associate the question of de jure recognition, 
either directly or indirectly, with the result of negotiations arising out of Poland’s lawless act, 
even more so considering that the League of Nations itself was morally responsible for 
Zeligowski’s forcible occupation of Vilna after the city  had been assigned to Lithuania by 
Russia and indeed, after the Lithuanians had entered into agreement with Poles 
themselves.”478 
 Certainly  this gave Lithuania an implicit ultimatum, leaving it free only  to choose 
between the alternatives discussed at Brussels and acceptance of the inevitable union with 
Poland. Yet it must be noted that within this set of boundaries, in 1920 the league represented 
a far better opportunity  for the Lithuanians to gain much more than what the powers could or 
would have been willing to offer them. This is even clearer in historical perspective. As the 
historian Alfred Erich Senn observed, at the Peace Conference in 1919 Lithuania’s demands 
were regarded as but a minor aspect of the broader Polish and Russian questions. The 
Lithuanian delegates had only “standing room back against  the wall” while greater powers 
decided their destiny behind closed doors.479 At Yalta in 1945, these decisions required even 
less discussion and were made with no consideration whatsoever for Lithuanian wishes.
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CHAPTER 3: THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE
3.1 Introduction
! The failed attempt to organize the plebiscite had led the League of Nations to 
conclude that the Polish-Lithuanian conflict  was no mere border dispute but a deeper political 
conflict that would threaten peace and stability in the region, and consequently in Europe, 
until durable political, economic, and military cooperation was established between Poland 
and Lithuania.
At the same time, the league understood that it was unrealistic to expect the Lithuanians to 
voluntarily  enter into any agreement with Poland that would jeopardize their national 
sovereignty and independence. The Hymans Plan, negotiated in Brussels under the 
presidency of Paul Hymans between April 29 and June 3, 1921, represented a compromise 
between Lithuania’s claims to independence and sovereignty  over the Vilna district, and 
Polish federalism. This chapter analyzes its significance relative to the league’s strategy and 
goals and evaluates it in the broader context of Lithuania’s and Poland’s conflicting, often 
even self-contradictory visions of their common past and present relations.  
 Timothy Snyder argued that in 1920, any  possible agreement between Poland and 
Lithuania along federalist lines was arguably  already  doomed, because federalism was 
inherently  more complex than the annexation of Vilna to a national state and also required 
well-chosen borders, compromises among elites, and the consent of the governed.480 In this 
sense, and without taking into account or mentioning the league’s attempt to mediate the 
dispute, he argues that the triumph of Polish and Lithuanian nationalism was less an example 
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of postwar self-determination than a victory of modern nationalism over the traditional 
multiethnic patriotism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that imbued Pilsudski’s federalism.481 
 As this chapter shows, the divide between Pilsudski’s federalism and modern 
nationalisms was far from clear-cut. Moreover, the Lithuanians in 1921 still saw finding an 
agreement along federal lines for the disputed territories (though not in Sapieha’s and 
Pilsudski’s terms) as a possibility. Therefore, the league owed its ability to make a difference 
between the disputants to the discussion of the Hymans Plan at  the Lithuanian Constituent 
and the Kaunas government’s willingness to accept the plan as a basis for discussion. Given 
that the league had been created to assist  states in disputes that they were unable to solve 
alone, its contribution should not be overlooked. Indeed, it becomes even more remarkable 
when evaluated against the Poles’ and Lithuanians’ many failed attempts to solve their 
problems through direct talks long before 1920. 
 A second reason to focus on the contending parties’ response to the Hymans Plan is 
that it allows investigation of the role of the ideological meaning of territory in the 
negotiation of territorial and ethnic disputes. Today territorial disputes are typically explained 
through the conceptual lenses of power politics and rational strategic and economic state 
interests. This view has prevailed not only  in the study of international relations, but also in 
policy-making and management of territorial disputes.482 Norms are usually  seen simply as 
efforts to legitimize territorial claims and transfers, not as factors producing the disputes in 
the first place.483 However, this chapter shows that for contending parties, conflict over the 
ideological significance of a territory can take priority over the economic and political 
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interests that unite them. Finally, the discourse of territorial claims justification also affects 
how the Polish and Lithuanian disputants evaluated Ashkenazy’s possible solutions to the 
problem, suggesting that  its importance in the negotiation process is worth examining. The 
league understood this very  well. Hymans’s and the Council’s efforts to overcome the two 
delegations’ intransigence by  drawing up a second Hymans draft are discussed in the final 
section of this chapter. 
 
As far as the league was concerned, the Polish and Lithuanian delegations had been 
invited to Brussels “to discuss an entirely  new question” that differed substantially from the 
one previously  negotiated by the Council.484  Whereas some within the Political Section 
acknowledged that, speaking strictly ethnographically, Polish claims over the city of Vilna 
were more legitimate than Lithuanian ones, establishing good relations between the two 
countries seemed far more important and also would serve Poland’s own interests.485 League 
officials no longer saw the fate of Vilna as the only  matter at stake, because a successful 
territorial settlement hinged on addressing the broader question of general relations between 
the two countries. Having reached this goal, “we will reserve for ourselves the right to draw 
the frontiers and to decide on the organization of the Lithuanian state, which are relatively 
easy questions to deal with.”486 
Instead of imposing federation between Poland and Lithuania, the league opted for 
transforming Lithuania into a federal state with “close ties” with Poland. Before the opening 
of the conference, informal talks with both delegations had left the impression that the 
Lithuanians could be relatively easily persuaded to accept the creation of a Lithuanian federal 
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state, as long as they were guaranteed sovereignty over the Vilna region and independence 
from Poland. Though they had not made a direct statement on this matter, the Lithuanian 
delegates seemed willing to agree to the borders suggested by the Military Commission, 
which left Grodno and Lida to Poland. Similarly, Paul Denis was confident that “they  could 
be persuaded to accept autonomy for the Vilna region.”487  The Lithuanians made vague 
statements about holding the elections announced by Zeligowski, a concession that would 
greatly please Poland and perhaps left reasonable grounds to hope they would also accept 
Polish as the second official language of the Lithuanian state.488
The league saw the Hymans Plan as the best way to accommodate Lithuania’s claims 
over Vilna with Poland’s wish to create a federation. The scheme also served to provide a 
political, rather than administrative, solution to the problem of Lithuanian and Polish 
coexistence in the ethnically mixed Vilna region.489  Hymans was not particularly eager to 
impose the details of a plan that he considered provisional, flexible, and therefore negotiable; 
his main concern was instead to prevent one party from prevaricating or imposing its views 
and thus compromising the chances of reaching agreement.490 This meant convincing the two 
governments that the plan needed to be accepted as a whole, since choosing to agree only to 
conditions favorable to a party’s own interests would lead nowhere.491  For this reason 
Hymans had initially thought to address the status of the Vilna district at the opening of the 
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talks, leaving for later the question the league considered more important, namely, the 
establishment of “close political, economic and military ties” between the two countries.492  
According to Hymans’s scheme, the two states would recognize each other’s 
independence and sovereignty, but Lithuania had to become a federal state consisting of two 
autonomous cantons of Kaunas and Vilna, whose boundaries should coincide with those of 
the neutral zone created by  the Military Commission of the League of Nations. The cantons 
were organized on the model of the Swiss cantons, the central government had the same 
powers as the federal government in Bern, and Vilna was the capital of the federal state. The 
army was organized on the basis of local recruitment and under a single command, as in 
Switzerland. Polish and Lithuanian were the official languages throughout the state, and 
ample guarantees to education, religion, language and the right to association were extended 
to all national minorities. 
Despite the hopes of the powers and the Polish federalists, the league’s plan did not 
federate Poland and Lithuania but rather established a kind of loose but permanent political, 
economic, and military cooperation through ad hoc councils that nevertheless did not infringe 
on either state’s independence and sovereignty. Each government would appoint three 
representatives to a common council to coordinate their foreign policy, decide by majority 
vote on questions of common interest, and prepare reports for conferences between the two 
governments. The Polish and Lithuanian parliaments would appoint two delegations of equal 
members, selected to attend the conferences via a system of proportional representation. 
Foreign policy measures of mutual interest that required legislative sanction were to be 
submitted first to the two delegations in joint  session; their decisions were then subject to 
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ratification by each country’s national parliament.493 A Defensive Military Convention would 
coordinate the decisions and activities of the two general staffs, and in the event  of war, it 
would outline a mobilization scheme for concentrating and deploying troops on the borders. 
In the strategic interests of both, each country  was to guarantee each the other military 
assistance and allow mutual use of territorial bases, roads, railways, and so on. Even if both 
armies were placed under a single command in a military  operation, the main body of 
Lithuanian troops would remain under Lithuanian command. Finally, the two countries would 
conclude an economic convention of a more comprehensive nature than the “most-favored 
nation” clause, establishing the principle of free trade with such exceptions as might be 
rendered necessary by  either their internal fiscal regime or, pending the establishment of a 
common monetary system, by inequality of exchange. 
The Economic Council, consisting of representatives of both governments, would 
supervise implementation of the customs agreement, making all the necessary  provisions. It 
was also to study  questions of economic interest, such as transport, communication, monetary 
system, fiscal regime, monopolies, purchases of goods abroad, and economic conventions. 
The council would submit its reports to both governments. Lithuania would allow Poland free 
access to the sea and free transit for commerce. The port of Memel was placed under 
Lithuanian sovereignty, but Poland had the right to use it and the Niemen to transport all 
kinds of goods, including ammunitions and war materiel. In case of disagreement about the 
interpretation of the present scheme, the two countries undertook to accept the decision of the 
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Permanent Court of International Justice or of an arbitrator appointed with both parties’ 
consent.494 
  To show respect  for Lithuanian sovereignty, the plan did not envision the adoption of 
a bicameral system but gave Lithuania the option to decide between retaining one parliament 
elected by  universal suffrage, or admitting a certain number of delegates from the cantons to 
a House of Representatives.495  But it also attempted to reconcile political loyalties with 
cultural and linguistic differences in the Lithuanian federal state, and thus neutralize 
nationalistic antagonism. Hymans regarded Belgium and Switzerland as viable models of 
bilingual and even trilingual countries where peaceful coexistence of several languages was 
possible because language alone was not a marker of national identity. Switzerland in 
particular seemed the best example of a country where autonomous cantons not only did not 
weaken strong national identity but even strengthened patriotism.496 
  Hymans’s reflections revealed his confidence that in the age of nationalism, it  was 
still possible to create a state in which citizens were loyal to democratic rule rather than the 
nation, and where the nation was understood in political and civic terms rather than national. 
In his opinion, the strength of the patriotism existing in the city  of Vilna made it impossible 
and dangerous to look to minority protection solutions implemented in other countries where, 
once a minority  treaty  was signed, the Great Powers had to deal only with humanitarian and 
not political problems.497  The Polish-Lithuanian dispute was a completely different and 
unique question that demanded a compromise solution between the current de facto situation 
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created by the Polish occupation and the new settlement that was negotiated.498  Finally, 
assigning the Vilna region a special regime seemed the optimal compromise between the two 
parties’ very  well-known aspirations to a territory  in which, Hymans remarked, Poles were 
admittedly a significant presence. Similarly, the status of Polish and Lithuanian as the two 
official languages was another compromise necessary to solving “a very delicate question 
which is always likely to generate a lively and, sometimes, even heated debate in the country 
concerned.”499 
   The conference at Brussels opened on April 20, 1921, at  the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, where the Polish representative Count Wladyslaw Sobanski temporarily 
replaced Ashkenazy to negotiate with the Lithuanian delegate, Minister of Finance Ernestas 
Galvanauskas. However, the negotiations started only after Ashkenazy’s arrival on May 6. 
Initially the talks proceeded smoothly thanks to Hymans’s reassurances of the Lithuanians, 
who were constantly anxious not  to alienate any portion of their state’s sovereignty and 
freedom of action. The Polish delegation adopted a watchful, critical attitude and rarely took 
the initiative in making proposals.500 From the outset Hymans made it clear that any solution 
to the dispute had to be based on the principle of the equality and sovereignty  of the two 
states, a statement that both delegations welcomed and accepted. Hymans waited several days 
to present his draft plan because he wanted the disputants to have the floor as much as 
possible. Again, the goal was not to impose Geneva’s view, but to help the disputants find the 
solution that suited them best. 
 As soon as the Vilna question came up, though, it  aroused such strong feelings that 
Hymans decided to reverse the order he had planned to follow. He suggested that foreign 
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policy, military defense, and economic matters be discussed first, as though the territorial 
dispute were already  settled to both parties’ satisfaction.501  The talks on military matters 
conducted between Chief of the Lithuanian General Staff Colonel Klescinskas and Major 
Beck of the Polish General Staff, assisted by the league’s Military  Commissioners General 
Burt and Colonel Chardigny, were rather successful. Though Galvanauskas had declared at 
the first meeting that he would not promise more than friendly neutrality  toward Poland, the 
conversations finally resulted in a draft of the defensive military convention. The draft 
contemplated an understanding between general staffs on the method of peacetime training 
and organization, and on the elaboration of a plan for wartime mobilization, concentration, 
and operations. The Polish delegation pressed for a permanent liaison through a technical 
body created ad hoc, but the Lithuanians instead favored the agency of the military  attachés. 
Following Hymans’s schema, the convention also envisioned mutual military assistance 
(within limits), reciprocal use of territorial bases and infrastructure, and a single command in 
the event of common military action, which nevertheless left Lithuanian troops under their 
own command. This program, which Hymans submitted to both delegations, was accepted 
and considered final.502 
 Not without effort, Hymans also managed to get the Lithuanians to accept a proposal 
for a special economic understanding between the two countries.503 Ashkenazy’s support of 
Hymans’s outline for the creation of an economic council met with resistance from 
Galvanauskas, who favored an agreement based on the “most favored nation” clause that 
would establish free transit and a monetary  understanding. Galvanauskas stressed that any 
economic convention with Poland should be reconciled with the principle of free trade, which 
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to Poland seemed “in the case of Lithuania, merely a theoretical aspiration.”504  Only 
Hymans’s efforts could ultimately sway the Lithuanian candidate to accept the convention in 




3.2 The Ideological Debate: Disputed Territories and Contested Statehood 
Figure 2: Map of Expansion of Lithuania in the XIII-XVIth Centuries.
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Figure 3: Map of Administrative Gubernia of the Northwestern Provinces of the Russian 
Empire
The greatest obstacle to the progress of the negotiations arose when the conference began to 
discuss foreign policy. According to the Lithuanians, this matter could be decided only after 
the Vilna question was settled. Hymans had not yet presented his own plan, and the 
Lithuanians had already  stated that whereas they did not rule out the possibility  of close ties 
with Poland in future, at present it was impossible to create the common foreign affairs 
ministry implied by federation with Poland.506 
 The Polish delegate Ashkenazy was disappointed to hear Hymans hint at an outright 
assignment of the Vilna district to Lithuania, despite Hymans’s reassurance that under 
Lithuanian rule, “a regime for the protection of all the rights of the Polish population will be 
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established to guarantee the present and future development of their cultural life.”507 
Ashkenazy objected that the question of who should govern the Vilna region was a matter for 
discussion, not a foregone conclusion. He expected the Lithuanians instead to bring 
compelling evidence and arguments to justify their claim to the city, which immediately 
showed that for him, there was more at stake than the safety  of the Polish minority. 
Unsurprisingly, Ashkenazy’s objection opened a long debate over what constituted the 
legitimate basis and justification for possession of Vilna. This question, in turn, exposed the 
core issue, which was less a dispute over a territory than the incompatibility  of imagined 
communities.508
 Claiming a right to sovereignty over a territory implies that the entity  seeking this 
right possesses the power to win international support for its decisions about life within this 
territory and about the use and enjoyment of this territory and the resources it contains. Given 
the significance of the potential consequences, a claim must be backed by powerful 
justifications.509  This lends still more power to ideology, explaining why the disputants’ 
arguments and counterarguments were so vital and so much more important, in influencing 
the league, than the already  successfully negotiated economic and military conventions. The 
Lithuanians’ argument was based mainly on “historical rights,” whereas the Polish delegation 
claimed the Vilna population had the right to determine which state it wanted to belong to. 
 Ashkenazy held that despite the discussion and somewhat successful negotiation of 
the economic and military conventions, the fate of Vilna could be decided only by popular 
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consultation, “without which any discussion was pointless.”510  Ashkenazy  remarked that 
Poland would be dissatisfied with anything less than a decision that fully  respected the 
wishes of the contested territories, which would be carried out even if no agreement was 
reached with Lithuania on this matter.511 
Figure 4: Map of Linguistic Groups in Lithuania and the Disputed Territories 
(Russian Census 1897).
 
 Ashkenazy’s claim for the Vilna population’s right to self-determination on ethnic 
grounds is rather peculiar, considering that he was a federalist. His position is even more 
interesting when evaluated against the clear-cut divide usually  drawn between Pilsudski’s 
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federalism on the one hand, and Polish and Lithuanian nationalism on the other.512 But this 
was not the first time a Polish federalist had tried to ratify  a restoration of the historical 
Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth via popular consultation. In April 1919, entering Vilna at 
the head of the Polish army repelling the Bolsheviks, Joseph Pilsudski did the same: he 
immediately announced the creation of the Government of Central Lithuania and issued a call 
for all the citizens of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy to vote to ratify its reestablishment.513 
 Why would two eminent Polish federalists resort to claiming the right to self-
determination—on ethnic grounds, no less—to restore a historical Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth that was based on a civic rather than an ethnic notion of citizenship? A brief 
account of how the Polish-Lithuanian intellectuals living in Lithuania defined their identity 
may reveal that the divide between Polish federalism and Polish nationalism was less clear-
cut than some have argued. 
 As a native of the Vilna region, Pilsudski has been considered representative of the 
Polish-speaking gentry  families who lived mainly in the eastern territories of Lithuania. Also 
called krajowcy,514  they  have been described as confident in their superiority  to local 
Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants and Jews and therefore sincerely convinced that the 
restored Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should be culturally Polish.515 Several historians 
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who disagree with this view argue instead that since the early twentieth century, the 
conviction of Polish superiority over the Belarusians and Lithuanians was more a feature of 
Poles in Lithuania516  who followed the National Democratic Party than of the krajowcy. 
These Poles in Lithuania associated themselves with the modern ethno-cultural Polish nation 
of the newly  resurrected Poland and did not consider Poles in Lithuania to have a specific 
ethnic culture of their own. All who thought, spoke, and prayed in Polish, they asserted—
even those with Lithuanian surnames—were Poles. Influenced by highly prominent Polish 
nationalists such as Zygmunt Balicki, Romand Dmowski,517  Poles in Lithuania saw the 
Lithuanian and Belarusian national movements as unnatural and their own connection with 
Poland as a historical fact. They also argued that Polonization of Belarusians and Ukrainians 
was evidence that Polish culture was attractive to them.518 Finally, they opposed federation 
because they considered the lands inhabited by Lithuanians ethnically Polish and saw 
Historic Lithuania519 as a mere territorial unit without prospects for independent statehood.520 
 The krajowcy instead believed in the specificity of the gentry  culture of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. They identified with it and also viewed it as setting them apart, 
culturally and politically, from the gentry  of Poland.521  This self-perception as a group that 
was culturally and politically  distinct from the Polishness of Poland is a crucial feature 
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reflecting the krajowcy’s consciousness of having played a leading role in the Russian-
administered Lithuanian lands—a role that, more importantly, they intended to defend and 
maintain in the soon-to-be restored Grand Duchy of Lithuania.522 Diverse views were found 
among this group, whose members ranged from loyalists to the Romanov empires to the more 
democratically minded, but they all shared the consciousness of being citizens of the Grand 
Duchy and viewed the territory of Lithuania and Belarus, which they  called the Native Land, 
as a united, indivisible political, social, cultural, and economic whole with its own specific 
historical-cultural traditions and distinctive social structure.523 Consequently, they  envisioned 
a modern version of the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in which Lithuanians, 
Belarusians, and Poles would enjoy perfect equality  rather than cultural or political 
subordination to Poland.524 
 Therefore, far from assuming their superiority to other nationalities, the democratic 
krajowcy neither resented the emergence of modern nationalism nor denied the existence of 
three distinct Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Polish ethnocultural nations.525  They  even 
supported these national movements, considering them prerequisite to the creation of a 
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understanding and rapprochement between Poles and Lithuanians.526  More conservative 
krajowcy did fear the potential for social antagonism in the emerging Lithuanian and 
Belarusian national movements, insofar as they  were critical of the modern Polish 
nationalism of the Kingdom of Poland. Generally speaking, though, all the krajowcy regarded 
Historic Lithuanian society as a model of patriarchal society in which language differences 
between Polish landowners and Belarusian and Lithuanian peasants were irrelevant, and the 
only political identity  they recognized relied on the concept of the political nation, a 
democratized version of the old political nation of the Grand Duchy devoid of any ethnic 
connotation and based instead on common historical belonging in the same body politic.527 
 
  Thus, Pilsudski’s vision of Poland playing a leading role in the expected restoration 
of the Polish-Lithuanian and Belarusian Commonwealth clearly set him apart from the 
krajowcy with whom he has often been associated. This proves him far less nostalgic and 
loyal to Adam Mickiewicz’s vision of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth than some have 
argued.528  Perhaps Pilsudski himself would have agreed. In April 1919, he confided to his 
supporter Leon Wasilewski that  he was neither an imperialist  nor a federalist  until he could 
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speak of those matters with some degree of seriousness and a gun in his pocket.529  His 
politics and strategy in Vilna in 1919 reflected this view very  well. As he explained, the 
popular consultation he wished to hold in Vilna was meant to ratify the fait accompli, that is, 
to legitimize the military occupation and the establishment of the Government of Central 
Lithuania in the eyes of the international public, should anyone wish to contest it.530 
 Pilsudski’s pragmatism therefore looks like the response of a shrewd politician willing 
to make the best of the Allies’ rhetoric on the rights of nations. After all, in the age of self-
determination of peoples, who would dare question the legitimacy  of Central Lithuania if it 
reflected “legitimate aspirations” of the “overwhelmingly  Polish” population of the Vilna 
region? Knowing it would surely  take more than a plebiscite to get the powers to 
acknowledge his fait accompli, he could at  least embarrass them if they decided to settle the 
question otherwise, against the “free will” of Polish citizens. It was no wonder, then, that 
Ashkenazy adopted a similar strategy  in 1921. In Brussels, he presented his government as 
having no choice but to call for establishment of a new administration capable of handling the 
vital interests of the local population and the general reconstruction of the country after many 
years of war and multiple occupations.531 The Polish Parliamentary Commission for Foreign 
Affairs, he remarked, had invited the government to act accordingly, in collaboration with 
Zeligowski.532
 Territorial claims based on the right to self-determination are typically  supported by 
powerful arguments about representing the strongest ethnic group and having effective 
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control of the territory.533  The Polish delegate’s explanation fits squarely within this 
paradigm. As Ashkenazy explained to Hymans, the Vilna territory had for centuries formed a 
voluntary union with Poland, and its “overwhelmingly Polish population, which the Polish 
army had freed from the Bolshevik yoke, had expressed the wish to be united to Poland.”534 
 The Lithuanian delegates instead developed their arguments along the traditional view 
of historical rights based on priority  and duration.535 Priority means being the first, in one 
way or another, to have inhabited a territory; duration augments this claim with the fact of 
persistence over a long period of time.536  The Polish preference for effective control of 
territory has traditionally been considered the most legal basis of territorial claims, but 
history and justice are their most emotional foundation.537 Often overlooked in international 
relations theories, justice is a potent motive for state action because it is highly  emotionally 
charged based as it  is on the subjective perception that a territory that rightly  belongs to “us” 
has been unjustly taken away.538 The sense of justice also contributes greatly to claimants’ 
heightened intransigence. Accordingly, the Lithuanian delegates warned Hymans that, given 
the illegality  of the Polish occupation, the Poles had no grounds to question the “indisputable 
Lithuanian rights over Vilna”; on the contrary, they had created a situation that “was even 
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more unfair to Lithuania, deprived of its capital while the country was still fighting for its 
independence.”539 
 In response to Polish remarks, the Lithuanians also presented a long memorandum 
that besides priority  and duration emphasized the cultural significance of the city  and region 
of Vilna in the formation of their identity as a historical nation.540 The city  of Vilna “was 
founded by the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas, at the beginning of the XIV century on a 
territory that had been inhabited by Lithuanians since time immemorial.”541  For over four 
centuries, it argued, Vilna had been the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a purely 
Lithuanian political entity extending far beyond the ethnographically Lithuanian palatinates 
of Trakai, Vilna, and Samogitia to include vast Slavic lands as well. As the seat of the Grand 
Duchy’s legislature and judiciary, Vilna formed a political and administrative unit entirely 
separate from the autonomous Slavic regions of the state. This unity persisted even under 
tsarist domination, when the districts of Kaunas, Vilna, and Grodno were called the 
“Northwest Provinces” and Vilna became the seat of the tsarist governor-general.542 
 In the delegation’s opinion, in line with Lithuanian modern nationalism, only Vilna 
could be considered the political and intellectual center of a newly  reborn Lithuanian state 
because, among other reasons, it symbolized the centuries-long Lithuanian struggle for 
statehood against  Polish and Russian domination.543  The memorandum stressed that other 
nationalities, particularly the Jews, had contributed as well, though it unsurprisingly also 
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argued that “the same could be hardly said about the Poles.”544 Everything in Vilna, with its 
buildings, churches, and palaces of the Lithuanian aristocracy, had invaluable historical and 
national significance because it had been built  under despotic regimes.545 The claim against 
Polish oppression obviously required some explanation of the circumstances that had led to 
the Union of Lublin, concluded between Poland and Lithuania in 1569, which the 
memorandum used to exemplify “how Poland took advantage of a difficult moment for the 
Grand Duchy.”546 Finally, as Lithuania’s intellectual, artistic, and religious mecca, Vilna had 
strongly influenced the Polish scientific and artistic contribution, and Vilna University had 
remained the heart of Lithuanian cultural life even after Polish replaced Latin as the medium 
of instruction.547
 The scantiness of economic and legal arguments bolstering claims in the 
memorandum supports the contention that the problem was primarily ideological. One brief 
reminder of the Lithuanian-Soviet Treaty of Moscow of July  12, 1920, which Soviet Russia 
considered still valid, established Lithuania’s legal rights over the Vilna district.548 As for the 
economy, without the Vilna region Lithuania clearly  would become a small, insignificant 
province totally  dependent on Poland, which explained why the region had never been 
severed from the rest of the country.549 
 Instead, the memorandum discussed ethnographic considerations at  length, though 
more to refute the Poles’ claim to an ethnic majority  in the region than to provide alternative 
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evidence about the population’s national identity. On the contrary, the Lithuanians contended, 
the political and social processes that had shaped the region would have made such a majority 
impossible. In the Vilna region, excepting only  the eastern borderlands, Lithuanians had been 
the first inhabitants. Jews appeared in Lithuania in the twelfth century; other first  inhabitants 
also included a small number of Tartars and Karaims. No historical evidence existed, the 
memorandum stated, of an ethnographically Polish or Slavic-Polish settlement in the 
contested territories, where until the late sixteenth century Lithuanian statutes forbade non-
Lithuanians to buy land or hold public office in the Grand Duchy. Historically religion, not 
language, had been the marker of identity, distinguishing the Catholic Lithuanians from the 
surrounding Slavo-Russian Orthodox Christians who spoke a patois of Polish, Russian, and 
Lithuanian.550 
The memorandum claimed that the population’s repeated exposure to political 
oppression and persecution was another reason why language did not reflect national identity. 
The peasants had been forced to use Polish at  church and on the estates, to speak Russian in 
dealing with the tsarist  authorities and when serving in the army, and to use Lithuanian only 
at home,551  yet they nevertheless remained “psychologically” Lithuanian. Their national 
consciousness had formed only  recently, and often regardless of their language, which 
explained why some Lithuanians called themselves Poles while others ignored the Lithuanian 
language but nevertheless declared themselves Lithuanians.552  But although no antagonism 
existed between the Lithuanian and Belarusian languages, “the language of the aggressive 
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Poles represents a constant danger to the existence of Lithuanian.”553 Only the educated elites 
in Vilna and in other cities understood Polish. Influenced by Polish activists and clergy, 
members of the largely  illiterate lower social strata often declared their belonging to the 
“Polish faith”; however, statistical records and scientific studies confirmed that despite the 
Poles’ efforts, Lithuanian had begun to regain ground.554 The Lithuanian memorandum thus 
doubted that petitions and resolutions could accurately support a claim that  the region was 
overwhelmingly  Polish, as “they were the result of the state of oppression created by the 
occupying authorities.”555 
 Finally, the Lithuanian delegation claimed that  Lithuania was hoping to restore Vilna, 
“its capital and sanctuary, to the significant role that it played in the past in bringing together 
different nationalities.”556 In trying to prove to the league that, unlike the Poles, they had no 
need to resort to violence to establish rule over the city, the Lithuanians recounted how in 
December 1920, when Zeligowski had announced his intention to hold elections in Vilna, the 
Jewish and Belarusian minorities that together constituted a majority in the contested 
territories had repeatedly  expressed their wish that  the city of Vilna be reattached to 
Lithuania. Like the Lithuanians, they resented participating in a consultation meant to ratify 
the Polish occupation.557 
 As negotiations progressed and the volume of exchanged memoranda increased, it 
became clear that what the Polish delegation was really contesting was the legitimacy of the 
Lithuanian modern state created in 1918, which included Vilna. The will of the population of 
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the contested territories remained the crucial element, Ashkenazy countered, and was far 
more important than historical and legal considerations.558 The Polish delegate insisted that 
the Belarusian and Jewish minorities’ attitude to the Vilna elections in December 1920 was 
irrelevant because the elections had never taken place, and in any case “the Jewish population 
represents only a small minority in the area.”  He instead objected that on the contrary, the 
Kaunas government had always regarded the Vilna region as part of the newly established 
Lithuanian state and since 1918 had always been very  intolerant  of its Polish minority’s 
requests to discuss the region’s status with Poland.559   Finally, once again, Ashkenazy 
contended that despite what the Lithuanians claimed, they had never been able to defend 
Vilna, which in the summer of 1920 was liberated from the Bolsheviks by the Polish army, 
supported by the region’s Polish population.560 
 From the Polish perspective, the Kaunas government was as illegitimate as the 
Lithuanians’ claims over Vilna, because although the situation of the Lithuanian state seemed 
to resemble that of Latvia and Estonia, there were important differences.561  Unlike the 
Latvians and the Estonians, who had fought against the Germans and the Russians in the First 
World War, Lithuania’s independence was born of the end of the German occupation that 
meantime had maintained peace in the country, and the Treaty of Moscow signed with Soviet 
Russia in July 1920. Moreover, whereas Estonians and Latvians had been content to create 
states based on the ethnographic principle, the Lithuanians had always claimed territories in 
which they were a minority. For this reason, Poland was more than willing to support  an 
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“independent Lithuanian state within ethnographic boundaries.”562  Finally, Lithuania’s 
historical claims were simply Kaunas’s attempt to disguise its intention to annex the Vilna 
territory and Lithuanize it.563 
 The Polish memorandum also denied any  historical continuity  between the early 
modern Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the modern Lithuanian state. It argued that the term 
Lithuania was currently  being improperly  used to denote the “Historical Lithuanian state, 
known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” which had been joined to Poland almost from its 
inception. A second meaning of the term instead designated the ethnographically Lithuanian 
territories that had only recently come to constitute the modern Lithuanian state. The Grand 
Duchy, meanwhile, had never been a Lithuanian state, as its founders were most likely of 
Norman origin and had never ruled the vast conquered territories stretching from the Baltic to 
Kiev and Moscow.564  The court and the nobility used Ruthenian as the administrative 
language alongside Polish, in use since the times of Algirdas and Gediminas. The real capital 
of Lithuania proper was Trakai, where Germans, Jews, and Ruthenians nevertheless greatly 
outnumbered Lithuanians. Gediminas’s founding of Vilna, however, dated only to the 
thirteenth century, and the city had become the capital of the Grand Duchy only as recently as 
1569, when the Union of Lublin created the “Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania.” This personal and dynastic union culminated in the Constitution of May 3, 1791, 
which created a “Kingdom and Grand Duchy of Lithuania” that  dropped the former 
distinction between the two states.565 Polish became the literary  and administrative language, 
while Lithuanian was spoken only  among the lower strata. Prior to the modern national 
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movement, the term “Lithuanian” had referred only to regional origin and had no ethnic or 
national connotation.566 Finally, the Poles asserted, Vilna had indeed been the intellectual and 
cultural center of Historic Lithuania, but  not of Lithuania as a nation, and the founding and 
intellectual development of the University of Vilna was exclusively  the outcome of Polish 
efforts.567 
 The Polish delegation also attacked Lithuania’s alleged legal claims to Vilna, holding 
them to be as ungrounded as the historical ones, because on August 1918, the Soviet 
government had abrogated all the treaties and conventions that had ratified the partition of 
Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, including the clause regarding Poland in the treaty 
concluded between Germany and Russia on October 4, 1833. Moreover, the Treaty of Riga 
signed between Russia, Ukraine and Poland on March 18, 1921, had invalidated the border 
that the 1920 Treaty  of Moscow had established between Russia and Lithuania, because 
according to Article 4 of the Treaty  of Riga, “all the territories to the west of the frontier 
established by the present treaty which are disputed by Lithuania and Poland, are a matter of 
interest of these two states alone.”568  According to Ashkenazy, these legal acts not only 
proved that Kaunas had no legal or historical right to the disputed territories but also 
implicitly  acknowledged Poland’s rights to not just the Vilna region but Kaunas too, which 
had belonged to Poland until the first partition of 1772. Consistent with the Poles’ 
commitment to the principle of self-determination on ethnic grounds, however, the Polish 
delegate pointed out that Poland claimed only Vilna, as “it was not in the least interested in 
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upholding her historical rights on a territory that is almost completely  ethnically 
Lithuanian.”569 
  Poland’s denial of what  Lithuania considered its historical rights to statehood was so 
crucial to the Lithuanian delegation’s line of argument that the question featured in the work 
of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the admission of Lithuania in late 1920. After 
all, the framing of an argument or a disputant takes the context and the audience to be 
persuaded into account.570  The Lithuanians took their arguments over historical rights so 
seriously that they were afraid the Polish counterarguments would, in Geneva’s eyes, 
discredit their right to statehood and admission to the League of Nations. 
 At the request of the Fifth Committee appointed to examine Lithuania’s credentials 
for statehood, the Secretariat had prepared a memorandum summarizing the history of Polish 
and Lithuanian relations. Both delegations found its phrasing inappropriate and inaccurate. 
Voldemaras objected that in stating that “it would appear [emphasis added] that the 
Lithuanian territory  extended from the Black Sea to the neighborhood of the Baltic,” the text 
in effect questioned the historical fourteenth-century  territorial expansion of the Lithuanian 
state. Furthermore, the statement that “‘the sole object of the 1831 and 1863 insurrections 
was to obtain a greater degree of autonomy from Russia’, was a complete perversion of the 
truth,” and these mistakes could not be ignored “because they  could seriously  prejudice 
Lithuania’s case for independence before the League of Nations.”571 Lithuania had been an 
independent state for centuries, which explained not only its present aspirations to statehood 
but also the nature of its relations with Poland and Soviet Russia. The memorandum, 
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Voldemaras argued, should have been based on more modern, scientific works than the 
Joseph Ehret book chosen by the Secretariat.572 
 Historical inaccuracy was not Voldemaras’s only  concern. The document had been 
written by M. Green, an American, and the Lithuanian delegate feared that it reflected the 
American government’s standpoint on the Russian question. US Secretary of State 
Bainbridge Colby had recently  made a statement about Russia’s frontiers “that logically 
included the whole of the former Russian Empire.” The only  exceptions were Finland, 
Poland, and Armenia, “whose aspirations to independence were entirely legitimate, because 
they  were annexed by violence, and their liberation from foreign oppression did not involve 
any violation of Russia’s territorial rights.”573  Voldemaras objected that according to these 
principles, Lithuania had an even greater right to independence than did Finland, which 
Russia had never annexed. Even though “the opinion of United States cannot have direct 
influence on the decisions of the League of Nations and on our admission,” he pointed out, 
“it  is important to stress that in the past, statements like these have already affected us 
adversely on former occasions, depriving us of the support of the great Transatlantic 
Republic.”574 
Poland too objected to the league’s version of history. Three days later at the same 
Assembly, on November 30, Ashkenazy informed Mantoux that the outline of Lithuania’s 
history had left  a painful impression on him as a Polish delegate, and still more as a historian. 
It contained a series of astounding inaccuracies evidently derived from a propaganda 
168
572  Mykolas Ašmys invited the eminent Swiss scholar Joseph Ehret  (October 18, 1896–March 13, 
1984) to Lithuania in autumn of 1919. There Ehret established the Ereta Lithuanian Telegram Agency 
and volunteered for the Lithuanian army in 1920. He obtained Lithuanian citizenship and tirelessly 
supported Lithuania’s independence in public lectures and articles published in translation in Western 
European journals. Aldona Vasiliauskiene, “Juozas Eretas. Darbai Lietuvai” [Joseph Ehret and His 
Work for Lithuania], Mokslo ir Technikos Raida 3, no. 1 (2011): 87–88.
573 LNA, 28/ R 1452, Voldemaras to Eric Drummond, Geneva, November 27, 1920, p. 3.
574 Ibid.
pamphlet and devoid of any  scientific character. He contested the claim that “in 1772, 1793 
and in 1795 there were three partitions of Lithuania, by Prussia, Russia and Austria,” because 
this history acknowledged only  the disgraceful partitions of Poland; similarly, this version 
implied only Polish revolts had taken place in 1831 and 1863. These inaccuracies were all the 
more regrettable as they  were being circulated by an editorial office (by  which he meant the 
league) whose absolute objectivity  was beyond any doubt. Conscious of the great difficulties 
the Secretariat had encountered in preparing this document, Ashkenazy wanted to avoid 
further discussion and left it to Mantoux to decide whether his letter should be circulated 
among the members of the Assembly or the fifth Committee.575 
The Secretariat’s reaction reflected more concern for the disputants’ criticism of its 
work than for their conflicting interpretations of their common past. The Lithuanian fears had 
no bearing on the question of the state’s admission, and the Political Section thought it 
unnecessary  to inform the Assembly and the Fifth Committee about the Polish letter.576 
Mantoux hoped to settle the matter informally  with Ashkenazy, whom he considered a close 
acquaintance.577 He therefore apologized to his friend for the Political Section’s inability  to 
provide a better, more accurate document and regretted that  pressing obligations had 
prevented him and Paul Denis, who was acquainted with this history, to prepare the document 
personally.578 
Eric Drummond, for his part, resented the criticism and argued against it.579  After 
conducting some research, he concluded that the Secretariat had prepared the memorandum 
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with the utmost care and full impartiality.580  Preferring to follow the advice of the Legal 
Section’s director, Joost Von Hamel, he therefore replied to both delegates, also forwarding 
them a note from the author of the memorandum.581  Von Hamel did not share Mantoux’s 
concern about the disappointment caused by  the memorandum; on the contrary, “the fact that 
both parties complained about Green’s work, proves that he has formed a nice medium.”582 
The questions raised by Voldemaras “were essentially controversial in their nature,” as was 
clearly  proven by the fact that Ashkenazy had criticized the same statements from an opposite 
point of view.583 
Green’s remarks held information for both delegates. Lithuania’s application for 
admission, dated October 12, 1920, had reached the Secretariat after its library and archives 
had been packed for the move to Geneva. The removal of the staff to Geneva, and the 
subsequent unavoidable delay to unpack and rearrange the library, had left little time for the 
Secretariat to prepare the memorandum and moreover deprived it of the use of the library. 
Given the situation, Joseph Ehret’s book La Lituanie- Passé- Present- Avenir had been 
chosen because its outline of Lithuanian history  seemed largely  accurate. Still, certain 
precautions had been taken because the Lithuanian Bureau at Bern had published the book 
with a laudatory preface and apparently  distributed it with the semiofficial approval of the 
Lithuanian authorities. Aware of possible bias, the memorandum thus stated that its historical 
outline of Lithuania was based upon a “not unfavorable summary.” Moreover, though 
Professor Ashkenazy  had characterized the memorandum as a “propaganda pamphlet devoid 
of any scientific character” and attacked the historical outline within it as full of astounding 
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inaccuracies and bias in favor of Lithuania, any  statement in it  that did not seem entirely 
beyond dispute was qualified by  the phrase “it is said.”  The disputants’ mutually 
contradictory criticism could nevertheless be seen as certain evidence of the substantial 
accuracy  of the statement in question, which was confirmed by  the presumably  impartial 
authority of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Finally, Green objected that the Lithuanians had no 
reason to complain, considering that any bias in Ehret’s book was for, not against, 
Lithuania.584 
 Regardless of the league’s responsibility for lack of accuracy, this quarrel clearly 
shows how the intensity of the disputants’ emotional commitment to their arguments and 
justifications not only complicated the work of the league, but also altered the contending 
parties’ perception of the league’s own priorities and outlook on the question.
3.3 The First Hymans Draft
  The justification that states offer in support of their actions influences the shape of 
territorial conflicts in one more important respect.585 The prevailing ideas of what constituted 
their legitimate arguments to establish sovereignty over the Vilna territory deeply affected 
and influenced the delegations’ response to the Hymans Plan.586  While the Poles remarked 
that any settlement had to conform with the wishes of the population concerned, the 
Lithuanians were less categorical because they recognized that after all, the Hymans Plan was 
granting them Vilna without imposing federation with Poland. 
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 On May 20, 1921, after witnessing endless discussions and fearing that the “two 
irreconcilable views of the parties” might bring negotiations to a standstill, Hymans finally 
decided to provide the discussion with more guidance by presenting his own scheme.587 The 
Secretariat expected the project to please the Poles greatly and disappoint the Lithuanians.588 
What happened was exactly the opposite. 
 The Lithuanian delegation had several objections to the plan. Galvanauskas remarked 
that a cantonal system was not a proper solution to national minority  protection, and that  he 
would prefer a treaty signed between Lithuania and the Allied Powers, in keeping with the 
precedent of the minorities treaties signed by Poland and other Eastern European states.589 In 
his opinion, Article 7 of the Hymans scheme already envisioned ample guarantees for 
minorities throughout the whole territory, so the creation of the Vilna canton was redundant. 
True, international minority treaties had granted territorial autonomy to regions in 
Czechoslovakia and Carpathia-Ruthenia, where, unlike in the Vilna region, the population 
was ethnically homogenous.590  In all other cases, however, minorities had been given 
personal, not territorial rights.591 Moreover, the Swiss cantonal system reflected Switzerland’s 
historical tradition and was completely alien to Lithuania, where the districts of Vilna, 
Kaunas, and Grodno had always formed one territorial and administrative unit.592 
Introduction of the bicameral system was expected to encounter hostile Lithuanian public 
opinion. The creation of provinces was a domestic question that a convention could not 
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decide, and anyhow the administrative provinces already enjoyed great autonomy and did not 
seem to require further rearrangement.593 
 The decision to make Polish and Lithuanian the two official languages throughout the 
whole state was also highly questionable. After all, having two official languages was 
considerably different from allowing minorities to exercise the right to speak their own 
language, a right Lithuania had never violated.594  Finally, regarding the league’s role as 
arbiter in case of disagreement between the two countries, Galvanauskas objected that it 
might be considered a violation of Lithuania’s sovereignty,595 explaining that beyond these 
considerations a question of principle was also at stake, because
We have had entered the present negotiations not because of 
sympathy  or genuine interest to create a firm alliance with our 
neighbor, but because of the de facto situation created by 
Zeligowski’s act of violence. We are determined to regain the Vilna 
territory and only  for this reason we have agreed to discuss here 
matters that concern the internal organization of our state that should 
have been dealt with by us in our capital Vilna. Even so, it is simply 
out of question for us to accept the creation of a state other than the 
one freely chosen by and built  with the efforts of the Lithuanian 
nation that we are representing.596
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! Despite these objections and the ill-disposed attitude to establishing ties with Poland, 
Hymans’s clarifications and guarantees of Lithuanian independence and sovereignty over 
Vilna contributed to the delegation’s acceptance of his scheme as a basis for discussion on the 
condition that searching for an understanding between Poland and Lithuania did not imply 
establishing any federal ties.597 
The Polish response was ambivalent. The delegation expressed satisfaction that the 
first part of the negotiations had uncovered the considerable community of political, 
economic, and military interests existing between Poland and Lithuania, and declared itself 
more than willing to proceed with the signing of the convention treaties. Consistent with his 
arguments based on the principle of self-determination, Ashkenazy nevertheless objected that 
his government could not accept the outright annexation of the Vilna territory to Lithuania 
without giving Vilna’s inhabitants a chance to have their say.598  On the contrary, since the 
Hymans Plan was based on the principle of a cantonal system in which the Vilna district 
stood on completely equal footing with the Lithuanian state, Warsaw replied that the 
negotiations could continue only if a delegation representing the population concerned was 
admitted on equal footing to the Brussels conference.599  Ashkenazy admitted that the 
delegation did not represent any  government, “but it  has great moral authority, because it was 
the expression of men’s right to freewill and to self-determination.”600
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3.4 The Lithuanian Counterproposal and the Cultural Autonomy Trump Card
 
Confronted with the Polish request, three days later Lithuania presented a 
counterproposal that completely dismissed the establishment of any “special” relations 
between the two countries.601  The Lithuanians had presented this document to the three 
ambassadors in Warsaw in mid-April 1921, in response to the federalist  plan Sapieha had just 
submitted. Their return to this draft now represented a step  back from what Hymans hoped to 
achieve. It suggested that the two countries undertake to peacefully  resolve any future 
dispute, observing neutrality in case of conflict and recognizing their mutual independence. 
Lithuania was willing to recognize the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Riga and negotiate a Polish-
Lithuanian military and defensive convention, but Poland was expected to acknowledge 
Lithuanian sovereignty over Vilna and over Memel, if the latter was granted to Lithuania. 
The Lithuanians’ goal was to neutralize the Poles’ request that the league admit a 
delegation from Vilna and offer generous guarantees of minority  protection. In their opinion, 
giving minorities a voice in a dispute between two sovereign states infringed on their state 
sovereignty, which they were not willing to share with representatives of the Vilna region.602 
They were, however, ready to share their sovereignty rights over the Vilna territory with the 
minorities living there. For this reason, the Lithuanian counterproposal stressed that  Polish-
speaking Lithuanian citizens of the Vilna territory  would enjoy  the same cultural autonomy 
already granted to other minorities living in Lithuania. In addition, the Kaunas government 
was also willing to sign a minority  treaty similar to the one that Poland and the Allied Powers 
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signed on June 28, 1919, under the guarantee of the League of Nations.603  At their own 
expense, Polish-Lithuanian citizens could establish, direct, and supervise charitable, 
religious, and social institutions; school; and other educational establishments of every  kind 
where they could freely use their own language. In addition, special rights applied in towns 
and districts where they were a considerable presence. The Lithuanian government undertook 
to grant suitable facilities to ensure instruction in the Polish language in primary and 
secondary  school, alongside the still-compulsory instruction in Lithuanian. Moreover, Polish-
Lithuanian citizens were also entitled to an equitable share of public state or municipal 
revenues to support  their educational, religious, and charitable needs, to be administered 
through representative bodies elected by them and authorized to collect taxes from their 
communities. Finally, a special Ministry for Polish Affairs would be established.604
Unfortunately for the Lithuanians, the Polish delegate Juljusz Lukasiewicz objected 
that “what we need is a solution for a majority, not a minority!”605  In his opinion the 
Lithuanian counterproposal was not only incompatible with Hymans’s bicantonal system but 
also inappropriate because the Lithuanians, who according to him made up  only 2 to 10 
percent of the population in Vilna city, were treating the Poles as a minority.606  
3.5 The Thirteenth Session of the Council and the Second Hymans Draft
  The intransigence of both parties was seriously  jeopardizing the possibility of 
reaching agreement. In Brussels, league officials gathered that the Poles were showing 
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interest in concluding the economic and military  conventions even regardless of the 
successful settlement of the Vilna dispute only  to put the Lithuanians “that have justly 
rejected this possibility, in the position of ending the negotiations.”607  The league was 
determined to guard itself from the uncomfortable position in which Poland had put it, and to 
expose Warsaw to public opinion if necessary.608 On the one hand, granting the Polish request 
raised several political and legal problems, because any delegation from Vilna would 
inevitably represent Zeligowski’s regime.609  The term Middle Lithuania610  denoted only a 
geographical territory, not a political entity, and therefore was not entitled to any formal 
representation. And as in the case of the plebiscite, Geneva considered the illegal military 
occupation a major obstacle to free and fair expression of the will of the population.611 On the 
other hand, dismissing the request would give the misleading impression that Poland was 
championing the rights of the Vilna population against Lithuanian intolerance and the 
league’s indifference.612 
 Once again, Eric Drummond acted as arbiter, suggesting that  each delegation include 
two delegates from the Vilna region as auditors.613 This had been done in the Aaland dispute 
and might help overcome the obstacle, provided the Lithuanians did not object; otherwise, the 
question would be submitted to the Council.614  Hymans, in conveying the Secretariat’s 
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decision to Ashkenazy, did not spare him severe criticism, as the league “cannot ignore the 
circumstances created by  Zeligowski’s act of violence or fait accompli and that  the 
representatives of his regime, whose authority  is likely  to be contested, can be hardly 
considered representative of the true will of its population.”615  Only the evacuation of 
Zeligowski’s forces would guarantee fair representation.616  Finally, since Poland had also 
agreed to negotiate in Brussels under the terms of the Council resolution of March 3, 1921, 
and since Zeligowski’s presence was the main obstacle to a fair plebiscite, the request to 
admit representatives for the Vilna region prompted the obvious question of whether he was 
prepared to withdraw so that normal conditions could be reestablished in the region.617 
 The parties’ mutual intransigence pushed the question to the Council, which 
considered the possibility of admitting a Vilna delegation on condition of Zeligowski’s 
withdrawal with his troops. Lithuanian and Polish police forces would replace his troops to 
maintain peace and order while the region was placed under a provisional administration until 
the negotiations in Brussels were over.618  The two governments would decide on all other 
military, economic, and political matters.619  Besides setting these conditions, the Council 
members worked hard to secure unanimous consensus on the Hymans scheme, not only in 
response to the intransigence of the disputants but also because “nothing could delay  or 
hamper the settlement of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute more than the suspicion that the great 
powers are divided in the Council and that while one power sides with Lithuania, another 
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sides with Poland.”620  The British delegate Herbert Fisher and General Chardigny were 
particularly worried after reading in The Times that
“so long as France backs Poland and Great Britain snubs her, all 
Poland’s enemies will speculate on the differences in policy of the 
two governments which control Europe, but as soon as it is obvious 
that they both want the same thing, Zeligowski’s raids and Korfanty 
insurrections and all such mischance will disappear.”621
 The Council resolution of June 28, 1921, established that one or two representatives 
of the various groups living in the contested territory could, with Hymans’s permission, 
express their opinion during the negotiations “for informative purposes.” The Council wanted 
to honor the Vilna population’s right to a say  on the matter and found a way to reconcile 
respect for the principle of self-government with Lithuania’s and Poland’s state sovereignty 
rights. It therefore resolved that once Poland and Lithuania had reached and signed an 
agreement, it would be submitted to a Vilna diet elected expressly to ratify it.  The Political 
Section saluted this decision as one that would hopefully “leave us free to control the 
influence of the minorities on the negotiations, while at the same time we will avoid the 
criticism of Poles, Lithuanians and international public opinion for neglecting the voice of 
those concerned.”622
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 The resolution also recommended that  in the meantime and before the next Council 
meeting on September 1, 1921, all officials and all troops of Zeligowski’s who were not 
natives of the disputed territory within the limits set by Hymans’s draft, leave the territory 
upon the reopening of negotiations in Brussels in mid-July. The Military  Commission was 
responsible for organizing a local police force not  exceeding 5,000 men to maintain order, 
and all Polish war materiel, including arms and munitions, was to be evacuated. The 
commission was also to determine when the Vilna-Grodno railway could be reopened, as 
until September 1, 1921, Lithuania was allowed to recover the stations previously  held in 
peacetime. The two countries were to reestablish consular relations and study measures for 
reestablishing free communication between Vilna and the neighboring districts without delay. 
They  were also expected to assist and facilitate the Military Commission’s execution of these 
recommendations.623 
 Hymans believed that the negotiations in Brussels should not resume unless Poland 
consented to its troops’ demobilization and replacement with local militia, because meeting 
these conditions “will safeguard the prestige of the Council and show the Lithuanians that we 
have done our best to end the military occupation.”624  The league hoped it had found a 
solution to the impasse created by Poland’s request and Lithuania’s May 30 counterproposal, 
and that negotiations could now proceed. The Poles too seemed to signal hope when Warsaw 
in principle accepted the Council resolution of June 28, 1921, though on the condition that  no 
agreement would be final without previous ratification by duly  appointed representatives of 
the population of Vilna. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstanty Skirmunt meantime 
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guaranteed that Zeligowski had been informed of the request to withdraw and that his reply 
would be immediately forwarded to the league upon receipt.625 
  However, the Military  Commission’s reports on Lithuanian and Polish attitudes to the 
Hymans Plan cast  serious doubt on the prospects of reaching agreement. In Chardigny’s 
opinion, neither party was willing to accept it because anti-Polish propaganda, which had 
intensified in Lithuania since July, left little hope that the Lithuanians would come around. 
Their intransigence was, on the contrary, encouraged by the lack of collaboration between 
Paris and London, whose arbitration the Lithuanians still mistakenly hoped would prove 
more favorable to them.626  The reply of the Lithuanians—who, unlike the Poles, made no 
attempt to sound conciliatory—confirmed Chardigny’s prescience. Without preamble, they 
demanded the immediate execution of the Suwalki Agreement signed under the auspices of 
the Military Commission in October 1921, which had left them Vilna. They also protested the 
recommendation that the Military Commission be entrusted only with organizing the local 
police force, while the Polish administration was left in substantial control of the territory. 
On the contrary, the Council’s recommendation that Lithuanian troops mobilized 
compounded the seeming unfairness. Finally, the Lithuanian government also considered the 
clause of the Hymans Plan that placed the diet of the Vilna canton on equal footing with the 
Kaunas parliament absolutely unacceptable.627 
 Chardigny  reported that Warsaw saw the Lithuanian reply as irrefutable proof that the 
negotiations were over and the dispute settled.628 For this reason, he warned the Secretariat 
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against taking the Polish note accepting the scheme at  face value, because it was just an 
excuse to draw the Lithuanians into closer ties with Poland.629  The Poles wanted to keep 
Zeligowski’s troops in Vilna to guarantee against  a possible Bolshevik threat, and to 
counteract, in Chardigny’s opinion with some reason, Lithuanian and German conspiracy and 
collaboration. Zeligowski, for his part, was supporting the Hymans scheme only because he 
was sure the Lithuanians were against it.630  Warsaw confirmed Chardigny’s impression, 
notifying the league that after receiving several letters of protests against  alleged Lithuanian 
persecution of Poles under their rule, “it  will be very  difficult to adopt a friendly attitude 
toward the Lithuanian government at the upcoming negotiations resuming in Brussels.”631
 As soon as it became clear that the negotiations would not resume to discuss the first 
Hymans draft, approved by the Council on June 28, Hymans made a final effort to meet 
Lithuanian requests as far as possible by inviting both delegations to meet informally with 
him in Geneva on August  25.632  Following several long private conversations with each 
delegation, Hymans offered them a new draft on September 3, explaining that it did not add 
anything new or modify  in any degree the substance of the first draft, already  approved by the 
Council. Altering the original project, which in his view had already  been a reasonable 
compromise, would have rendered it  less acceptable to the other contending party.633 Instead, 
Hymans reframed Article 3, which in the first draft stated that the Lithuanian government 
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“the district of Vilna will constitute an autonomous canton in the State of Lithuania.”634 
Hymans admitted that  the only  change was in the wording, not the substance, because even 
though it was not the league’s business to interfere in the internal constitution of the 
Lithuania state, it was nevertheless necessary to secure autonomy for the Vilna region.635  
 Hymans’s second modification dealt with cooperation and was more real than 
apparent. In the first draft, the Joint Council for Foreign Affairs was to determine what was 
not in the two countries’ common interest, and delegations from the Polish and Lithuanian 
parliaments would meet and decide on matters of common interest, with their decisions 
subject to domestic legislative sanction. In the new draft, Hymans kept the Joint Council of 
Foreign Affairs but simplified its procedure by transforming it into a merely consultative 
body in which two delegations from each country would only examine and discuss questions 
of common interest, thus taking account of Lithuania’s concerns over a possible infringement 
of independence and sovereignty. 
 The last important amendment tried to overcome Lithuania’s objections to the 
Council’s recommendation that a Vilna diet ratify the Polish-Lithuanian agreement. Because 
it seemed very important to leave the agreement open for future modifications, Hymans 
reduced the powers of the diet, which instead of ratifying the agreement would now submit 
its resolution to the League of Nations for final examination and further recommendations.636 
Revisions might be needed, either in the light of experience after the arrangement had been in 
operation for some time, or because some provisions might prove unnecessary after the 
tensions between the two countries had disappeared as hoped.637 
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Not even this final attempt to accommodate both parties’ observations satisfied the 
Lithuanian delegation, which asked for further revisions. Hymans was particularly 
disappointed by Lithuania’s rejection of the autonomous canton of Vilna in favor of creating 
an “autonomous unit within the Lithuanian state.”638  From the Lithuanian point of view, an 
autonomous canton was not justified by any spirit of local patriotism in the population, which 
had never been politically  separate from the rest of the Lithuanian nation, and “the sporadic 
manifestation of local patriotism out of which the Poles recently  made capital is nothing but 
the result of the presence in the territory of the Polish military and civil authorities.”639  The 
Lithuanians instead suggested creating an autonomous diet for the Vilna territory, with 
legislative powers in matters of language, education, and religion, as well as local 
administration and any another matter that the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly decided. Its 
inhabitants would enjoy the right of priority access to various offices of the local 
administration and would be allowed to elect deputies to the diet according to the electoral 
law of the republic. However, these deputies would not have the right to vote in the 
Lithuanian parliament, even on legislative matters under the jurisdiction of the diet  of the 
Vilna territory. 
Although not entirely opposed to the idea of autonomy, Lithuania insisted it  could not 
conform to the Swiss model because of the great differences between the two countries’ 
historical and political conditions. In searching for a system of autonomy, the Lithuanian 
delegation claimed it saw a more suitable solution in the agreement between Ruthene and the 
Czechoslovak Republic as laid down in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 
1919. Notwithstanding Lithuania’s great respect and admiration for the Swiss cantonal 
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system, “We have strong reasons for saying that it does not correspond with the historical 
development of our united state, nor with present conditions. We believe that we have 
entirely  satisfied the desires of the League of Nations in conceding to the territory of Vilna a 
very large measure of autonomy based on a model made by the Great Powers themselves.”640 
Galvanauskas explained that the Polish language could, upon request by  the diet of the Vilna 
territory, be declared the official language within the limits of autonomous territory of Vilna, 
but not in the rest of the territory, where, according to the Lithuanian delegate, the Polish 
element spoke Lithuanian and hardly exceeded 2 or 3 percent of the population.641 
  The Lithuanians took a more generous stance on minority protection. They had 
accepted Article 7 of the Hymans draft, according to which “all racial minorities throughout 
the whole state shall be granted the broadest guarantees concerning education, religion, 
language and right of association,” and gone even further by agreeing to place it under the 
guarantee of the League of Nations.642 This last request attracted Hymans’s attention, “giving 
him food for thought,” and was included in his second draft and in the Council resolution of 
September 20, 1921.643 
The extent to which the second draft represented a final effort  to accommodate 
Lithuanian demands was unacceptable to the Polish delegation, which saw it  as a betrayal of 
the original federal project.644  “We have never recognized and never will that Kaunas-
Lithuania has the smallest right  to the territory of Vilna,” the Polish delegate declared. “Berne 
has no right to Geneva, but Berne can decide to federate with Geneva. This was why the idea 
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of federation could be discussed.”645 The main difference, according to Ashkenazy, was that 
the first draft  had defined the relationship between the Vilna and Kaunas cantons as similar to 
that of the Swiss cantons, which were sovereign insofar as their sovereignty was not limited 
by the federal constitution, which guaranteed absolute equality.646  Therefore the Polish 
government saw two essential differences between the drafts: autonomous cooperation 
between cantons had replaced the adoption of federalism, and territorial autonomy was 
preferred to the bicantonal system, thus making the organization of the Vilna territory a 
matter of internal Lithuanian state administration.647  On September 13, the Polish 
government consequently  informed the league that it had already accepted the resolution of 
the Council of June 28 on July 15, 1921, and saw no reason to set aside the last resolution in 
favor of a new scheme that clearly rejected the principle of federation between Kaunas and 
Vilna. Poland expressed readiness to resume direct negotiations on the first draft  so long as 
Kaunas adopted a more tolerant attitude toward the Polish population in Kaunas.648
 Ignoring both parties’ objections, the Council Resolution of September 20, 1921, 
unanimously adopted Hymans’s second draft scheme, which differed only in details and was 
based on the same principles as the first, retaining both the constitution of the Vilna territory 
as an autonomous canton modeled after the cantons in the Swiss constitution, and the 
political, military, and financial understanding between Poland and Lithuania.649 The Council 
also undertook to appoint a representative responsible for interpreting the agreement and 
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who were not natives of the territory had to withdraw immediately. The Lithuanian 
government was expected to take up  its headquarters at  Vilna as soon as municipal, cantonal, 
and legislative elections had been held, and the organization of the canton of Vilna had to be 
completed within six months of the agreement’s acceptance by legal representatives of the 
population of Vilna.650 
3.6 The Lithuanian Dilemma 
 On September 21, 1921, the Lithuanian delegation accepted “in its broad outline and 
its fundamental principles the second Hymans Plan, while reserving the right to submit 
amendments at some points to the League of Nations.”651 This ambiguous reply  reflected the 
difficult situation and tension that discussion of the Hymans Plan had caused at the 
Lithuanian Constituent Assembly.652 It  was the outcome of a difficult compromise reached 
within the constituent  assembly between those who resented the Hymans Plan altogether and 
those who instead wanted to continue to accept it. The willingness to accept the Hymans Plan 
was even more remarkable, considering the great pessimism at this time in Lithuania, even 
among the krajowcy, about the prospects of collaboration between Poles and Lithuanians. 
Mikolas Romeris, for example, noted in 1918 that Lithuania would never accept federation 
with Poland if the latter failed to acknowledge the former’s independence or used the union 
to strengthen Polish influence and interference in Lithuania’s internal affairs and territory.653 
A few years later, a more embittered Romeris compared the Union of Lublin of 1569 with the 
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Hymans federalist solution, concluding that whereas the former had destroyed Lithuanian 
independence and national identity almost everywhere in the Lithuanian territories, a new 
federation would have destroyed even its memory in those areas where it had survived.654 
! The Lithuanian Constituent Assembly convened in April 1920 and opened on May 15, 
1920, in Kaunas. Its work began with ratification of the proclamation of February 16, 1918 
on the independence of Lithuania, which had been issued under German occupation by the 
Lithuanian provisional government. The temporary  constitution of June 2, 1920, established 
Lithuania as a parliamentary democratic republic in which a cabinet of ministers exercised 
executive powers.655 
 The Christian Democratic bloc, which besides the Christian Democratic Party 
included the Farmers’ Union and the Federation of Labor, had the majority in the constituent 
assembly. It called for a strong religious tone in Lithuania’s public life, favored of land 
reform, and agreed on most social questions with the second-largest party in the assembly, the 
Populists, even though the latter aimed to restrict the clergy’s and Church’s influence on 
public life. The third major force was the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, which 
supported the formation of a Lithuanian state but was always very critical of the Christian 
Democrats’ “bourgeois patriotism.”656  Even though the Christian Democrats had a clear 
majority, they sought to share the responsibilities of government by forming a coalition with 
the Populists. Christian Democrat Aleksandras Stulginskis was elected President of the 
Republic, and the Populist Prime Minister Kazys Grinius took office in June 1920.657 Six 
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Jews, three Poles, and a German were among the representatives in the constituent 
assembly.658
 Since the beginning of the Lithuanian national movement, most political parties had 
considered Poland a major enemy, but they also acknowledged that the real threat came from 
Germany and Russia, against whom Lithuania and Poland should form a common front. In 
October 1920, when Zeligowski occupied Vilna, the Farmers’ Union, led by Mykolas 
Slezevicius, believed it necessary to compromise on the territorial dispute so as to reach 
agreement with Poland.659  Augustinas Voldemaras, leader of the Nationalist Party, and the 
Social Democrats also shared this view; the Christian Democrats urged issuing an ultimatum 
to Poland. 
 A year later, however, the Christian Democrats and the Farmers’ Union favored 
acceptance of the second Hymans draft. Since the beginning of the Brussels conference, the 
Christian Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs Juozas Puryckis had strongly supported 
Galvanauskas’s efforts to promote a conciliating attitude at home in high hopes that  the 
League of Nations could help  resolve the conflict.660 On August 20, 1921, during discussion 
of acceptance of the Hymans Plan, Puryckis explained to the constituent assembly that 
Lithuania had only two alternatives: either accept the plan in order to secure an agreement 
with Poland, or reject it and lose this opportunity. Rejecting the league’s solution would most 
likely end the negotiations, leading to the temporary  loss of Vilna and possibly, in the long 
run, even war with Poland. But Puryckis also had serious objections to the cantonal system 
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and to Polish as an official language, as well as to the creation of seemingly permanent 
federal ties with Poland.661 
 Despite these reservations, the Hymans scheme suited the Christian Democrats’ 
notion of security, which went beyond military  concerns to include economic and territorial 
considerations. Though Poland remained the greatest enemy, the Lithuanians had everything 
to gain from a union that would protect  them from the Soviet threat.662  They argued that 
regaining Vilna and establishing economic ties with Poland was be the best way to counteract 
Soviet power; therefore they  were inclined to accept the Hymans Plan, one the sole condition 
of reduced Polish influence on Lithuanian domestic life.663 The Farmers’ Union also wanted 
to end the centuries-old state of war that hobbled the Lithuanian economy. One of its 
members, Kazys Skirpa, remarked that acceptance of the plan would secure the support of the 
western powers, which was needed because whether Lithuanians liked it or not, “might 
makes right,” and losing western support  would isolate Lithuania, leaving it at  the mercy of 
Soviet Russia and Germany.664 Populist Prime Minister Kazys Grinius, optimistic about the 
prospects of the Vilna region’s integration with Lithuania, also stressed the advantages of an 
agreement with Poland.665 
 Among the opposition, the Social Democratic and the Nationalist Parties both 
resented the Hymans Plan, but their criticism targeted their own government rather than the 
League of Nations. Voldemaras said the government should resign, having erred mightily  in 







Nationalist, Antanas Smetona, agreed in principle that the Lithuanians had to find an 
agreement with the Poles, but he resented the Hymans Plan, fearing it might lead Lithuania 
into a new Union of Lublin.666 In his opinion, the solution depended on improved economic 
conditions in the country  and adoption of an agrarian reform that could win Polish 
landowners’ trust and convince them that they  could live in favorable conditions under 
Lithuanian rule.667 Like the Nationalists, the Social Democrats remained firmly opposed to 
both the first and second Hymans draft and again criticized the government for acting against 
the nation’s interests. Evaluating the consequences of the plan’s adoption from a Marxist 
perspective, the Social Democrats stressed that it would prevent ratification of the agrarian 
reform, leaving the Lithuanians in the position of serving Polish landowners.668 
 
 Both the debate in the constituent  assembly and the way  the Vilna nationalities’ 
leadership responded to the Hymans Plan (discussed in the next chapters) well illustrate that 
in 1920–1921, Poland and Lithuania still regarded the question of their mutual relations as far 
from settled. Solutions other than those along strictly nationalistic lines were still being 
evaluated, at least in Lithuania. Unlike the Allied Powers, the league had made protection of 
Lithuanian independence a question of principle and substance. For this reason the Hymans 
Plan was able to breach Lithuania’s intransigence. Considering Poland’s determination to 
make no concessions, this partial success that was all the more significant in terms of the 
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prospects of a successful outcome of negotiations. However, respect for the principle of self-
determination—assumed to be one of the league’s responsibilities though not explicitly 
enshrined in its covenant—posed several problems for the dispute settlement. It lent itself to 
political exploitation and had come to serve not only modern nationalism but also the 
ideology beyond the reconstruction of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It  also 
indirectly reinforced the disputants’ conviction that their cases for territorial claims and right 
to statehood, when presented before the League of Nations, had to be maximally  compelling. 
This belief altered their understanding of the league’s priorities and goals, and also seriously 
limited their freedom of choice and flexibility at the negotiating table.
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CHAPTER 4: THE HYMANS PLAN AND THE MULTINATIONAL VILNA REGION
 Hymans defined his federal plan as a political solution for two states in conflict, but 
his scheme also reflected the league’s awareness that this dispute was not just a Lithuanian 
and Polish question. It also involved other nationalities whose rights were not to be 
neglected. This chapter has two aims. First, it shows that to the extent possible, the league did 
not sacrifice minorities’ right of self-government to security concerns. On the contrary, the 
creation of the Vilna federal canton with a diet based on proportional representation shows 
that the league tried to go beyond standardized application of minority  treaties and the 
alleged state-centric approach to minority questions that is considered one of the league’s 
main features.669 This attempt also challenges the entrenched belief that in the long run the 
league encouraged or even promoted assimilation of minorities. Second, the chapter aims to 
analyze how the most active political groups of Vilna nationalities responded to the Hymans 
Plan and to Lithuanian cultural autonomy. These two questions intertwine because the 
interest that the leaders of Vilna’s nationalities expressed in Lithuanian cultural autonomy 
was more apparent than real—that is, it was instrumental to the pursuit of their own domestic 
and international political agendas rather than reflective of a desire for genuine political 
collaboration. Therefore this chapter evaluates the significance of Lithuanian cultural 
autonomy in relation to Lithuania’s foreign politics, as well as in the broader historical 
context of relations between Lithuanian and minorities since the late 1890s.
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 There is widespread agreement among scholars that the league evaluated minority 
questions through the lens of security  at the expense of democracy and minorities’ rights. 
According to this view, the League of Nations aimed to create homogenous nation-states 
even in Eastern and Central Europe because it could not reconcile the idea of peace and 
stability  with the existence of multiethnic states. Consequently, these accounts stress, the goal 
of the league’s minority protection system was to provide temporary  protection to minorities 
in the hope that they would meantime assimilate to the majority. For this reason, they argue, 
the league was closed to outside improvement to its own provisions and promoted the 
western model of the nation-state.670 Under the Versailles treaties, the league could do no 
more than mitigate the blatant  injustice of depriving many nationalities of the right to self-
determination, by  devising a minority protection system. Newly constituted states of East 
Central Europe were obliged to sign minority protection treaties under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, giving the league the right to investigate and take action against alleged 
violations of rights reported by  minorities or states. According to this view, the league 
intended to provide minorities with only temporary  protection from discrimination and 
dissimilation, and it envisioned no measures or guarantees to prevent assimilation, which 
instead was to be indirectly  facilitated and encouraged.671 Hence, though the league’s treaties 
envisioned state-funded native-language primary  education and the right of minorities to 
establish, fund, and manage cultural and educational organizations, the temporary measures 
merely concerned security  and were designed chiefly  to keep  minorities from disturbing 
international peace and the territorial status quo.672 While awaiting the desired assimilation, 
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the league instituted a supervision system that offered little practical defense against 
“nationalizing” practices supported by  host states, which also were interested minorities’ 
speedy assimilation.673 
 According to recent studies, a different approach could not prevail until the creation in 
1925 of the Congress of Nationalities, headed by the German Balt Paul Schiemann, leader of 
the Nationalities Movement. The congress saw its duty and purpose as solving the problem 
the league had allegedly dismissed, that is, reconciling the creation of multinational 
democratic states with international peace and security. Inspired by the ideas of Karl Renner 
and Otto Bauer, Schiemann believed that pursuing assimilation of minorities would lead to 
domestic and international instability.674 Allowing each nationality to freely  practice its own 
culture was a precondition for peace; therefore, cultural autonomy needed to be enshrined in 
the state constitution.675 Cultural autonomy, also known as non-territorial autonomy, seemed 
an ideal solution to the conflict between belonging to a state and belonging to a nation: in the 
absence of any real prospect of statehood, it  offered alternative paths by which national 
minorities could express their cultural identity.676 Each national minority would be eligible to 
constitute itself as a public corporation with a self-elected council and manage its own 
cultural and educational affairs with state funds allocated in proportion to the size of the 
minority.677  The Congress of Nationalities had the mission of promoting, through cultural 
autonomy, the creation of a-national states in which the Staatengemeinschaft (state 
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community) was understood as a collection of different national groups sharing the same 
territory. This solution seemed to better suit the reality of multinational coexistence in Central 
and Eastern European states.678  This interwar organization’s inability to establish itself has 
been ascribed to Schiemann’s views, seen as too far-reaching and ahead of their time. 
Moreover, the congress’s efforts to confine its work to minority rights while pointedly 
avoiding discussion of border disputes failed to dispel the league’s and the Allied Powers’ 
distrust in this largely German-dominated organization.679 
 Even though concerns with security and international peace lay  at the heart of the 
league’s approach and management of minority  questions, Geneva did not altogether dismiss 
the application of the principle of self-determination to peoples in the settlement of minority 
and border disputes. On the contrary, the Hymans Plan tried to reconcile security and 
international peace between Poland and Lithuania with recognition of the significant Jewish 
and Belarusian presence in the disputed territories. In this respect, the project represented an 
obvious alternative to the statist approach prioritizing protection of state sovereignty  over 
protection of minorities’ rights that has traditionally  been considered one of the league’s 
trademarks.680 
 Far from dismissing the problem of reconciling Polish and Lithuanian claims over 
multinational lands with the presence of other minorities, Hymans turned to Switzerland as 
an obvious example of a state in which linguistic differences had not prevented political 
unity. In this respect, the Hymans Plan dovetailed with the victorious western powers’ 
conviction that Europe had witnessed enough nationalism. As James Headlam-Morley, one of 
the architects of the minority treaties in Paris, put it in 1919, it was necessary to see the tide 
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begin flowing in the other direction. If the free expression of national sovereignty for smaller 
nations in Europe was to be allowed as a counterweight to the large multinational states of 
1914, then it was also necessary  to progress beyond this phase by allowing the existence of 
smaller multinational states like Belgium and Switzerland.681 The Hymans Plan fulfilled this 
objective by proposing the adoption of Polish and Lithuanian as official state languages and 
providing ample guarantees of national minorities’ rights to education, religion, language, and 
association.682  In addition, the Vilna region was organized as an autonomous canton within 
the Lithuanian state, with local executive and legislative institutions and rights based on those 
in the constitutions of Swiss cantons, and proportional representation for the Vilna canton in 
the Central Diet.683  This latter provision granted minorities significant power and political 
representation. 
 The league’s Minority Section director, Eric Colban, wrote a long article explaining 
the league’s view of minority questions and its minority  protection system, which aimed at 
“establishing friendly  cooperation between the different racial, religious and linguistic groups 
living on their territories” through treaties signed by minority  states and guaranteed by the 
League of Nations.684 He certainly did not deny that minority  questions related to issues of 
security: “The minority problem, an aspect of the frontier problem and—besides the 
economic aspect—perhaps the most important side of it. It would not be an exaggeration to 
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say that a solution to the minorities problem, would contribute to the removal of the sources 
of conflict in Europe.”685 
 Minorities were expected to be a source of conflict because “apart from the fact that a 
peace conference has the natural tendency to go as far as possible in satisfying the aspirations 
of the victorious nations,” the Versailles peace settlement had been unable to “arrange for 
each race to form a single state or to prevent several races from coming together within the 
boundaries of the same state.”686  This situation, Colban acknowledged, at once violated 
peoples’ rights to self-determination and to self-government, which “inevitably raises the 
problem of transforming about 30 million individuals into loyal citizens of the countries to 
which they  belonged.”687  Hence, the league did not dismiss the question of reconciling 
whatever could be saved of minorities’ rights to self-determination or self-government with 
international security. On the contrary, winning minorities’ loyalty  was still possible and 
necessary. However, it was achievable only if states guaranteed their national and cultural 
rights, so that “they  may then little by little be induced to cooperate with the majority of the 
population and to abandon whatever aspirations they still might have for union with a 
population outside the boundaries of their host state.”688  The way the most active political 
groups representing Jewish, Belarusian, and Polish minorities in Vilna responded to the 
Hymans Plan indicated that promoting this collaboration would prove just as difficult as the 
peacemakers in Versailles and league officials after them had expected. 
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 Part of the problem was that these groups did not regard themselves as minorities but 
as national communities with the right to statehood. As early as 1916, the subjected 
nationalities of the former Habsburg and Russian empires had interpreted Wilson’s statements 
in their own terms. The Allies in Paris were willing to acknowledge the principle of self-
government, that is, minorities’ right to choose the nation to which they would belong, but 
minorities themselves understood it as the right to create their own nation-state.689 Respect 
for and implementation of what they, unlike the powers, considered a right and not a 
principle, was crucial to these communities because they saw it  as the only guarantee of 
national survival, a conviction reflecting the Herderian and Mazzinian principle that world 
peace would prevail once each ethnic group had attained its own nation-state.690  Many 
nationalities consequently  saw the league—which after all had been created to handle 
minority questions in Europe, among other things—as a substantial opportunity to gain what 
the Peace Conference had failed to grant. 
 The league’s petition system and the Polish-Lithuanian dispute offered the leaders of 
the Polish, Belarusian, and Jewish communities in Vilna their best chance yet to be heard in 
Geneva.691 As this chapter will show, petitioning the league under the pretext of protesting 
ethnic violence in the disputed territories was an opportunity  for minorities to express 
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political opinions about the shape of the settlement of the dispute between Lithuania and 
Poland. Whereas the Polish activists very bluntly claimed their right to self-determination, 
Belarusian and Jewish leaders chose a different strategy. In memoranda sent to the league, the 
latter pledged to support Lithuania in exchange for Kaunas’s commitment to grant all 
minorities cultural autonomy. Their arguments, however, betrayed less interest in 
collaborating with Lithuanians to create the a-national state advocated by  the Austro-
Marxists, than in using Lithuanian cultural autonomy as the best temporary solution until full 
independence became possible. 
4.1 Cultural Autonomy in Lithuanian Foreign Politics: From Paris to Geneva
 Lithuania, for its part, hoped to use cultural autonomy as a bargaining tool to gain the 
League of Nations’ support for its claims over Vilna. Antanas Smetona, who served as 
provisional president of Lithuania’s (April 1919-June 1920) represented the Lithuanian 
government’s view of the question. The highly ethnically mixed nature of the contested 
territories ruled out bifurcation of the country  along ethnic lines. The Poles, however, were 
trying to do exactly  this because they  enjoyed social superiority in the eastern and southern 
territories and planned to continue Polonizing these regions.692 For this reason, in Smetona’s 
opinion, the Vilna Poles wanted to be either joined to Poland or granted autonomy. From the 
Lithuanian standpoint, however, the only long-term solution to the problem lay  in territorial 
autonomy, “which Lithuania would not deny to the Belarusians either, if they asked for it.”693 
In the meantime, personal autonomy rights in schools, courts, and other institutions requiring 
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equality  of languages would suffice and gratify  the 150,000 Poles living in Kaunas and 
Suwalki and the 250,000 resident in Vilna.694 
 This was not the first time the Lithuanian government had used minority  rights in 
general and cultural autonomy in particular as diplomatic tools to gain international support 
for their claims over Vilna. The Lithuanian delegation in Paris had sought not only to obtain 
de jure recognition but also to counteract Poland’s attempt to organize a plebiscite in Vilna 
after Marshal Pilsudski had entered Vilna on April 21, 1919, following the Bolshevik retreat. 
A month later Pilsudski organized the Civil Government of the Eastern Territories to 
administer territories of Historic Lithuania that the Poles had recently taken from the 
Bolsheviks. 
 Precisely because of their common interest in opposing Polish claims, Jewish, 
Belarusian, and Lithuanian leaders finally  started to collaborate. In exchange for Jewish 
support on the Vilna question, the Lithuanian delegation in Paris had seriously discussed the 
project of Jewish national autonomy for the first time. On August 4, 1919, the latter 
finally approved the Declaration on the Rights of the Jews of Lithuania, which guaranteed 
that “the Lithuanian government would ratify it in the Constitution.”695 Alongside equal civil, 
political, and national rights regardless of nationality, religion, and language, the declaration 
granted equal representation to the Jewish population, the right to participate in governmental 
and judicial institutions, and the establishment of a Jewish ministry  for their particular 
concerns. In terms of political rights, Jewish communities were recognized as a juridical body 
entitled to state subsidies. Proponents of Jewish national autonomy in Lithuania later saw the 
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guarantees announced at  the Paris Peace Conference as the political bedrock of national 
autonomy.696  
 In Geneva, however, championing generosity  toward minorities had broader 
significance than in Paris, and cultural autonomy was no longer only  a trump  card for 
territorial gain. Far from resenting the signing of a minority  treaty as an infringement of their 
sovereignty, the Lithuanians hoped that a show of tolerance toward minorities would also 
facilitate the still-awaited de jure recognition and admission to the League of Nations. 
“Kaunas is committed to granting697 cultural autonomy to all minorities living in Lithuania,” 
Galvanauskas stated in an interview with a representative of the Comite des Délégations 
Juives in March 1921.698 It was important to convince the international public that this project 
transcended Lithuanian-Jewish affairs, reflecting the broader goal of creating a Lithuanian 
state in which minorities were allowed to organize their national life. The Jews constituted 13 
percent of the total population of Vilna region, Galvanauskas explained, but there were also 
other nationalities, namely, Lithuanians, Poles, and Belarusians.699  The Lithuanian 
government acknowledged its duty  to create conditions under which minorities could develop 
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their own national culture, “because this will consolidate their loyalty to the state.”700 
Trusting in the impact this could have especially on international Jewish public opinion, 
Galvanauskas presented cultural autonomy as “the only political solution possible that would 
hopefully set Lithuania as an example for other nations.”701 
 The new significance of the minority  question and cultural autonomy in Lithuanian 
public diplomacy was a response to the league’s defense of minorities and role in the process 
of new states’ international recognition. The First Assembly of the League of Nations had 
discussed whether minority  treaties should be imposed as a precondition for newly 
constituted states’ admission, a question that in turn depended on how minority  protection 
was to be reconciled with international security. On December 15, 1920, the Assembly 
resolved to grant admission to the Baltic and Caucasian states and Albania on condition that 
they  were willing to enforce the principles of the minorities treaties through measures whose 
necessary details would be arranged with the league’s Council.702 
 This decision was reached only after lengthy discussions within the Fifth Committee 
of the Assembly, created for this purpose. The Versailles treaty  had fully  acknowledged the 
principle, established by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, that no state would be recognized 
and granted accession of territory unless it accepted obligations respecting its linguistic, 
religious, and racial minorities. This nevertheless left many questions open, and it was now 
the league’s task to establish how and where this principle should be applied.703 Should the 
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signing of minority treaties be imposed as a condition for admission to the league, and if so, 
what right did the league have to impose this infringement of states’ sovereignty? Moreover, 
were the treaties to be imposed on all members of the league or only on newly admitted 
states, and on what grounds?704  The question of whether the league should be involved in 
minority protection was not so obvious. The Swiss delegate Huber Motta and the Canadian 
Newton Wesley Rowell, for instance, believed the league had no right to infringe the very 
principle it was based on, namely, respect for state sovereignty.705 Rowell was also wary of 
adopting this principle to govern general admission to the league, because “minorities are a 
European problem, and the effect of such a policy would be to perpetuate in Canada the 
division which had marred Europe. Nor it could be carried out in the United States.”706 The 
Polish delegate Bohdan Winiarski was instead concerned that minorities, particularly  the 
Jews, would use these provisions to maintain “special conditions that  it would be to their 
advantage to remove, because they  are an obstacle to their progressive assimilation to the 
Polish population.”707  
 The view of the Czechoslovakian Edvard Benes, France’s Viviani, Lord Cecil, and 
Herbert Fisher, which ultimately  prevailed, was instead that the league ought to do something 
about minority protection. Several member states had promised to respect the rights of 
minorities within their territories, which, they held, constituted a precedent that allowed the 
league to take steps to obtain guarantees from new states. Interfering in states’ internal policy 
was certainly undesirable, but the greater danger lay in disregarding the causes of the earlier 
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struggles at the root of the last war; therefore, the League of Nations should not remain 
indifferent to possible causes of conflict in Central and Eastern Europe.708 Benes meanwhile 
raised important points concerning the need to protect  states from minorities as well. He 
argued that  if the world had just emerged from a war provoked by great  states’ oppression of 
their minorities, then these states “must create a new mentality, and strive to understand what 
were the principles on which the present system for the protection minorities is based.”709 
States also needed to educate minorities. Benes recalled how, in certain states, 
minorities had tended to abuse the position accorded to them by pursuing artificial agitation 
through energetic complaints that all too often proved unjustifiable and indeed, were opposed 
to the security of their states. Therefore the great powers purposed to use minority treaties to 
safeguard the majority, as well as the minorities themselves. This aspect of the question was 
particularly relevant  in Czechoslovakia, where the government was not afraid to grant more 
generous concessions than were actually stipulated by the Polish Minority  Treaty. In his 
country, it  was not  the minorities but  the state, Benes argued, that was likelier to need the 
league’s protection against improper, dangerous interpretation of the principle of 
nationalities.710 Finally, the committee recommended that any  state applying for admission to 
the League of Nations should undertake the same kinds of obligations that Romania, Serbia, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Austria had agreed to under the 
peace treaties.711 
205
708 Ibid., p. 12.
709  Emphasis added. LNA, R 1365, Fifth Committee, Examination for New Admissions, Ninth 
Meeting, Geneva, December 13, 1920, p. 15.
710 Emphasis added. Ibid.
711  LNA, R 1365, Provisional Verbatim Record, 25th Plenary Meeting, Geneva, December 15, 1920, 
p. 7.
 In response to the league’s course of action, for over a year and until its admission to 
the league on September 21, 1921, the Lithuanian delegation strove to convince the league of 
its willingness to not only abide by the league’s own standards for minority protection but go 
even further with cultural autonomy. In a note to the league on December 14, 1920, 
Voldemaras confirmed that his government was ready to start negotiating with the Council to 
define the scope and details of the execution of its international obligations of minority 
protection.712  He declared that Lithuania’s citizens and all its nationalities had enjoyed 
complete equality  before the law since the reconstituted Lithuanian state’s first days of 
existence. This equality had received legal expression in the provisional constitution drawn 
up in November 1918, as well as in the fundamental principles of the constitution adopted by 
the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly.713 In conformity with these fundamental principles, all 
national minorities in Lithuania—Poles as well as Belarusians and Jews—were at present 
accorded the right to participate freely and without reservation in the state organization, the 
parliament, the Army, and, generally  speaking, all state institutions.714  They were also 
allowed to use their language in government institutions, schools, the press, and public 
meetings as well as in economic and other organizations. Polish, Belarusian, and Jewish 
national schools and colleges existed side by side with Lithuanian educational institutions, 
under exactly the same conditions.715 
In addition, the government guaranteed national minorities certain special rights to 
autonomous educational and national organizations offering means for protecting and 
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developing the interests of national minorities. To ensure that these privileges were placed on 
proper legal footing and received effective means for their development, special portfolios 
were reserved in the Cabinet for National Minorities,716 and respective ministries of Polish, 
Belarusian, and Jewish affairs had been created. According to Voldemaras, since the very 
first days of Lithuanian independence the Jewish and Belarusian ministers “had been able to 
work with energy and success in the interest  of the nationalities which they represented. As 
for the Poles, they had hitherto refused, in spite of the repeated offers, to make use of their 
right to take part in the organization of their autonomous life,” and for this reason the post of 
Minister of Polish Affairs remained vacant. The Poles had also declined high-ranking 
appointments offered to them in other ministries.717 
 
4.2 The Domestic Dimension: A Difficult Collaboration 
 Lithuanian generosity  nevertheless had its limits. In Brussels, Galvanauskas objected 
to the Polish request to admit a delegation from Vilna, on the grounds that international law 
acknowledged that the right  of the disputed territory to express its will was attached to either 
country, but “it would be inconceivable that a Diet of a disputed territory should be given 
right to legislate an agreement dealing with political, economic and military relations 
between two sovereign states.”718 Allowing this exception would be a “dangerous innovation 
from the point of view of public law.”719  In other words, the Lithuanians could conceive of 
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sharing sovereignty over the Vilna territory with non-Lithuanian minorities, but sharing state 
sovereignty with them was not an option. 
 The question of minorities’ role and significance had been relevant in Lithuanian 
politics since the beginning of the Lithuanian national movement, for a very simple reason: 
claiming Vilna as the historical capital, to be included within the boundaries of the new 
modern Lithuanian state, posed the question of how to legitimize national claims over this 
multiethnic area, in which the Lithuanian element was only  a minority. Thus, from its earliest 
beginnings, Lithuanian domestic and international politics was marred by the tension 
between having to share sovereignty over territory with the other minorities while also 
creating a national state. 
 The Lithuanians considered cultural autonomy a possible solution to the problem, but 
this choice still betrayed a state-centric approach to the whole question because the definition 
of minority  is itself positional and relative to a state.720  In fact, the underlying assumption 
was that they had the right to create their own state while Belarusians, Jewish, and Polish 
nationalities would accept  the status of minorities. The political representatives of these 
groups obviously saw things very differently; for them, the solution to the problem of 
democratic reforms in these multiethnic regions was hardly  so obvious. Before outlining 
these groups’ views on the dispute, and in order to understand how they  presented their views 
before the league, it is therefore necessary to step back and look at the development of the 
domestic dimension of Lithuanian-minorities relations before, during, and after the First 
World War. 
 The Russian revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto stirred hopes for 
democratic reform, greatly contributing to the politicization of the newly  formed national 
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movements within the Russian Empire. As a consequence, Lithuania’s two major political 
currents, represented by the radicals (the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the 
Lithuanian Democratic Party) and the conservatives (the Christian Democrats and Lithuanian 
National Democratic Party), both called for Lithuanian autonomy, differing only on the 
strategy to achieve this goal.721 The first Lithuanian declarations for autonomy that included 
rights for minorities came from the leftist camp. Aligned with western socialism since 1906, 
the Lithuanian Democrats and Social Democrats advocated the creation of an autonomous, 
ethnographically  Lithuanian province with Vilna as its capital within a reformed and more 
democratic Russian Empire. Unlike the Lithuanian Christian Democrats and the National 
Democrats, who aimed to create a “Lithuania for Lithuanians,” they believed in the cultural, 
political, and economic liberation of the oppressed and envisioned protection of all national 
minorities’ civil and cultural rights.722 In its manifesto of 1905, the Social Democratic Party 
advocated equality for all citizens, regardless of nationality, religion, and gender.723 
 Cultural autonomy attracted the attention of Jewish political leaders, too. Simon 
Dubnow embraced the idea because he believed that only a reformed, more democratic, 
multinational Russian state could allow Russia’s nationalities to thrive. As Paul Schiemann 
would later echo, territory was not an essential condition for national existence, and only 
autonomy based on the personal principle could at once preserve the advantages of a great 
state and satisfy its nations’ wishes without incurring the disadvantages of creating small 
territorial units.724  Breaking the empire into independent national states would only  create 
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unrest and disorder, ultimately  resulting in economic, political, and social disaster. The 
Folkist Party used Dubnow’s ideas as its political program, which by 1905 most other Jewish 
national parties had adopted as well, for various reasons.725 Whereas the Folkists aspired to 
equality  for all nationalities living in a state, thus abolishing the hegemony of one group over 
the other, the Bund accepted the idea because, like Dubnow, it  held that Russia’s breakup 
would undermine the unity of the Jewish working class.726 In this respect, Dubnow’s and the 
Bund’s views clashed with those of the Lithuanian Social Democrats, who instead wished to 
create an autonomous Lithuanian state federated with Russia, in which the Jewish population 
would enjoy cultural autonomy.727 The Zionists, who shared the other groups’ pro-Russian 
stance, were less indifferent to territorial claims than Dubnow and the Bund, and finally 
decided to include cultural autonomy in their program, hoping that the struggle for national 
autonomy in the Diaspora would consolidate and secure Jewish national rights through 
proper institutions.728
 Also in 1905, initial contact was made among Belarusian, Jewish, and Lithuanian 
activists. In St. Petersburg, advocates of Lithuanian autonomy created the Autonomist-
Federalist Union of Lithuania. However, disagreement over the territorial and political 
aspects of the future Lithuania and the nature of interethnic relations proved insurmountable 
impediments to discussion, and the organization disintegrated in 1913. 
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 As the Lithuanians progressively  replaced the idea of a restored medieval Grand 
Duchy with the notion of an ethnic Lithuania including the provinces of Kaunas and Suwalki 
with parts of Grodno and Curland, collaboration became more difficult. The krajowcy saw 
this shift  as a betrayal of the historical traditions of the Grand Duchy; meanwhile the 
Belarusians opposed the inclusion of ethnically Belarusian territories—with the support of 
Jewish leaders, who dreaded the division of their communities among national states.  
 The First World War and the German occupation made it impossible to further ignore 
ideological discrepancies regarding Lithuania’s political future. The Lithuanian-Jewish 
political elites were forced to reconsider their pro-Russian stance, while the Lithuanians, for 
their part, could no longer afford to eschew collaboration with other nationalities. Talks began 
at the outset of German rule, when the Lithuanian Populist Jonas Vileisis, the Social 
Democrat Augustinas Janulaitis, and the Democrat Jurgis Saulys met with the Belarusians 
Anton and Ivan Luckiewicz and two Jewish representatives, Tsemah Szabad and Grigorii 
Romm. They created the Interim Council of the Confederacy of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, which in December 1915 called for creation of an independent state on the lands 
of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.729  Their initiative nonetheless remained a dead 
letter.730 
 The shift  toward ethnonationalism culminated in its official adoption as the platform 
of the Lithuanian provisional government created under German occupation in 1917, marking 
a setback in Lithuanian-minorities relations. A German-authorized Lithuanian conference in 
Vilna in September 1917 elected the Lithuanian National Council, known as the Taryba. A 
unilateral Lithuanian declaration issued on February 16, 1918, was another step toward the 
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creation of a Lithuanian national state that included the Kaunas and Vilna districts, as well as 
the ethnically Lithuanian parts of the Suwalki and Grodno territories, the northwestern part  of 
the Minsk governorate, and Curland.731 When the Taryba discussed the status of minorities in 
the future Lithuanian state, granting rights to minorities met with general agreement, but few 
supported cultural autonomy. 
Some, like Petras Klimas, held that “above all, nationally minded representatives of 
the Lithuanians must decide the fate of Lithuania.”732   Minorities could nominate 
representatives to the Taryba only  if they supported the goal to create an independent 
Lithuania, had never participated in any anti-Lithuanian activities, and were proficient in the 
Lithuanian language.733 Klimas believed that loyalty to Lithuania should be prioritized, even 
if it resulted in minorities’ boycott of the Taryba. Hence, Lithuanian leaders initially  made 
several public statements about their commitment to guarantees for national minorities, but 
never went as far as promising cultural autonomy. Saulys promised to abolish legal 
discrimination on religious or ethnic grounds and grant civil equality  (emancipation) and 
cultural freedoms to minorities.734  The final declaration on minorities went by  the very 
general formula of guaranteeing conditions for national minorities’ cultural development.735 
And whereas the Taryba included several Polish-Lithuanian landowners, the Belarusian and 
Jewish representatives were not invited to join. Having adopted the ethnographic principle to 
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draw the borders of the new state, the Taryba had decided to consider Vilna ethnically 
Lithuanian; negotiating with the Belarusians would thus be meaningless.736 
  The Taryba’s ethnonational stance obviously disappointed the other national groups. 
The Folkist Party called a meeting that was attended by the Bund, the Zionists, the Jewish 
Democrats, and Poelei Zion, who spoke against the Taryba’s legitimacy. Hopes were still 
high for federation with Russia; many within the Jewish camp therefore resented any 
reference to Lithuanian “independence.”737 The meeting also discussed union between Poland 
and Lithuania as an alternative to a Lithuanian national state, but this idea was dropped. Both 
Polish circles in Warsaw and Jewish members of the integrationist camp there discussed the 
option to ask for special cultural rights, but upon their doing so, the Polish National 
Democrats refused to consider the Jews a nation and rejected the request.738 Moreover, the 
Folkists in Vilna had economic reasons to oppose federation of Lithuania and Poland. 
Economically, the two countries had neither ties nor common interests, and anti-Semitism in 
Poland had already caused the Jews’ exclusion from economic life there. The Zionist  camp 
was divided between the pro-German and the pro-Russian stance, and the Bund now favored 
a greater Lithuanian-Belarusian state.739  Regardless of their differences, they, like the 
Folkists, were united by preoccupation with the exclusionist tendencies gaining ground in 
various strata of the Lithuanian national movement and saw national autonomy as an 
opportunity to defend Jews against bankruptcy.740
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 Jewish leaders initially  boycotted the Taryba because “there was no representation for 
the Grodno and Bialystok districts largely  inhabited by Jews, and it had not been elected by 
the total population of all nationalities.”741 In response to Jewish remarks, Steponas Kairys, 
leader of the Social Democratic Party, argued that “it is true that it is better to have more. But 
not always.… We don’t need such territorial expansion today.” Another Lithuanian leading 
figure, Leonas Sliupas, agreed that “we must reinvent the principle of ethnic Lithuania.” 
Given Jews’ dispersion throughout the state, he too considered the request for autonomy 
inappropriate for several reasons.742 The Jewish quest for national autonomy Sliupas said “is 
necessarily regarded by the Jews as a desire to create a state within a state.”743  The 
Lithuanian state was willing to guarantee equality of rights to all its subjects, but none should 
expect any further concession. Schools in which students’ mother tongue was the medium of 
instruction were permissible in areas where the majority of the population was Polish or 
Belarusian, but Jews “who are dispersed throughout the state cannot be granted schools in 
which the language of instruction shall be Yiddish.”744 
 The German capitulation in November 1918 made the de jure recognition of Lithuania 
a possibility, marking a new stage in Lithuanian-minorities relations. The territorial question 
that had divided Jewish, Belarusian, and Lithuanian leaders became the starting point for a 
new, at times difficult, collaboration. The peace talks that opened in Paris in January  1919 
imposed a new set of priorities on the Lithuanian agenda, making support of minorities an 
important part of Lithuanian international diplomacy. 
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 In the Jewish camp, the Zionists finally renounced their pro-Russian orientation, 
conceding that the question was no longer whether Lithuania should be or not, but which 
Lithuania should be created. They certainly did not support the Taryba’s stance in this regard, 
nor had they renounced their hope of living in a state of nationalities rather than a nation-
state. Thus, as early as November 1918 they  supported Vilna’s inclusion in Lithuania—not 
out of sympathy for Lithuania, but because they  believed they were likely to enjoy more 
freedom and better living conditions than in Poland. After all, they did not constitute a 
majority, and Vilna was no less Jewish than it was Polish.745 
 In the meantime, Vilna’s Belarusians had created the Vilna Belarusian Rada (Diet), 
led by  Dominyk Semaska and Jan Stankiewicz and Anton Luckiewicz, which supported the 
creation of a Lithuanian-Belarusian state that included the ethnically  Belarusian territories of 
Bialystok and Bielsk and granted cultural and administrative autonomy to national minorities. 
They  also asked for proportionate representation of Belarusians in the Taryba.746 However, 
the Vilna Belarusian Rada was marred by a division between supporters of autonomous union 
with Lithuania and advocates of Belarusian independence. The split deepened after the Rada 
of the Belarusian People’s Republic (Beloruska Narodna Respublika, BNR) fled Minsk after 
the Germans’ capitulation in November 1918, sought refuge in Kaunas, and started to 
collaborate with the Lithuanian government. 
  Led by Anton Lutskevich, Belarusian nationalists and social revolutionaries had 
elected the BNR rada in German-occupied Minsk in February  1918. On March 24–25, 1918, 
the rada declared Belarus an independent and free state including all ethnographically 
Belarusian territories. Following linguistic and national criteria, they regarded as Belarusian 
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not only the inhabitants of today’s Republic of Belarus, but also the populations of extensive 
adjacent areas, such as the Vilna district, Pskov, Novgorod, Smolensk, Briansk, and parts of 
the Ukrainian Polessie.747  The Belarusian declaration of independence was largely a political 
statement that remained internationally unrecognized; nevertheless, like the western powers, 
the BNR rada insisted that it voided the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between 
Russia and Germany, including the stipulation that the Imperial German government would 
not recognize any  new states on the territories of the former Russian Empire.748 After the 
Bolsheviks’ return to Belarus following the German capitulation, the Minsk rada sought 
refuge in Vilna. After Zeligowski’s coup, it moved to Kaunas and remained there until 
1923.749 
 Initially, the Taryba denied the request of autonomy advanced by  the Vilna rada’s 
supporters of the Lithuanian-Belarusian federation because, after hearing reports from both 
Jewish and Belarusian representatives, the Lithuanians had decided that minorities did not 
need equal representation with them to work in their provisional government.750 The Vilna 
Belarusian Rada, otherwise isolated and weak, had no choice but to join the Taryba on the 
Lithuanians’ terms. On November 27, 1918, six Belarusian members entered the Taryba, 
followed the next spring by three additional representatives of the Grodno region.751 A month 
later the Lithuanian government established the Ministry for Belarusian Affairs, headed by 
Joseph Voronko, which kept close ties with the BNR rada based in Kaunas.752 Relations were 
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still strained because the Lithuanians wanted the latter to renounce the principle of 
indivisibility of the Belarusian lands and compromise on the question of Belarusian 
independence. Moreover, the Polonophiles in the BNR rada led by Anton Lutskevich still 
hoped to reach an understanding with Pilsudski for federation between Poland and Belarus, a 
union with one diet but separate legislatures, armies, and finances.753  The internal 
disagreement was overcome only when the Russian-Polish war and Pilsudski’s lack of 
interest in Belarusian independence and federation with Poland changed the balance of 
power, forcing the exiled BNR prime minister in Kaunas, Waclaw Lastowski, to join forces 
with the Lithuanians to contain Russian and Polish imperialism.754  In exchange for 
Lithuanian recognition and support of the independence of the Belarusian People’s Republic, 
Lastowski agreed to also leave to the Lithuanians the ethnographically Belarusian territories 
they claimed.755
 Finding an agreement with the powerless Belarusian leadership seemed convenient to 
the Lithuanians only  in early 1919, when they started seeing the Belarusian question as key  to 
settlement of the Vilna dispute. This conviction grew especially keen after Zeligowski took 
Vilna in October 1920, and a month later on November 11, 1920, a Belarusian-Lithuanian 
military agreement was signed. In exchange for Lithuanian diplomatic recognition, 
permission to establish an embassy in Lithuania, and financial credits, the BNR’s government 
offered its support in any future plebiscite on the fate of Vilna. Meanwhile, a secret 
agreement established a plan for mutual cooperation and assistance in promoting anti-Polish 
propaganda and organizing guerrilla actions. It also recognized the Lithuanian eastern border 
as defined in the Lithuanian-Soviet Treaty of Moscow of July 12, 1920, which granted Vilna 
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to Lithuania.756  To prove Belarusian loyalty  to Lithuania, on November 15, 1920, Anton 
Semaska, minister of Belarusian affairs at the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly, claimed that 
the inhabitants of the Belarusian territories of Augustova were under Polish occupation and 
persecutions, waiting for the Lithuanian army to rescue them. Semaska also confirmed that he 
had addressed a note to all the Belarusian paramilitary  organizations under the command of 
the Belarusian Commissariat in Grodno, inviting them to trust in the Lithuanian army and 
work together for the “creation of a common Lithuanian fatherland.”757 In practice, all these 
agreements made the Belarusian government dependent on Lithuanian foreign policy, but 
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4.3 The Vilna Minorities’ Petitions and the League of Nations 
4.3.1The Belarusians 
 In December 1920, when Geneva was still trying to organize the plebiscite in Vilna, 
Lastowski and other members of the BNR sent the league two memoranda that reflected all 
the ambiguities of Lithuanian-Belarusian relations as well as the BNR’s interest in gaining 
the league’s support  for the independence and reunification of Belarusian territories that the 
Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, had left divided between Russia and Poland. In their 
petition, the Belarusian representatives remarked that only a special treaty between Lithuania 
and Belorussia—not the league’s plebiscite—could decide the fate of the territorial dispute, 
because the question of the city of Vilna was a uniquely  domestic affair between the 
Lithuanian and Belarusian states.758 Consequently, both memoranda heavily emphasized the 
strong collaboration between the BNR and Lithuania, whose future relations, for many 
reasons, were not a matter of concern because “beyond the historical and moral ties and 
common important economic interests, Lithuanian and Belarusian collaboration was based on 
the trust and mutual respect that had led to the signing of a treaty on November 11, 1920.”759 
 The BNR representatives were instead protesting the Polish occupation as “an 
illegitimate appropriation of a territory that  belongs to others.”760 In their view, no plebiscite 
was needed to decide the fate of the districts of Grodno, Minsk, and Vilna because these were 
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not “debatable lands.”761 Historically, the city  of Vilna had been the capital of the Lithuanian-
Belarusian state created in 1313 by the joint efforts of Lithuanians and Belarusians, and it 
was the political as well as the intellectual and spiritual center for both the Catholic 
Lithuanians and the Orthodox Belarusians.762 The confessional distinction between Catholics 
and Orthodox Christians was important because Poland’s claim that the entire population of 
the Vilna region was Polish were based precisely on the conflation of the two. And religion 
was not the only marker of identity: from an ethnographic standpoint, the region was 
inhabited by Belarusian-speaking Orthodox Christians, though its western part was mostly 
Lithuanian.763   Given the ethnically mixed composition of these territories, the BNR was 
willing to grant cultural autonomy to all minorities, including Poles, as already stated in the 
Belarusian Constitution of March 25, 1919, and confirmed by the Rada of the BNR, which 
included Jewish, Polish, and Russian representatives.764  The BNR considered the league’s 
decision to hold a plebiscite counter to its interests and extremely unfair, because even 
beyond important historical, economic, and political considerations, Zeligowski’s regime of 
terror was an obvious obstacle to a fair consultation.765 
 The Belarusian activists were also deeply concerned about the effect of Polish 
propaganda on the Great Powers’ opinion of the Belarusian question. The Poles, they argued, 
were trying to convince the international public that  since the majority of the Vilna 
population was Catholic, it  therefore was ethnically  Polish.766 The activists maintained that 
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this statement was unfair because it failed to account for two million Belarusians, most of 
them Orthodox, who had fled from Grodno, Vilna, and Minsk to Russia to escape the German 
occupiers after the outbreak of war in 1915.767 Those who had survived six years of war were 
now so exhausted that their chief concern was to avoid starvation, which rendered them 
completely dependent on Poland for food supplies. Thus, “Polish propaganda is sadly true 
when it announces that a Belarusian village can easily  be won over by  simply offering 
American flour!” Finally, it would have been extremely unfair to place under plebiscite a 
territory “over which the Belarusian state has no control.”768 
 If a plebiscite was  unavoidable, the BNR representative continued, then the best 
solution seemed to be that  votes be cast for either Poland or Lithuania-Belarus as a unit. If 
Poland lost the plebiscite, Vilna had to be provisionally placed under Lithuanian 
administration until a new treaty between Belorussia and Lithuania determined the internal 
organization of the territory. Ballots had to be printed in Belarusian, Polish, Lithuanian, and 
Yiddish.769  The league was therefore not to interfere with the territorial and political 
settlement of the territorial dispute, which was a domestic question, but was expected to act 
to defend the Belarusian population and its right to statehood. Though they emphasized 
Belarusian collaboration with Lithuania, both memoranda argued at still greater length 
against Poles’ violent persecution of Belarusians, which in Vilna and in the countryside “is 
worse than that suffered under German occupation during the war.”770 War refugees could not 
return to their homes in territories that had been resettled with Poles from Poland, while those 
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who worked for Polish landowners lived in conditions resembling ancient serfdom. Children 
were forced to attend only Polish schools, and Orthodox churches were shut down while the 
Catholic ones spread Polish propaganda and chauvinism.771  These acts of violence “were 
committed in the historically and ethnographically Belarusian territory of Grodno, the cradle 
of the rebirth of the Belarusian state” that “in the name of justice should be rejoined to the 
western Belarusian territories,” which included Minsk and Vilna.772 
 Both memoranda interpreted the current violence as intended to crush the Belarusian 
national movement and any attempt to create an independent state. To illustrate this point, the 
petitioners reported that immediately  after the war, the territories they were claiming had 
become a battlefield between Poland and Russia, “making the peaceful reconstruction of the 
country  impossible.”773  Cruel persecutions accompanied the Polish withdrawal from the 
region from January  1919 to July 1920 as the Bolsheviks advanced and also followed the 
signing of the Treaty of Riga on October 12, 1920, when the Polish army reoccupied the 
region of Grodno, “severely endangering the existence of the Belarusian state.”774 Despite the 
roadblocks of the tsarist regime and later the German occupation, a Belarusian national 
movement had started in Grodno, where it remained a cultural phenomenon until 1918. By 
that point a hundred schools had been opened and several national committees and 
cooperatives formed.775 
According to the account in the memoranda, the first Belarusian regiment of infantry 
and cavalry  was also created in Grodno in January 1919, and in March 1919 the various 
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national organizations and committees united to create the Central Rada of the Belarusian 
State of Grodno. By the end of April 1919, however, the Polish army had occupied the entire 
province, disarmed the Belarusian regiments, and deported the officers to Kraków.  Although 
one Belarusian school had survived in Grodno, all the others in Brest and Bialystok had been 
closed and replaced by Polish ones, and Belarusian teachers were imprisoned and deported to 
concentration camps in Poland and Galicia. Local councils led by Polish priests had taken 
control of towns and villages, and Polish landowners had terrorized the Orthodox population, 
hoping to win over the Catholics’ support. A fierce persecution against the Orthodox church 
had resulted in priests’ arrests and deportation from their own parishes. 
The Belarusian petitioners also conceded that all these horrors faded in comparison to 
the crimes committed against the Jewish population, which was mainly concentrated in the 
cities and had suffered pogroms, pillage, murder and rape.776  Finally, despite the Polish 
efforts to prove the opposite, they contended that because only 5.5 percent of the population 
was ethnically Polish and many of its Catholics were descended from the Lithuanian-
Belarusian nobility, the Poles had no right to claim these lands on ethnographic grounds.777 
They  therefore were appealing to the League of Nations to help  fight these crimes and 
support the reunification of the two sections of Belarusian territory currently under Polish and 
Soviet control. They emphasized their commitment to reestablishing the Belarusian 
independent state proclaimed by the BNR’s Rada in Minsk in December 1919, and by  a 
congress of 300 delegates representing nine districts of the Grodno region in November 
1920.778 
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 On September 12, 1921, violence seemed also to be the reason why Lastowski’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Anton Cvikevich, in a letter to the league, once again drew the 
league’s attention to persecutions of Belarusians living under Polish occupation. Cvikevich 
argued that  “it is in the interests of the Belarusian population that the territory disputed 
between Lithuania and Poland be reunited to the Lithuanian state on the basis of territorial 
autonomy as the only solution that could guarantee peace and prosperity  in this corner of 
Eastern Europe, because the brutality of Zeligowski’s oppressive regime proves that Poland 
aims at the ultimate suppression of our national movement through terror.”779 
 Since Cvikevich was officially representing the view of his government in this note, 
his only option was to support Kaunas’s position and claim Vilna for Lithuania. Yet at  the 
Belarusian National Political Conference held in Prague on September 21–29, 1921, just ten 
days later, Cvikevich was very critical of Lithuanian-Belarusian collaboration and spoke in 
favor of the Hymans Plan.780 The conference resolved that the city of Vilna was Belarusian, 
even if Lithuania had held it temporarily in 1920, and that it was necessary  to support  the 
Hymans Plan in hopes that it would result  in a Lithuanian-Polish federation and 
establishment of Belarusian statehood.781
4.3.2 The Jews
 Whereas championing Belarus’s right to statehood was the main project of the BNR, 
Jewish leaders were driven largely  by  concerns for their safety and national survival. The 
Vilna question and the Hymans Plan divided Lithuanian Jewry, and the passionate debate in 
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the city’s press throughout 1919–1921 reflected Jewish ambivalence on these issues. Unzer 
Tog represented the pro-Lithuanian stance, while Najer Morgen was clearly pro-Polish. In 
December 1920, several articles in Unzer Tog advocated creating a Lithuanian independent 
state with Vilna as its capital and equal rights for all four nationalities living there. Yet this 
paper also warned against Lithuanian rule over regions that were not ethnically  Lithuanian 
and emphasized the need to protect  Polish culture.782  Najer Morgen instead dreaded the 
creation of an “artificial wall” between Polish Jewry and Vilna’s Jews, “whose fate had been 
historically linked to Poland.” Poles and Jews had often fought together against Russian 
oppression, and even though Jews spoke a different language and therefore needed their own 
autonomous schools, they had a future only in Poland.783 
 These positions crystallized only  in 1920–1921. Writing in Unzer Tog in late 1919, the 
leader of Vilna’s Jewish community, the Democrat Zemah Shabat, had expressed the hope 
that the Paris Peace Conference would solve the Vilna question through a cantonal plan very 
similar to the one Hymans drafted less than two years later. A state of nationalities where no 
group would predominate seemed the solution best  suited to Jewish interests.784 On April 12, 
1921, however, in the same newspaper, Shabat criticized Hymans’s bi-cantonal system and 
advocated rejoining “what now is called Kaunas-Lithuania to Central Lithuania to form a 
unified state with only one parliament.” Two days later, the Zionist minister of Jewish affairs 
in Lithuania, Jacob Vigodski, made a similar comment in Unser Fraind.785 
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 In 1921, then, why would the Vilna Zionists, the Democrats, and the Jewish Geneva 
delegate Max Soloveitchik champion cultural autonomy as the only solution acceptable to 
Jews, ruling out other options such as union with Poland or the Hymans Plan? According to 
the historian Theodor Weeks, even though many Jews recognized that only a minority of 
Poles had participated in or approved of the excesses committed, the memory of pogroms in 
L’viv in November 1918 and Vilna in April 1919 had consolidated Lithuanian Jewry’s 
conviction that their security  and national existence would be in danger in a Polish state.786 
On the other hand, they also feared that strong expression of loyalty to Lithuania could put 
them in danger, especially after Zeligowski’s occupation increased the likelihood that  the city 
would be joined to Poland.787  For this reason Wygodski, the president of the Jewish 
community, expressed satisfaction at finding Zeligowski willing to guarantee prevention of 
further violence, but he nevertheless reminded the Polish general of his duty to respect the 
Versailles treaty’s provisions on minorities.788 
 In September 1921 at the League of Nations, Soloveitchik presented the situation of 
Jewish-Polish relations as having been essentially  satisfactory “with only a few 
exceptions.”789 Still, the Jewish population of Vilna and its leaders, for whom he claimed to 
be entitled to speak in Geneva, believed the only acceptable solution was to establish an 
absolutely independent Lithuanian state that included Vilna.790  This position arose from 
economic, cultural, and political considerations, he argued, rather than sympathy for 
Lithuania. Creating an artificial border between Kaunas and Vilna would have disastrous 
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consequences for their economic and political life, and “if reunited to Lithuania, Vilna would 
play a greater role than if it belonged to Poland.”791 
 In Soloveitchik’s opinion, “the coexistence of citizens speaking different languages 
was more likely to thrive in a unified Lithuania rather than in an artificially divided 
country.”792  By creating a Polish-Lithuanian bilingual state, the Hymans Plan ignored the 
needs of all inhabitants and particularly the Jews, who according to him constituted 40 
percent of Vilna’s population, and whose voice could not be ignored.793  History gave them 
this right to their say, because “the Jews had been living in the region since the XIVth 
century, contributing heavily to the cultural, economic and social development of the country 
to which it has been united by indissoluble historical ties.”794 Finally, Soloveitchik claimed, a 
general consensus among Jewish leaders in Vilna held that “there is no such thing as a 
‘Vilna’ or a ‘Lithuanian’ question, but only  the problem of the domestic organization of the 
Lithuanian state that must take into account the needs of its entire population, without 
distinction of language.”795 
 His remarks centered on the hope for creation of a state of nationalities rather than a 
Lithuanian national state—that is, a state where each national group  enjoyed perfect equality 
through institutions of cultural autonomy. This was possible only with possession of Vilna, 
because “what we enjoy today in Lithuania is only the beginning of a national life and the 
final ratification of cultural autonomy depends on securing Lithuanian sovereignty  over 
227
791 Ibid. 
792  LNA, 41, S 339, Max Soloveitchik, “Les Juifs en Lithuanie,” Bulletin Des Délégations Juives 
Auprès de la Conference de la Paix, September 3, 1921, 3–4.
793 Ibid., 2–3.
794 Ibid.
795  LNA, 41, S 339, Max Soloveitchik, “Les Juifs en Lithuanie,” Bulletin Des Délégations Juives 
Auprès de la Conference de la Paix, September 3, 1921, 2–3. (Emphasis added). 
Vilna.”796 He feared that if large Belarusian and Jewish minorities remained under Polish rule 
beyond the Lithuanian border, the Lithuanians would back out of their earlier promises to 
ratify cultural autonomy in the final constitution.797 
 At Geneva, Soloveitchik argued that supporting Lithuania was worthwhile because 
the government had kept the promise it made in Paris in 1919, and all minorities already 
enjoyed de facto cultural autonomy. But unlike the Zionists Simon Rosenbaum and Leib 
Garfunkel, who in Kaunas had insisted they were loyal to Lithuania, Soloveitchik’s position 
took a gloomy view of the future and reflected his concern for the security of the Jewish 
community  more than an interest in collaborating with Lithuanians and other minorities. He 
acknowledged that at  the moment Jewish national identity was well tolerated in Lithuania, 
where unlike in other countries, the Jews had never been forced to conceal it. Even the most 
nationalistic of Lithuanian intellectuals did not concentrate on assimilating Jews but focused 
primarily  on asserting their own national claims.798  Extreme anti-Semitism therefore had 
not developed yet; however, it was only  a matter of time, “and I don’t hold out much hope for 
the future. Today Lithuania is essentially  a peasant country, lacking a strong middle class. 
The Jews are still necessary and play  an essential role in the economic life of the country, but 
after they have contributed to its prosperity, a fierce struggle will begin and anti-Semitism 
will appear. It is an inevitable historical process. But when that moment comes, the 
Lithuanian Jewry will be prepared to confront it. Our efforts to negotiate national autonomy 
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attest to our concern for the future.”799 Hence, in his opinion, the Jewish question could not 
be solved within the Diaspora, but only by establishing a Jewish home in Palestine under 
protection of public law. Cultural autonomy represented the lesser evil until this was 
achieved.800 
4.3.3 The Poles
 Of the minority representatives that addressed the league, only  the Polish deputies of 
the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly seemed to openly support the Hymans Plan: they 
claimed to support Lithuania’s independence, but at the same time they also believed the 
country  would prosper only  in close alliance with Poland, and only if its Polish population 
was offered all the guarantees it was entitled to on Lithuanian territory.801 
 On July 7, 1921, in a note addressed to the Council, the Polish delegates nevertheless 
informed the League of Nations of the price they paid for openly favoring the Hymans 
scheme at the Lithuanian Constituent  Assembly. They  lamented the loss of their right to 
“determine their fate” and all their other political and civil rights. They also complained that 
in 1920, the constituent assembly had spared no effort to diminish the number of elected 
Polish deputies through gerrymandering, splitting Polish-majority districts and apportioning 
them among Lithuanian areas. Finally, several irregularities in the administration of the 
elections had clearly  undermined the electoral freedom of Lithuania’s Polish population.802 
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of International Justice,” to defend the human, civic, and national rights of a Polish 
population whose national autonomy had been denied.803 
The memorandum described the persecution as essentially political in nature. 
Up to the present time, the Lithuanian population had successfully resisted 
“the demoralizing influence resulting from the proceedings of its politicians, 
whose efforts to arouse the basest instincts of the population by  a criminal 
anti-Polish propaganda have failed and not a single act of hostility  on the part 
of its population as such toward Polish citizens can be recorded.”804 Moreover, 
the petitioners insisted, the long-standing good and friendly relations between 
the Polish and Lithuanian national groups remained substantially  unaffected 
by the “unbridled anti-Polish agitation which for several years has been stirred 
up by the official influences in Lithuania.”805 
 
However, they  vehemently protested the abuse of civilians through indiscriminate 
arrests and innumerable requisitions carried out with the Kaunas government’s consent by 
irregular forces created ad hoc. The Lithuanian authorities had also “stained their hands with 
blood by  shooting without trial in November 1920, several Poles in the district of Olita.” The 
country’s administrative bodies interfered with use of the Polish language and often 
prohibited it, whereas these same bodies nearly always used Russian. Churches attended by 
Polish minorities faced the same systematic discrimination and persecution, and most of their 





nonexistent.806 In 1920, an organ of the Polish press was suspended four times, despite being 
already subject to preventive military  censorship  of any political opinion found to be critical 
of the government. The Kaunas deputies concluded their note by  announcing their 
withdrawal from the Lithuanian constituent assembly, sadly acknowledging that “the 
Lithuanian regular campaign of extermination of the Poles, depicted as a camp of 
degenerates, traitors and agents of Warsaw” had succeeded in depriving the Polish population 
of its parliamentary representation.807 
  This memorandum was also an opportunity to express their own views about the real 
national identity of Lithuania’s Polish-speaking citizens. The question had been discussed at 
the Brussels Conference on May 24, 1921, when Hymans explained that the significant 
number of Polish deputies in the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly  justified the introduction 
of Polish as the country’s second official language.808 Galvanauskas then objected that  the 
Poles in Lithuania were in fact Polish-speaking Lithuanian nationals—originally Lithuanian 
families, they had later become Polish in culture and owed their wealth to the exploitation of 
Lithuanian labor.809  Moreover, even if their cultural identity was Polish, they had always 
considered themselves citizens of the Lithuanian nation; thus they were the best candidates to 
reestablish moral ties between the two nations.810 Galvanauskas was relying on the principles 
of priority and duration to undermine Polish claims to self-government for the Polish-
speaking citizens of Lithuania.811  He was certainly  not a krajowcy, but obviously his 
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argument was an extreme, rather unsuccessful attempt to invoke the traditions of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, where citizenship was based on the civic rather than the national 
principle.812 
Resentful of this “clarification,” Ashkenazy reminded Galvanauskas that he had no 
moral right to speak in the name of the 200,000 Poles living in Kaunas.813  In this respect 
Ashkenazy was right, as the Kaunas Poles had no trouble speaking for themselves. In fact, 
along with the league’s Council they took great exception to Galvanauskas’ declaration, 
which they  saw as denying the existence of Poles in Lithuania and thus implicitly depriving 
them of any rights as a national group.814  They admitted to being “entirely indigenous and 
attached to the country  by strong bonds,” but more than priority, what mattered to them was 
their elitist claim that they  alone were able to develop the territory  to its fullest potential.815 
They  were, they insisted, the only national group in Lithuania with a complete, well-
developed social structure including landowners, a peasantry, the liberal professions, and the 
middle classes.816 
After taking refuge in Vilna in the summer of 1921, the ousted Polish deputies of the 
Lithuanian constituent assembly found support among the Council of Representatives of the 
Municipalities and Districts of the Vilna Region, which issued a declaration of vehement 
protest against Lithuanian abuses.  In Vilna they  also expressed “the deepest gratitude to 
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Zeligowski for liberating the region from the inimical and foreign occupation of the 
Lithuanian government.”817  Safe from Lithuanian persecutions, the Kaunas Polish 
representatives claimed, they finally  felt free to express their views about Lithuania’s 
admission the League of Nations and the Hymans Plan.818  Consequently, in October 1921 
they  clarified their own political ideas for an optimal territorial and political settlement in a 
second note addressed to the league. Beyond their apparent support of Hymans’s scheme, 
however, they outlined their own plan, which was clearly  closer to the program of the 
National Democrats than to the Hymans Plan or Pilsudski’s federalism. In this respect, they 
therefore represented the dominant view in the Polish-speaking society of the time in both 
Lithuania and Vilna, where the National Democrats had already supplanted the federalists.819 
 Unlike the federalists, they did not consider the present conflict an attempt by two 
nations once joined in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to reestablish the 
commonwealth on the basis of the principle of equality, but a border dispute between two 
sovereign states.820  They claimed to recognize the Lithuanian sister nation’s right to a 
national life and statehood, but they contested the legitimacy of the present Lithuanian state 
for three reasons. First, it  had been created by the Germans during the war. Second, Kaunas 
was still pursuing an anti-Polish policy of persecuting those who declared themselves Polish, 
interpreting the slightest protest as treason.821  Finally, the current Lithuanian state had no 
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right to be admitted to the League of Nations because only the northwestern parts of the 
district of Suwalki and Samogitia were ethnographically Lithuanian; the eastern territories 
were mostly  Polish.822 The European public need not be misled, because “under the name of 
Lithuania exists a multinational state that includes large non-Lithuanian minorities.”823 The 
country  was essentially a “Lithuanian territory” with a large majority of Poles living on a 
largely Polish territory that still included the city of Kaunas “only because the Military 
Commission has interfered,” preventing Zeligowski from occupying the city  and thus leaving 
more than 450,000 Poles under the Lithuanian yoke.824 
 They  therefore agreed with the National Democrats that a more appropriate approach 
was to create a Polish and a Lithuanian Samogitian canton, the latter with a capital (other 
than Kaunas) “that is a Polish city.”825 These two cantons should be joined to Poland, making 
Lithuania an autonomous province. If the Lithuanians rejected this solution, the Kaunas 
Polish deputies in Vilna declared, it was ready to fully support the organization of elections in 
Vilna and to vote for annexation of the Polish Lithuanian territories to Poland.826 
   
4.4 Managing Conflicting Views: Geneva and Minorities’ Petitions
 It would be very  unfair to conclude that the League of Nations prioritized political 
concerns and security  over the rights of minorities simply  because it  could not fulfill all their 
requests and political wishes. The task in itself was simply  impossible, as each nationality 
was internally  deeply divided by conflicting priorities and goals. Moreover, these 
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communities were hardly  unanimously committed to collaborating with the Lithuanian 
government, which also suggests that any conclusion about cultural autonomy as a viable 
alternative to the league’s minority  system, or as one that failed because it lacked the league’s 
support, must be carefully evaluated in light of the interplay  between the domestic and the 
international context. Domestic collaboration between Lithuanians and other nationalities 
proceeded only haltingly, but the First World War, the Peace Conference, and finally the 
presence of the League of Nations also played significant roles, at times hampering as well as 
promoting this collaboration. 
 The league, for its part, drafted a plan for a territorial and political solution to the 
Polish-Lithuanian dispute that complemented extensive minority rights with federalism, thus 
improving on a rigid, homogenizing statist approach. The petitioners did not get what they 
wanted in the way they wanted it, but their presence and their rights were both taken into 
consideration even before the drafting of the Hymans Plan. On December 20, 1920, when 
Drummond circulated the Belarusian Memoranda for the information of the Council 
members, he mentioned that perhaps “the Council might envision the possibility of 
determining the fate of the Vilna territory  otherwise than through the pure and simple 
annexation of the disputed territory to either Lithuania or Poland.”827 Before the opening of 
the Brussels Conference, the Military Commission had forwarded a new note from the BNR 
the Political Section, and Paul Mantoux opined that finding a general solution to the Russian 
question went beyond the league’s duties and that the more prudent objective was a solution 
to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. But despite the impossibility of embarking on creation of a 
new Belarusian state, Mantoux added, “any settlement imposed on Poland and Lithuania 
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should nevertheless contain some sort of measures in favor of the Belarusian population, and 
it might be useful to consider this option in advance.”828 
 Open as it was to considering the views of all concerned minorities as far as possible, 
the league was also determined to keep them from obstructing its mediation of the Polish-
Lithuanian conflict, or even worse, exploiting it for political purposes. For this reason, 
Colban turned Soloveitchik away when the latter tried to convince him that the Lithuanians 
deserved Vilna because they alone would grant cultural autonomy to the Jews and all other 
minorities as well. This offer, the Jewish delegate argued, could not be ignored because 
the particular situation in the Vilna district required a more far-reaching minority rights 
system than that in the Polish minority  treaty.829  As far as Colban was concerned, 
Soloveitchik was simply missing the point. The League of Nations had no objections to 
cultural autonomy, but it  was more important that the Lithuanian government declare its 
willingness to apply the stipulations of the Polish treaty to the whole territory without making 
it conditional on any settlement of the Vilna question.830 
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CHAPTER 5: PEACE AND SECURITY AFTER THE HYMANS PLAN
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter analyzes the League of Nations’ mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian 
dispute in the time between the end of the Hymans Plan negotiations in summer 1921 and the 
decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, which finally settled the dispute in March 1923. 
In early August 1921, the military commissioners had already informed the Secretariat of 
their understanding that Lithuania most likely  would not accept the Hymans Plan because the 
domestic public resented the federalist project and the idea of entering into an agreement with 
Poland. This scenario in turn prompted the league to seek out a new solution to maintain 
peace amidst the social unrest aroused by the political debate surrounding the Hymans Plan 
in Lithuania and the worsening of violence in the disputed territories. It did not  stand by 
passively  while awaiting the official Polish and Lithuanian replies regarding the Hymans 
scheme, which finally reached Geneva in late December 1921. The goal of this chapter is to 
show that the league’s strategy  for handling this new scenario not only  forbore to sacrifice 
humanitarian and democratic concerns to security, but on the contrary made them major 
tenets of its own understanding of what constituted security. As had been the case during the 
organizing of the plebiscite and drafting of the Hymans scheme, the Military  Commission 
took a hand in shaping the Secretariat’s decisions. The Political and Minority Sections and 
the Council reconsidered their own decisions and agenda in light of several humanitarian 
observations and concerns that the Military Commission brought to their attention between 
the summer of 1921 and its official withdrawal on March 6, 1922. 
 On November 16, 1921, Warsaw once again challenged the league by announcing it  
would organize elections to be held in Vilna in January. The Military Commission warned the 
Secretariat about the kind of peace these elections would bring. The league dealt not only 
237
with this knotty  question, but also with its implications and the several dilemmas it created. If 
Geneva accepted election results that, as the commission anticipated, did not reflect the true 
will of the population, then peace in the region would come at the expense of the local 
population’s right to self-government. But allowing an “unjust peace” implied acknowledging 
Zeligowski’s regime, a problem for Geneva given its moral responsibility in the international 
public eye. 
 The Vilna population’s right to a fair deal was not Geneva’s only concern. Escalating 
violence in the disputed territories convinced the Military Commission that it was the 
League’s duty  to provide not just short-term but also long-term effective protection for 
minorities of the Vilna region. Between December 24, 1921, when Lithuania officially 
notified the league that it rejected the Hymans Plan, and the March 1923 decision of the 
Conference of Ambassadors, Geneva worked tirelessly to secure Kaunas’s ratification of a 
minority treaty to be placed under the League of Nations, a last resort that would secure the 
latter’s right to intervene in future to keep peace in this troubled region. 
5.1 Tension in Vilna
 In early  August 1921, Chardigny was already pessimistic about the ratification of the 
Hymans Plan and had concluded that only time could bring peace. The Poles were already 
organizing the disputed territories as an autonomous region, and eventually these two parts of 
Lithuania—Central Lithuania and Kaunas Lithuania—would have to find a modus vivendi 
based on equality. In the meantime, in his opinion, the league could do nothing but maintain 
peace.831  This seemed the most urgent task to the military  commissioners, who noted 
increasing political tension and social unrest in the disputed territories between August and 
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November 1921. Zeligowski could count on Warsaw’s support and, far from taking measures 
to calm the population of the disputed territories, “was also inciting unrest and patriotic 
feelings for annexation to Poland.”832 In Chardigny’s opinion, final settlement of the whole 
question hinged on giving the Council the authority and power to arbitrate the dispute instead 
of confining it to making recommendations as in the case of Upper Silesia. He was well 
aware of the implications of such a move and had his own reservations about the advisability 
of taking on this responsibility. Still, he had faith in “our Council more than in the Supreme 
Council”833 that had so greatly disappointed Poland with its decision on Upper Silesia.  
 The Military Commission was deeply concerned about what it was witnessing in 
Vilna and the surrounding areas. Among Vilna’s Polish elites, supporters of the disputed 
territories’ annexation to Poland were gaining ground against the federalists and against 
proponents of solutions like the Hymans Plan. On August 16, the Polish Council of the 
Representatives of the Municipalities and Districts of the Vilna Region formally declared that 
the league resolution of June 28, 1921, which requested that Zeligowski’s forces disarm and 
withdraw, was unacceptable because, the council claimed, the fate of the territory  was still 
uncertain. According to the council, the population was in a state of anarchy and the League 
of Nations was helpless against the Lithuanian forces still present on the Vilna-Grodno 
railway line.834 Since it  “was the right of every Pole, regardless of place of origin, to defend 
Polish soil and its territorial integrity,” the Polish council resolved that the Vilna territory 
must be united to Poland and requested that Zeligowski act to end the protracted state of 
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uncertainty. In the meantime, the council offered to help organize an election that would not 
question Lithuania’s independence, which was undisputed, but rather its sovereignty over a 
territory that was almost entirely Polish.835  Zeligowski took note of this resolution and 
informed Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstanty Skirmunt that since he was no longer 
obliged to reach agreement under the terms agreed between Poland and Lithuania at the 
Brussels conference, he was finally allowing the Vilna population to express its will.836 
 Social unrest was on the rise. Military Commissioner Carlo Bergera reported that in 
Vilna on September 29, five thousand people had massed to demonstrate against the League 
of Nations and England.837 Eighty percent of the soldiers attending the event were not  natives 
of the region; nor was the organizer of the demonstration, a university  professor from Volynia 
assisted by Acting President of the Provisional Commission of the Government of Central 
Lithuania Stefan Mokrzecki, who fully supported his anti-British and anti-League 
propaganda.838 Bergera took seriously the concerns of Tadeusz Wroblewski, the leader of the 
Lithuanian party representing the Kaunas government in Vilna, who believed the Poles were 
preparing a military  action against Lithuanians living in Vilna. Wroblewski had informed 
Bergera that the Polish authorities in Vilna had distributed weapons to civilians, which would 
likely turn peaceful demonstrations into armed clashes eventually  targeting the Jews and their 
stores. Moreover, according to Wroblewski, the Poles were preparing a concentration camp 
for political prisoners at the second station of the Lida railway. The municipal administration 
and the University of Vilna were entirely in the hands of Poles who, Bergera confirmed, were 
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not natives of the region. Stationing the Military Commission in Vilna could prevent further 
acts of violence, Wroblewski believed. This request seemed even more sensible to Bergera 
after he heard the Polish military  commandant in Vilna assert that “Vilna will be tainted with 
blood if the city is annexed to Lithuania.”839
 Chardigny  agreed that the situation was serious. Utopian and unrealistic though the 
Lithuanian aspiration to rule Vilna seemed, he warned Geneva that the Kaunas government 
would face serious consequences if it ignored the negative Lithuanian public opinion on the 
matter.840  In his opinion, a country with 1,800,000 inhabitants—1,400,000 of them 
Lithuanians—that was short of economic resources and civil servants was unlikely  to absorb 
the 800,000 inhabitants of disputed territories devastated by war. Yet  he acknowledged that 
the Polish acts of repression carried out against Lithuanians in Vilna had seriously 
undermined the effect of the Lithuanian government’s pro-Hymans propaganda.841 
 The Secretariat also heeded a note received from Lithuanian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Jonas Puryckis on October 27, which formally  protested “the persecution of 
Lithuanians in the town of Vilna that had increased to an extent until now unknown.”842 The 
letter reported that in August, a Lithuanian girls’ high school of 200 pupils had been closed 
after three years of activity and that in October, the Teacher’s Seminary, the Higher Primary 
School, and the Advanced School for Adults as well as a Lithuanian school of 500 pupils had 
met the same fate. Polish government officials accompanied by a detachment of police armed 
with rifles had brutally driven the pupils from the classrooms and the director and his family 
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from the school. When the police issued an order to fix bayonets and charge the crowd, the 
pupils, assembled around the building near a door guarded by police, began singing the 
Lithuanian national anthem.  The police charged, and “this was the signal for Polish students 
and members of the Harcerzy [Scouts] organization of the school to charge, armed with 
sticks, the Lithuanians that were finally  wounded and dispersed.”843  The school was then 
placed at the disposal of the directors of the Polish Lelewel High School, and some 1,000 
Lithuanian students resigned themselves to pursuing their studies in the open air outside the 
town, weather permitting. However, the Polish authorities had forbidden even this, Puryckis 
reported. On October 4, the Great Lithuanian Shelter children’s home, suffered the same fate: 
247 children between the ages of four and seven and 30 staff were turned out onto the street.
The next day, the Vilna branch of the Lithuanian Bank of Industry and Commerce was 
closed and its documents and funds transferred to the Polish State Savings Bank. Lithuanian 
cooperative societies and private companies that conducted their business in the Lithuanian 
language were also attacked and shut  down. Personal security  was abolished; anyone 
speaking Lithuanian in public was liable to maltreatment, beatings, arrest, or expulsion as a 
Lithuanian agent. All Lithuanian newspapers in Vilna had been confiscated.844 In view of this 
intolerable state of affairs, “which gives but a faint idea of the desperate situation of the 
Lithuanian population under the rule of General Zeligowski,” Kaunas petitioned the League 
of Nations “to take necessary steps without delay to put an end to those persecutions and to 
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 Bergera confirmed that “even the last  remnant of the short-lived Lithuanian presence 
in Vilna is disappearing,” observing also that the campaign against the Lithuanian bishop of 
Vilna, Monsignor Jurgis Matulaitis, had become more violent. The Polish authorities were 
more careful with the Jewish population, whose support they hoped to win, but the Jews were 
highly  suspicious and guarded.846 “These acts of violence,” Chardigny added, “are sometimes 
even considered at Kaunas as a Polish measure carried out for the express purpose of exciting 
Lithuanian public opinion against the federalist plan.”847  Meanwhile, the Military 
Commission acknowledged that Kaunas was powerless against the social unrest  due to anti-
Polish propaganda spread by the Lithuanian army and political parties. When the Brussels 
negotiations ended, the Lithuanian delegation had proceeded to Kaunas and started producing 
“active and sincere propaganda” to convince the government, parliament, and public of the 
need to accept  the deal.848 Several meetings were held to explain the situation, and statements 
favoring the Hymans Plan’s acceptance were provided to the press and the Lithuanian 
political parties’ chiefs.849 The Lithuanian government had to acknowledge reluctantly  that 
accepting the plan was expedient; however, “all its efforts to control and counteract the 
hostility of public opinion represented by the clergy, certain intellectuals and the military—
the population is substantially indifferent to the question—are of no avail. The intensive anti-
Polish propaganda to which they  have been exposed for two years has created a sort of 
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Lithuanian megalomania that paralyzes the freedom and power of the relatively moderate—
because better informed—government that would be willing to negotiate.”850  These circles, 
Chardigny  reported, unanimously  opposed accepting the Hymans Plan without amendments 
that would completely  alter it, namely, by eliminating  Polish as an official language, the 
cantonal system, and the establishment of economic and political ties with Poland. Facing 
unanimous opposition, the government was forced to temporize. It hoped that once calm and 
order were reestablished, it would be possible to announce a decision favoring acceptance, 
subject to certain reservations concerning language, regional recruiting, and the delegations 
system. Meanwhile, it endeavored to suppress any dangerous controversies arising in the 
press or among the population, and to keep  silent on the Vilna question.851 In late October, the 
commandant of the city of Kaunas banned dissemination of incorrect information in the press 
or by word of mouth, under penalty of imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 marks. The 
Lithuanian party newspaper Lietuvos Balsas was suppressed for several days. In the first 
week of November, the government summoned its representatives abroad to Kaunas to sign a 
declaration asserting that under the present conditions it was necessary to accept Hymans’s 
scheme. The Lithuanian intellectuals of Vilna declared that the “rejection of the scheme 
would place Lithuania out of court,” a statement that was widely  publicized.852 Yet opposition 
to the plan was still heard in the parliament, the press, the army, the various political parties’ 
meetings, and socialist and peasant milieus.853
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 Lithuanian circles abroad were actively  supporting opposition to the federalist plan. 
Late in October, a Lithuanian assembly attended by several unaffiliated activists, as well as 
leaders of different political parties and representatives of the territory of Memel and Vilna 
and of the American Lithuanians, had unanimously rejected the Hymans Plan as “nothing less 
than the kind of union with Poland that Lithuania has never supported” nor intended to enter 
at the time when it requested the League of Nations’ assistance.854 The assembly resolved that 
adopting Polish as the second official language in the Vilna region, “where the White-Russian 
and Jewish elements greatly outnumber the Poles, is contrary to any principle of equality and 
democracy and will only facilitate Polish imperialism and the Polonization of the country.”855
5.2 Increasing Violence in the Neutral Zones 
 Lithuanian historians generally concur that negative Lithuanian public opinion, along 
with social unrest that culminated in an attempt on the life of Ernestas Galvanauskas, finally 
persuaded the government to reject the Hymans Plan in December 1921.856  It  is well 
established that the Nationalist  Party  was responsible for the anti-Hymans and anti-League 
campaign launched during the Brussels negotiations.857  Yet recent studies have shown that 
the paramilitary  organization Sauliu Sajunga (the Lithuanian National Sharpshooter 
Association) and the army contributed greatly to the social unrest, especially  in the neutral 
zones, and influenced the government’s final decision to reject the Hymans Plan.858  The 
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Sauliu Sajunga was particularly successful sowing unease among Lithuanians as well as 
Belarusians and Jews living in the neutral zones, where the Polish authorities had taken the 
carrot-and-stick approach, trying to win the peasantry’s support with either threats of 
imprisonment for disloyalty or rewards of land grants to those willing to support annexation 
to Poland.859  As for the sharpshooters, they did not discriminate between Polish 
annexationists, federalists, and autonomists, whom they  considered equally hostile to 
Lithuanian independence.860  
The military  commissioners’ evaluation of events in the disputed territories over the 
autumn of 1921 anticipated the historians’ conclusions and confirm that this organization was 
a major cause of social and political unrest, not only  in Lithuania but also in the Suwalki and 
Vilna neutral zones.861 In the course of 1921, these areas had become a battlefield between 
Polish and Lithuanian paramilitary  organizations and thus a major source of concern for the 
Military Commission. The commissioners reported that when rumors spread that  Kaunas was 
about to accept the Hymans Plan, the Central Committee of the Sauliu Sajunga informed the 
Lithuanian cabinet about a series of protests, both verbal and in writing, received from the 
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that “it would be quite impossible to put the Hymans Plan into force without provoking a 
serious conflict whose consequences are difficult to foresee.”863 They therefore addressed a 
note to the Lithuania government of November 18, urging its rejection.864 
 The Sauliu Sajunga’s activities extended to all Lithuania, particularly districts where 
Poles were most numerous. Until the spring of 1921, it was independent of the Lithuanian 
army, but after repeated attempts to dissolve it failed due to parliamentary opposition, the 
Lithuanian General Staff placed the sharpshooters under its own control and issued strict 
orders that their troops remain within 10 km of the neutral zone.865 The organization’s general 
headquarters were at Kaunas. Its staff and principal officials were paid, but all other members 
were unpaid volunteers. In early 1921, it numbered 50,000 men, about 10,000 of whom were 
armed, but recently  the number had fallen somewhat and some of their arms had been 
withdrawn.866  It worked in close cooperation with the Lithuanian Supreme Council of 
National Defense, a political propaganda organization with adherents in town and in the 
principal villages established after Zeligowski’s occupation of Vilna.  The Sauliu Sajunga 
received contributions in cash and in kind for the defense of the country; in early 1921 these 
contributions were practically  compulsory. Its task was to monitor the Polish population and 
denounce suspects to the local authorities—over whom it sometimes exercised an influence 
contrary to the government’s instructions.867 
 The Poles had instead a secret group, the P.O.W, Polish Military Organization. Mainly 
present in the ethnically mixed districts at the border, where Polish interests were considered 
247
863 Ibid.




at risk, it had since 1918 extended its activities to conspiring against the Lithuanian 
government and had absorbed another secret organization known as the Niemen 
Sharpshooters Association. Beyond its propagandistic activity, the Polish Organization was 
behind all political manifestations in the country and “usually not overscrupulous in the 
choice of the means to achieve its ends.”868 In 1919, several of its members were arrested and 
condemned at Kaunas for conspiracy against the Lithuanian government. Thereafter its 
activities continued, though apparently on a lesser scale in the Vilna region. 
 In addition, in the first months of 1921, the General Staff of Zeligowski’s army 
created and maintained the District Union, which had its own organ, the Wilenska Gazette, “a 
chauvinist paper that has often published extremely violent articles against the League of 
Nations and its military commission.”869 The early nucleus of the District Union consisted of 
demobilized soldiers who had removed the insignia from their uniforms to form an 
organization dedicated to mobilizing the civil population. At the time of the Brussels 
conference in May 1921, it apparently was sufficiently organized to oppose and prevent the 
execution of any decisions taken against the interests of Poland. According to the Military 
Commission, the publication of the Hymans Plan offered some satisfaction to Poles who 
supported close ties between Lithuania and Poland, preventing the District Union from taking 
action.870 Finally, the Straz Kresowa or Frontier Guard, like the Odrodzenie (Resurrection), 
worked along the same lines but was not secret in any  sense. It  confined its activities to 
propaganda work along the borders and collection of information. Its organ, the Est 
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Polonaise, a French fortnightly  publication, was a leading review of Polish propaganda 
abroad.871 
  Maintaining order in the Suwalki and Vilna neutral zones was entrusted to the Polish 
police on the Polish side of the boundary line and to the Lithuanian police on the Lithuanian 
side. According to the military  commissioners, Polish troops had not always observed 
neutrality and were invited on several occasions to withdraw to the prescribed distance. In 
certain cases they followed this instruction only  after repeated, energetic action.872  In 
evaluating the attitudes of both parties, the Military  Commission concluded that the stipulated 
distance had generally been observed, especially on the Lithuanian side.873  In the neutral 
Polish zone, the population of the Punsk region was almost exclusively Lithuanian and had 
not readily reconciled itself to the idea of belonging to Poland. Meanwhile, some Polish 
villages on the Lithuanian side of the frontier wished to be included in Poland. This state of 
affairs, the commission reported, had led to unrest in the neutral zone.874  Lithuanians 
complained of ill-treatment and even acts of violence perpetrated by the Polish police, who, 
they  charged, were carrying out illegal requisitions and abducting young men and pressing 
them into service in the Polish army. The commission reported that  Poles living in the 
Lithuanian neutral zone had made similar complaints, especially  in the first months after the 
conclusion of the Suwalki Agreement.875 
To maintain order in the Punsk region and check the activity  of Lithuanian irregular 
forces that were raiding the district, the Poles had created a local force of some eighty 
249
871 Ibid.




mounted police there. The Lithuanians on their side alleged that  the marauding bands in the 
neutral zone had appeared solely because Polish police and even troops had crossed the 
demarcation line. Indeed, the Military Commission established that the Polish police was 
holding several points situated on the Lithuanian side and faulted the Lithuanian government 
for not informing the commission of this violation of the zone until April 1921, seven months 
after its creation.876  The chief source of the troubles in the Suwalki zone, the commission 
concluded, were traceable to the fact that the Curzon line had not been marked on the ground 
and to the mixed ethnic composition of the population on both sides of the neutral zones.877 
To remedy  this state of affairs, the commission had on several occasions tried to obtain the 
two governments’ consent to an agreement to slightly modify the line of December 8 and fix 
a definite border on the spot, based on the principle of mutual compensation and respecting 
the populations’ wishes as far as possible. Warsaw agreed in principle, but  the Lithuanian 
government had always refused to accept the Curzon line as a permanent border. The Military 
Commission suggested that in this region, should no agreement emerge between the two 
governments to rectify the line drawn December 8, the present frontier should be adopted as 
final. The neutral zone could then be abolished without undesirable results, and the country 
could resume its normal life.878
 As for the events taking place in Vilna, the British Military  Commissioner Major 
Keenan was frustrated by the commission’s helplessness to prevent further persecutions of 
Lithuanians.879 Similarly, Bergera was concerned about the mutual retaliation they were sadly 
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country  for how the Poles are behaving in Vilna, one must admit that Lithuanians are not 
retaliating against the Poles living in Lithuania and there is no official record of any  act  of 
violence caused by the situation in Vilna.”880 Major Keenan, afraid “to see his Ford blown 
up,” lamented that “the League has to face the awful show of Polish intrigues. The Poles have 
set things moving and the unpleasant part of it  is that they have been arming the peasants 
with rifles and bombs. Vilna is thriving and the Poles are ousting the Lithuanians of 
everything to make the town Polish. Their secret organizations allow a good control of the 
territory, but it may also happen that they will blow them out of Vilna in the long run and in 
any case, they will not hold Vilna forever.”881 
5.3 The Vilna Elections 
 At present, though, it  seemed the Poles were on their way  to securing power in Vilna. 
In Warsaw, Pilsudski’s threat to resign if his federalist project was rejected secured his 
victory, though federation received only 117 votes in favor versus 158 against. Of the 13 
representatives who abstained, 9 were Jewish and a few others were German. And even 
though their party voted against  the project, 38 National Democrats also abstained, more out 
of hope that Pilsudski would resign than because of sincere disagreement with his project: 
“this is how a matter of national claims over Vilna has turned into an electoral question.”882 
On November 21, Zeligowski nominated his successor, Alexandr Meysztowicz, a landowner 
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from Lithuania who struck Chardigny  as “extremely  cultivated, moderate and very 
respected.”883 
  On November 16, the Warsaw Diet announced that elections to the Diet of Vilna 
would be held on January 8, 1922. Once elected, this diet would decide the fate of the 
disputed territories.884  The news clearly  energized the Vilna region’s most active political 
elites. The Lithuanian government responded with a last attempt to win the national 
minorities’ support for its quest to gain Vilna. At the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly  sitting 
of December 17, 1921, Prime Minister Kazys Grinius declared that Kaunas was ready not 
only to grant cultural autonomy to all minorities as promised in Brussels, but  also to extend 
local autonomy to Central Lithuania by instituting a diet in Vilna that would legislate on the 
use of local languages, religious and cultural needs, local justice, and public economy, as well 
as any other issues relegated to it by the constituent assembly, whom the representatives of 
the autonomous eastern territory  would join on equal footing.885  In this final stab at 
reconciling minority rights with Lithuanian state sovereignty and territorial integrity, Grinius 
appealed to Polish-speaking citizens whom he considered Lithuanian “brothers who, in the 
course of history  have become estranged from us from the standpoint of language and 
culture, through adopting the Polish language and culture,” as well as to the Belarusian and 
Jewish minorities, guaranteeing that their right to autonomous institutions would be protected 
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and actively supported by  the state in the same spirit of tolerance “that several centuries ago 
in time of racial hatred and wars of religion, had made it possible for the Lithuanian state to 
make men of different races, religions and nationalities dwell in harmony within its 
frontiers.”886 The Lithuanian Constituent Assembly unanimously approved this declaration on 
the same day.
 Vilna’s Jewish and Belarusian leaders, for their part, did not in principle oppose 
participation in the Polish elections despite the pro-Lithuanian stance of their earlier official 
memoranda addressed to the League of Nations. On the contrary, securing the chance to have 
a say in the elections and in the administration of the region was now more important than 
loyalty to either side, and ad hoc national committees were created to deal with the matter. In 
their official reply to the Polish authorities, the Jewish and Belarusian National Committees 
confirmed their willingness to participate if all minorities were guaranteed fair participation 
in the elections and equal representation in the Vilna diet. 
 The Lithuanian National Committee alone refused to prepare a list of candidates for 
the electoral commissions. It considered the three years of administration by Poles 
“sometimes harsher than our ancient tormentors” and the persecutions of Lithuanians in their 
public and private life, along with the shuttering of their schools and suppression of their 
newspapers, commercial and industrial institutions, and associations, clear evidence of “the 
authorities’ desire to eradicate everything Lithuanian in Vilna.”887  Hence, from the 
committee’s viewpoint, the Vilna diet would reflect the views of only a minority of a public 
incited by Polish agitators, and the promised “freedom” of elections was merely illusory 
because the Poles already had full control of the administration and all political activity. 
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Finally, preventing reattachment of Vilna to an independent Lithuanian state would only 
worsen the living conditions of Lithuanians in Vilna and Lithuania alike.888
  Adopting a less intransigent attitude, the Belarusian National Committee resolved to 
participate in elections to a Vilna diet, but only  if the vote was extended to all nationalities 
and held in all Belarusian territories occupied by Poland, because “the goal is to create a truly 
representative body  joining all nationalities in the political reconstruction of the region.”889 
The resolution also raised objections to the vague nature, competence, and duties of the diet 
and questioned the fairness of elections that “are being convened by only  one side by  a Polish 
Diet that has not yet officially defined its functions.”890  Moreover, even though “Central 
Lithuania” comprised several different nationalities that claimed territorial political rights, 
“all power is exclusively in the hands of one single nationality, namely of Poles that are not 
even natives of the districts.” The campaign of oppression against the Belarusian nation, 
carried out by all available means for over three years “on White-Russian soil,” had led to 
complete suppression of their cultural and economic development in the district.891 In a press 
release, the Belarusian National Committee protested its exclusion from the Convention of 
Western Belorussia, assembled in Vilna on December 11–12 by the pro-Polish Organization 
for Regional Union, which had “threatened and brutally  ousted us because our views did not 
conform with those of the Union.”892 Finally, according to the Belarusian committee, instead 
of securing basic guarantees of freedom for the period of the elections, the Polish authorities 
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were still shutting down their remaining schools and organs of the independent Belarusian 
press, and preventing the emergence of new ones. This policy had so disorganized the 
Belarusian element that the thirty  days granted by the authorities were insufficient to prepare 
for elections.893
 The Jewish parties too did not rule out participation so long as fair representation was 
guaranteed, but  they were similarly cautious. The Jewish Declaration, representing the view 
of the Zionist Party, Jewish Democratic Party, Jewish Merchant’s Union, General Jewish 
Trade Union, and Young Zionists, resolved that as citizens of this district, “the Jews are 
interested in the development and reconstruction of the country  and consider it their duty to 
participate in a legislative assembly  which would be summoned on a democratic basis, and 
which would have as its purpose to regulate the internal life of the district.” The decision 
about their participation “could nevertheless only  be made only after the publication of a 
special decree which would define the competence of the Diet and the matters under 
scrutiny.”894
 The organization of the Polish elections posed several delicate questions for the 
league, whose policy was constantly  scrutinized by the international public. Clearly the 
elections would be held in unfair conditions, which raised the problem of deciding how 
Geneva would present its position to the international public without overlooking the right to 
self-government and the physical security of the population in the disputed territories. 
 Going beyond the official declarations of the Jewish, Belarusian, and Lithuanian 
national committees, for over a month the military commissioners investigated the general 
attitude of the different social strata to establish whether elections conducted under 
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occupation would reflect their true wishes. The commissioners also distinguished between 
the city of Vilna, where public opinion on the matter appeared to exist, and the countryside, 
where the sense of nationality was not fully developed.895 “It appears, therefore, legitimate to 
conclude,” Chardigny remarked “that, as regards the region as whole, there is no public 
opinion, and it is public opinion in Vilna which at present time constitutes the public opinion 
of the country.”896 Even so, the commissioners were hard put to determine the general state of 
public of opinion in Vilna because of the four resident elements, only  the Poles and the Jews 
possessed a fully developed sense of nationality.897  Nonetheless, they reported, the 
Lithuanian peasants were not indifferent to the sentiment of nationality that had sprung up 
and proliferated since the formation of the Lithuanian state, a natural focus for the two 
compact ethnic groups in the Svienciany and Olkieniki districts of the Vilna region. 
Meanwhile, the Belarusian peasants who formed a majority in the rural population were, 
despite the efforts of a small number of intellectuals, schoolmasters, and priests, largely 
illiterate and lacked even an elementary consciousness of national identity.898  The only 
important town in the district was Vilna, the real intellectual and economic center and a 
dominant influence throughout the region. Other towns were merely provincial centers with 
an entirely subordinate place in the political life of the country.899 
Although, according the Military Commission, the Polish element in Vilna scarcely 
represented one-half of the city’s population, its influence there was distinctly 
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predominant.900 Vilna Poles, who had always been the avant-garde of Polish influence, were 
proud of their ancient traditions and actuated by an uncompromising nationalist  spirit still 
further accentuated by vigorous nationalist propaganda.901  The Russian persecutions 
synonymous with the name of the tsarist Governor General of the Northwestern Province 
Michail Muraviev haunted their memory, and they saw Poland as guaranteeing their future 
freedom. Separated from their mother country by vast tracts inhabited by a mixed population, 
Chardigny  explained, they felt the need for Poland’s support all the more deeply and were, 
notwithstanding arguments contrariwise, unanimously convinced that they must be the 
masters of Vilna and the entire district. They “are, therefore, prepared to defend their rights 
by force of arms.” Polish influence in the rural districts, apart from the administrative 
authorities, was wielded by  the great landowners and clergy, which had always, up  to the 
present day, been the chief agents of the country’s Polonization.902
The Vilna Jews, however, seemed to the commission to look rather to Lithuania, 
where the economic situation was more favorable and their coreligionists enjoyed a 
privileged position.903 Jews were extremely numerous in the provincial capitals and country 
towns, and practically  controlled the entire trade of the country. If Vilna became the capital of 
a Greater Lithuania, they would therefore expect the Lithuanians to need their support to 
consolidate their influence in town. Vilna’s location on the great trade route running from 
Germany to Russia through Kaunas was an additional reason for the Jews to favor 
Lithuania.904  Regardless of its official declaration, the position of the Jewish National 
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Committee was hard for him to discern, but Chardigny reported that the rabbi of Vilna had no 
complaints about the authorities’ attitude to the Jewish population and would decide what to 
do only after promulgation of the Polish election decree. In the meantime the Jewish 
Committee took a rather noncommittal view of both the Poles and the Lithuanians, but if the 
committee decided to follow the example of the Jewish leaders in Warsaw, Chardigny 
reported, “we can expect them to leave the Jewish electorate to freely express their opinion or 
to abstain.”905 A decision to abstain, he added, would most  likely be a reaction to the anti-
Jewish congress the right had organized in Warsaw fifteen days earlier. In this case, “the 
Jewish abstention is unjustified, because the Jews are absolutely free and well-treated in 
Vilna.”906  Their abstention alone represented a major setback for the elections, given their 
numerical strength and influence in Vilna.907
 In late December, Chardigny concluded that it was hardly surprising that the 
Lithuanian and Belarusian national committees had ultimately opted to abstain from voting, 
considering that freedom of the press in Vilna had been reestablished by  a decree issued on 
December 13, only  twenty-five days before the elections.908 This in turn meant the military 
occupation regime was free to successfully exert all manner of pressure during the elections, 
for many reasons.909 The Belarusian National Committee led by Lastowski from Kaunas, for 
example, despite its meager resources, represented the view of the Belarusian intelligentsia. 
But its weak influence in the countryside suggested that Belarusian peasants would be 
exposed to the propaganda of the other  Belarusian committee, financed by Poland and led by 
258
905 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Kaunas, November 26, 1921.
906 Ibid.
907 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Kaunas, December 7, 1921. 
908 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Warsaw, December 21, 1921, p. 4.
909 LNA, 11/ S 7, Report of the Military Commission, December 24, 1921, p. 9.
Paval Alaksiuk,910  which meant that the Belarusian population most probably would 
participate in the elections.911  To assist this committee’s work, the prefect of Vilna had 
authorized publication of the weekly periodical Jednosc in the Belarusian language and 
printed in Latin characters. It favored union with Poland and endeavored “to enlarge the 
circle of its readers among the White Russia population.”912 
 The Military  Commission noted that these circumstances compounded the unfairness 
of the elections because the peasants in the countryside, “whose sentiment of nationality is so 
little developed, will be influenced by the propaganda carried on among them and by  the 
temporary situation of the country  at the time of the plebiscite, rather than by any personal 
sentiment of nationality.”913 Moreover, “they  are almost wholly  illiterate, superstitious as they 
are religious, isolated in their villages owing to the lack of communications, particularly 
during the long and severe six months of winter, and their minds are preoccupied by  their 
struggle for survival, which could easily  explain why they are almost indifferent to political 
questions.”914  Hence, the commission noted, their political and material interests were often 
identical, and they  were ready to accept any  authority that would afford them security  and the 
possibility of working unmolested.915 
 Chardigny  also remarked that a combination of other factors “obviously makes it 
impossible to organize a legitimate electoral campaign in a country that lacks 
communications and is currently covered in fifty centimeters of snow. It will be possible to 
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vote in Vilna, but it is very  unlikely in the countryside.”916  The Polish provisional 
government could hardly expect more than 40 percent of the electorate to participate, a figure 
that also depended heavily  on the weather: with temperatures dropping to -15˚C, the already 
undecided had a good excuse not to walk six to eight kilometers to vote.917
Finally, Jewish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian abstention meant that only the pro-Polish 
elements and their committees would be represented in the Diet of Vilna. The Polish Central 
Electoral Committee had publicized the program for absolute annexation to Poland and 
supported the National Democrats’ platform. In their view, the purpose of the Vilna diet was 
to ratify this decision; all other matters would be referred to the Warsaw diet. The Polish 
Democratic Electoral Committee also favored union with Poland but advocated autonomy for 
the Vilna region, because “the Vilna Diet must constitute the supreme authority  and must 
concern itself with the interest of the country and revoke any measures unfavorable to the 
population already adopted.”918 The Polish Socialist Party also advocated a large measure of 
autonomy. The program of the Fourth Electoral Committee, which represented non-party 
elements, was not clearly defined, but it opposed Poland’s outright annexation of the territory. 
The Military Commission anticipated that the Central Electoral Committee was probably 
strong enough to prevail in the diet, which would in turn confront Warsaw with a definite 
demand for annexation that the Polish government could oppose only because the vital 
interests of the country were involved.919 Considering all the foregoing factors, the Military 
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Commission concluded, it was foreseeable that the elections would not reflect the true will of 
the population.920 
5.4 Difficult Decisions
The commission’s conclusions left no doubt that  the Vilna elections presented a 
serious, delicate problem requiring great caution because, as Secretary-General Drummond 
recommended, “it is necessary to avoid giving the impression that the Council is 
collaborating with the Polish authorities in Vilna.”921  The Secretariat evaluated the Military 
Commission’s analysis and started to draw its own conclusions. In Drummond’s view, which 
the British Foreign Office shared, the League of Nations had to maintain a steadfastly 
noncommittal attitude to elections that would be held in exceedingly  unfair conditions.922 The 
secretary-general therefore suggested that the Council explain, in a formal declaration at the 
next meeting, that it denied any responsibility for events in Vilna that disregarded its recent 
recommendation and the policy previously proposed for the plebiscite.923 
The implications of league’s stance regarding the elections were not only  political, for 
it would also have a forceful impact on international public opinion. League officials were 
well aware of this; thus Chardigny vehemently  disagreed with Drummond’s suggestion to 
publicly protest the elections, a move he found detrimental and even dangerous.924  Both 
parties had refused to abide by  the Council’s recommendation of September 20, 1921, that 
they  settle the dispute by adopting the Hymans Plan, so such a protest would have been 
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tantamount to taking sides with the Lithuanians, who were trying to continue the 
negotiations. So even if, “as I have already reported, these elections will not reflect the true 
wishes of the population, they will nevertheless bring peace and represent a step forward 
towards stability. In three years this country  has undergone seven occupations and it deserves 
peace, even if unfair like the present one.”925 
 In Chardigny’s opinion, the framing of a public declaration had important long-term 
implications for security in the region. The French colonel pointed out that  the voting would 
take place during, not before, the Council session, so a public declaration would not only  fail 
to change the de facto situation but also be interpreted as a sign of hostility to Poland, thereby 
complicating things further and possibly even keeping the Warsaw Diet from adopting the 
proposal for some kind of territorial autonomy. The outcome would be sheer annexation, 
“which will, in turn, preclude finding any agreement with the Lithuanians in the future. Is this 
what we really want?” In conclusion, Chardigny warned the Political Section, the Council 
had no interest in taking a stand on the elections but had abundant reasons to ignore them, so 
although he would gladly uphold this position before the Council, he nevertheless 
recommended dropping the issue.926 The Political Section’s director, Paul Mantoux, agreed 
with him, but in practice the Council could not dismiss the question altogether, having 
already received, on December 14, 1921, Lithuania’s formal protest against the elections. 
Mantoux instead suggested that while avoiding any statement about the elections’ unfairness, 
the Council should also publicly deny any League of Nations involvement in them, as “in 
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 The Vilna elections were not the only cause of trouble for the league. The escalation of 
violence in the neutral zone also called for action. Drummond did not conceal his frustration 
about “the meager resources available to the league to intervene against the further abuses” 
and suggested informing the Polish government that the Secretariat intended to bring the 
Lithuanian note of October 27, 1921, which reported Polish persecutions against civilians, 
before the Council.928  Nevertheless, the secretary-general had already succumbed to 
pessimism and disappointment “in the folly of the Lithuanians in not accepting the Hymans 
Plan.”929 
 The Lithuanian government, anxious above all to maintain order at home—especially 
after the attempted assassination of Galvanauskas on November 25—finally acknowledged 
that it lacked the country’s support. At its meeting of December 3, after a struggle of two 
months, it decided to abandon the contest and definitively rejected the Hymans Plan.930 The 
league’s last attempt to improve Lithuania’s international position by finally granting it 
admission to the League of Nations on September 21, 1921, at a time when the Kaunas 
government still lacked de jure recognition, had not helped.931  On December 24, the 
government notified the league that the country  could not accept the introduction of a 
cantonal system modeled on the Swiss Constitution, “which is entirely alien to the progress 
of its own history and to the conditions of its present life.”932 Article 5 of the Hymans Plan, it 
claimed, violated the Lithuanian state’s right to dispose of its army, exposing the state to the 
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gravest danger and undermining its ability to maintain order throughout its territory.933 The 
introduction of Polish as an official language outside the Vilna territory, where Polish-
speaking citizens understood Lithuanian and, according to the Lithuanian authorities, 
accounted for just 2 or 3 percent of the population, was an unnecessary violation of the 
Lithuanian constitution. Such a provision could be adopted only for the autonomous territory 
of Vilna and at  the request of its diet. In the meantime, the rights of the Polish population 
would be guaranteed not only  by the Lithuanian constitution, but also by the Convention on 
Minorities, which the government was about to conclude with the League of Nations. The 
plan’s system of delegations was equivalent to federation, and concluding a defensive 
military convention with Poland would compromise national sovereignty and security and 
deprive the government of the right to decide whether to go to war.934 The Poland-Lithuania 
border drawn by  Article 2 of the projected agreement allotted Poland the “purely Lithuanian 
localities of Punsk, Seiny, Vizainy that  have played an important role in the intellectual and 
religious development of the country.” Similarly, the loss of Grodno, which the Treaty of 
Moscow had granted to Lithuania, ran counter to the country’s economic interests.935  As 
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Petras Klimas explained, Lithuania was ready to enter 
into an alliance with Poland compatible with both states’ interests and the pacification of 
Eastern Europe, but it could not do so at the expense of its sovereignty  and independence.936 
As his government saw it, the policy of the League of Nations offered Poland, five times 
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larger and more populous, fresh opportunities to satisfy  its territorial expansion ambitions to 
the detriment of Lithuania’s independence and sovereignty.937
 In Drummond’s view, the resulting impasse could not be overcome. The two parties had 
rejected the recommendations of the Council, which had no power to impose them. The Vilna 
elections, carried out without international supervision, would produce invalid results. Hence, 
all the Council could do to preserve peace was to ask both parties to refrain from hostilities. 
The Council could then appoint, at the parties’ expense, one, two, or three observers stationed 
within easy reach of the Vilna region and charged with reporting all infractions of minorities’ 
rights in Kaunas and Vilna.938 Meanwhile, the Military  Commission had to be withdrawn as 
soon as possible because the league could no longer justify its expense.939 
 Given the intransigence of Poles and Lithuanians alike, withdrawing the commission 
represented an obvious risk that  was, however, inevitable at the moment.940  In the highly 
likely event of further hostilities, the disputants could always appeal to the League of 
Nations, which could then intervene unfettered by previous history.941 To Secretary-General 
Drummond, this seemed the best the league could do at present, because even though he felt 
the current situation could hardly continue and would inevitably lead to talks between Kaunas 
and Vilna, “it  would be a mistake in the present state to ram a settlement down the throats of 
either the Poles or the Lithuanians.”942 
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 Whereas Drummond advocated disengagement, Colonel Chardigny and others within the 
Political Section refused to yield to his pessimism, believing it was crucial to find a way to 
provide further help “because the situation is very  serious and needs to be evaluated 
carefully.”943 Securing the safety of the local minorities seemed the best way  to prevent war 
in the region. In fact, Chardigny suggested honoring Lithuania’s request, in its note of 
October 27, to place its minority  in the Vilna region under the protection of the League of 
Nations, because he considered the note’s information on Polish violence to be generally 
accurate.944 He had in mind both the short-term and the long-term implications of this action, 
it being necessary to find an arrangement that left the Council a fair degree of control over 
minority protection, not only at present but  also in a future that to Chardigny looked rather 
gloomy.945  The Polish government constantly  risked criticism from the right on the Vilna 
question and therefore planned to let the Vilna diet proclaim Vilna’s annexation to Poland, so 
that at the next Polish elections it could overthrow the opposition in the parliament by 
admitting twenty or twenty-five new members from Vilna. Chardigny commented that sadly, 
this seemed to suggest that the National Democrats, whose influence was still very  strong, 
were driven by their own political agenda without concern for the well-being of the 
country.946 Moreover, the Lithuanians would not  make things any easier, as they could hardly 
be expected to agree to ratify  a treaty  to protect minorities under the League of Nations 
unless the question of Vilna was guaranteed not to be irremediably closed, something that, 
Chardigny regretted to admit, was far from true.947 Yet, 
266
943 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, December 20, 1921.
944 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Warsaw, December 21, 1921, pp. 1–2.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid., p. 2
947 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny, December 14, 1921.
In Kaunas the situation is different and therefore it is necessary  to take 
advantage of the Lithuanian request so that the league reserves the right to 
intervene in Vilna in any unforeseen circumstance that might arise in the 
future. At stake is not only  a minority  question, but also the status of political 
relations between the Baltic States and Poland on the one hand and between 
them and Russia on the other hand. The latter in the long run can use the 
significant number of White-Russians living there as a pretext for interfering. 
Didn’t Catherine the Great accomplish the partition of Poland immediately 
after having established her right to protect the Russian minorities in Poland?
948 
 
Hence, although Chardigny  agreed that it was time to withdraw the Military 
Commission, he also believed that the league needed to find a solution for the protection of 
minorities in Vilna, which served the interests of its population as well as Poland and 
international peace. A recent dossier submitted by  the Belarusian National Committee 
“clearly indicates that that the League of Nations cannot ignore this minority that Poland has 
undertaken to respect  under the Minority Treaty  of 1919.”949 Chardigny warned Geneva that 
the situation was very serious.950  In Grodno, persecutions of schools and the Orthodox 
Church were worse than in Vilna. The schools of the districts of Vileika and Oshmiany and 
the training college of the same districts had been closed, and several Lithuanians and 
Belarusians had been arbitrarily arrested on suspicion of acting as anti-government 
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propagandist agents. Chardigny preferred not to go to Oshmiany, “where the White-Russian 
priest of the city has been arrested, because I wanted to avoid disappointing the authorities 
and offering the press new ground for speculation.”951   He therefore suggested that both 
governments be notified of the league’s intention to send a Commission of Inquiry to monitor 
the treatment of minorities in the contested territories, because “fear of the Lord is the 
beginning of wisdom, and this preemptive measure might warn both parties against  further 
violence.”952 As he saw it, the intervention should be guaranteed but not permanent.953  He 
agreed with Keenan that a commissioner should be stationed in the Vilna-Kaunas district to 
see to fair play. Absent a neutral person to follow the situation on the ground, only  someone 
well familiar with the situation and fully  empowered to deal with it could satisfactorily 
investigate and quash the unrest at the demarcation line.954 
 
5.5 Protecting Minorities after the Hymans Plan
The league did not  see the rejection of the Hymans Plan and withdrawal of the 
Military Commission as a disengagement from the dispute; rather, these events signaled that 
the two goals of maintaining peace between the two countries and protecting minorities had 
to be achieved by other means. 
On January 13, 1922, the Sixteenth Session of the Council resolved that since both 
parties had declined to adopt the Hymans Plan, the conciliation procedure was over and the 
268
951 LNA, 11/ S 7, Report of the Military Commission, December 24, 1921, p. 4.
952 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Kaunas, December 13, 1921, pp. 3–4.
953 LNA, 11/ S 6, Chardigny to Denis, Confidential Letter, Warsaw, December 20, 1921.
954  LNA, 11/ S 7, Recommendation by Major Keenan, in Report of the Military Commission, 
December 24, 1921, p. 12.
Military Commission would be withdrawn.955  The resolution reflected the Military 
Commission’s contribution to shaping the decisions of the Secretariat. As for the Vilna 
elections, the Council did not recognize any  solution of a dispute, submitted to the league by 
one of the parties, that might be reached without heed of the Council’s recommendations or 
the consent of both parties.956  To keep peace between them, both parties were invited to 
reopen their diplomatic and consular relations. The league proposed replacing the two neutral 
zones—one in the Suwalki region on either side of the Curzon line, and the other in the Vilna 
district—with a new temporary demarcation line and offered its assistance.957 
 The more pressing concern of the league, however, was the situation of minorities in 
Lithuania and the disputed territories. The Council undertook to send representatives to 
relevant locales if necessary  and collect the information needed to report to the Council.958 
Since Poland was bound by the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, to 
guarantee respect for minority  rights, and Lithuania had committed, in its own declaration to 
the Council on September 14, 1921, to applying the same general principles, the league 
considered it its duty to see that minorities were duly respected.959 
 Though willing to accept assistance for the protection of Lithuanian minorities under 
Polish rule, Lithuania was far less inclined to welcome the league’s suggestion to draw a new 
demarcation line. Kaunas disagreed with the Council’s recommendation because a new 
demarcation line between Lithuanian and Zeligowski’s forces would be implicit 
acknowledgment “of the state of things created by the rebel General,” and because Lithuania 
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considered the Suwalki Agreement, which had provisionally left Vilna to Lithuania, still 
valid.960 It was the absence of a definite border between Poland and Lithuania that had caused 
this conflict, so Lithuania suggested that the Council instead draw the Supreme Council’s 
attention to the gravity of the situation, “which requires the fixation of the eastern frontiers of 
Poland contemplated by clause 3 of art. 87 of the Versailles Treaty.”961  Kaunas was also 
willing to entrust the dispute resolution to the Permanent Court of International Justice.  
 Fearing Polish-Lithuanian relations might worsen, especially after the withdrawal of 
the Military Commission, and wishing to avoid a resurgence of border incidents, Lithuania 
petitioned the Council to appoint a high commissioner from a neutral nation to protect the 
different ethnic groups in the Vilna region and to report  on the situation of the Polish minority 
in Lithuania.962  The commissioner would also verify the accusations made by the Polish 
government concerning Lithuanian persecution of Polish-speaking citizens.963  At the final 
Council session on January 12, 1922 and before the final resolution of the Council was 
issued, the Lithuanian delegate in Geneva asked the league to acknowledge that “special 
measures for protection of minorities” were now necessary in the Vilna region, where Polish 
retaliations against  Belarusians and Jews who had abstained from voting were expected to 
increase.964 
 Even though the Council resolution of January 13, 1922, had officially  resolved to 
dissolve the Military  Commission by March of the same year, the latter continued to protect 
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the population of the disputed territories as much as possible and to monitor the escalation of 
tension between Polish authorities and Lithuanians and Belarusians pursuing subversive 
activities in the disputed territories, which had increased after the Polish elections in Vilna. 
Figure 5: Polish Election Official Results in Cities and Villages.
Source: LNA, S 8, Wybory Do Sejmu, w Wilnie, 8 Stycznia 1922. Wydawnictwo Generalnego 
Komisariatu Wyborczego. Wilno, 1922, 26. The only existing Polish election statistics are those 
provided by the Polish authorities that administered them.
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Figure 6: Polish Election Official Results in the Countryside. Source: LAN, S 8, Wybory Do 
Sejmu, 27. 
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Figure 7: Participation of Electoral Groups. Source: Wybory Do Sejmu, 41.
The commissioners reported that the newly elected Diet of Vilna was composed exclusively 
of Polish deputies, despite the mixed character of the region’s population. Although it  was 
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impossible to form a precise opinion of the value of these elections, it seemed a well-founded 
assertion that the limited number of votes cast by Lithuanians, Jews, and the more numerous 
Belarusians served merely  to pad voter turnout “without having any political significance, or 
any moral value.”965  According to the commission, speaking generally  and with few 
exceptions, the majority  of the Lithuanian population of the region of Vilna had abstained 
from voting. 
The Jews of the towns had from voting almost entirely. In the countryside districts, 
and particularly  in settlements where Jews lived in small groups and had close contact with 
the rest of the population, some voted in order not to appear conspicuous to their fellow-
citizens and to avoid compromising their position.966  Aleksiuk’s Pro-Polish Belarusian 
Committee, which was favored officially, submitted a list in only  two electoral districts—
Osamania and Komaje. No candidates from either of the lists were elected, so the Diet of 
Vilna contained no Belarusian deputy. “This fact  is significant,” Chardigny wrote. “It shows 
on the one hand that the White-Russians have no confidence in Aleksiuk’s candidates because 
of their relations with the Polish authorities and, on the other, that the independent White- 
Russians refused to take part in the elections. It would nevertheless be wrong to conclude that 
they  boycotted the elections. Many of them, particularly  the Catholics, voted for the Polish 
lists, influenced by the promise of agrarian reforms and by propaganda of the Polish 
priests.”967 
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 The Military Commission therefore concluded that the elections could not  be regarded 
as a real, sincere expression of the will of the electoral territory’s whole population, given 
that the organization and management of the elections had been entirely in Polish hands, that 
the voters appeared at the polls without identity cards or certified documents of any kind, and 
that the elections were carried out under military occupation, with the Polish element having 
all the governmental machinery at its disposal.968  
 At present though, arrests and expulsion of Polish authorities and Lithuanian and 
Belarusian political leaders as well as violence, perpetrated against civilians were more 
pressing issues. On January 20, 50 persons, most of whom Lithuanians and Belarusians 
leaders, were arrested by order of the Vilna judicial authorities. Without waiting for the 
secretary-general’s instructions to obtain information about these arrests on-site and make an 
official report to the Council, the commission had already begun making inquires and 
arranged to interrogate the released arrestees, who arrived at Kaunas on February 8.969 The 
Lithuanian and Belarusian victims of arrests, whom the military commissioners also 
integrated, claimed not to know who was responsible for the measures taken against them but 
were inclined to suppose that the Vilna authorities wished in this way to get  hold of 
documents the Belarusian and Lithuanian National Committees had collected to prove that 
certain irregularities had occurred in Vilna’s diet election.970 
 The Polish juridical authorities declared to the commission that the military 
authorities and recently the police had for some time kept  close watch on Vilna’s Lithuanian 
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and Belarusian provisional committees, which in practice constituted a single organization.971 
In this way, the Polish authorities claimed, they had ascertained in late 1920 that the former 
was really a secret  government working in close ties with the latter, and both were subsidized 
by Kaunas. “Under the cloak of humanitarian and social work, they  were aiming at 
overthrowing the established power in Vilna.”972 With this object they were now attempting 
to foment strife between the different nationalities in the country, provoke agrarian 
disturbances, and organize a secret military force of Lithuanian and Belarusian partisans. 
Further, they appeared to have acted as Kaunas’s spies by gathering information on 
the position of the Polish occupation forces, and to have been in constant communication 
with Communist agents and organizations in the district.973 Several Belarusian agitators had 
arrived from Bolshevik Russia, established themselves in Vilna and the neighborhood, and 
organized nationalist bands “animated by solely Belarusian sentiments” and communist 
bands that sought to provoke agrarian unrest and even resorted to terrorism, burning down 
houses on isolated estates.974  The Polish authorities maintained that evidence collected by 
juridical authorities enabled them to make these arrests. In addition, the head of the Vilna 
provisional government admitted to the commission that only under pressure from Warsaw 
had he agreed to release the prisoners, and only on condition that they  be expelled from the 
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district. He stated that in no case could he authorize them to return, except to go back to 
prison and to be tried according to the laws in force.975 
 The Lithuanians denied that they had ever resorted to subversive or illegal action, 
protesting that they only been defending their rights within the limits of the laws and decrees 
in force. However, the Polish prosecutor of Vilna maintained that he was in possession of 
overwhelming proof of an undoubted conspiracy against the security  of the state.976  The 
commissioners confirmed that once it was informed of the arrests, the Warsaw government 
took all possible steps to secure the release of the detainees, but after two weeks’ discussion 
with Vilna it could obtain nothing more than the expulsion of the prisoners. 
 The information collected at Kaunas and Vilna was, in the opinion of the military 
commissioners, inadequate to form any definite conclusion about these events, because on 
the grounds of “professional secrecy,” the Polish authorities had denied them access to any 
proofs.977 The commissioners could, however, state without doubt that the Lithuanian and 
Belarusian committees in Vilna operated in close alignment with each other and with Kaunas 
because they considered Vilna the capital of Lithuania, temporarily and illegally occupied by 
the Poles.978  While seeking to maintain and develop Lithuanian interests in Vilna, these 
organizations were working openly against  the de facto regime of the city, even though the 
commission had no evidence to establish whether they  had exceeded legal limits in doing 
so.979 
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 Aside from their distress at being unable, in the special conditions in which they were 
called upon to act, to either prevent such abuses or even ascertain whether repressive 
measures adopted by either side were justified, the commissioners emphasized that these 
most regrettable events were likely to exacerbate the already  existing tension between the two 
countries.980 Since late December 1921, the commission had noted that the Belarusians, who 
formed the basis of the territory’s population, had joined the Lithuanians in their cause to add 
Vilna to their territory.981 This collaboration was a source of major concern, because even if 
the Belarusian element still lacked a fully  developed national identity and offered little help 
to Lithuania, “when in a few years they are imbued with the true spirit of nationality, it is 
possible that  they may turn their attention in another direction toward a people of kindred 
race, if not of religion, unless the government of the Vilna territory, whatever it  be, succeeds 
in securing their sympathies.”982 
Obviously the commission worried that the Belarusians would look toward Soviet  Russia, a 
possibility enhanced by Lithuania’s and Poland’s inability to handle the nationalities question 
and the imperialistic tendencies each had displayed.983  Poland, meanwhile, would have to 
realize that in the mixed Vilna region, where the predominant Polish influence was due 
mainly to civilization, the Belarusian element, though but little developed and practically 
landless, was nevertheless the most numerous and could no longer be neglected without 
grave danger to Poland itself.984 
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  For now, though, the Military Commission was dealing with the matters at hand, 
while the Secretariat was flooded with petitions from minorities lamenting persecutions and 
abuses they  had suffered. Poland’s foreign affairs minister complained about bad sanitary 
conditions at the Kaunas prison where Polish prisoners were held,985 but Major Keenan, when 
sent to visit the Polish prisoners in person, found that they  were receiving suitable care and 
medical treatment. Civilian doctors were allowed to visit them in prison, if they wished. Of 
117 Polish prisoners, 8 were in hospital; the remaining prisoners occupied fifteen cells that 
normally accommodated 96 persons.986
 The Polish Socialist newspaper Robotic focused on denouncing “the particularly 
revolting manner in which the search was conduced in the Vilna’s Belarusian Secondary 
School.”987  Early  on January  25, 1922, the whole building was surrounded. Teachers and 
students could enter, but nobody was allowed to leave the premises. In every  part of the 
building, police aimed rifles at students who tried to leave the college. Only at two o’clock in 
the afternoon did the procurator, who had received many complaints about this barbarous 
treatment, ordered the children set free.988  The Lithuanian provisional committee in Vilna 
unambiguously regarded the Polish conduct in Vilna as stoking a desire for vengeance among 
Lithuanians that could eventually  lead exasperated victims to take matters into their own 
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hands, with deplorable consequences for the social life of the country and for peace and 
public security.989  
 Meanwhile, forty Belarusian delegates—legal representatives of the communes of 
Vilna, Grodno, and Svienciany—appealed to the Lithuanian government and the 
representatives of European and American power in Lithuania to appoint a League of Nations 
commission to inquire into acts of violence against the civilian population in these 
districts.990 According to the delegates, Poles were targeting the relatives of those who had 
boycotted the Vilna diet elections, refused to recognize the occupation, and preferred taking 
refuge in the woods to serving in the Polish army.991 
 As the Council awaited Chardigny’s report before making its final decision on the 
Vilna minorities question and transferring it from the Political to the Minority  Section, the 
Secretariat was assisting the work of the Military Commission with diplomatic and legal 
action, always careful to avoid any  act that might acknowledge Polish sovereignty over 
Vilna.992  Upon hearing of the violence against the Belarusian high school, Drummond 
straightaway informed the Lithuanian and Polish governments that he had already instructed 
the Military  Commission to ascertain the facts on the ground and report to the Council.993 In 
the meantime, Hymans requested on March 4 that the Polish government release the 
detainees, reminding Warsaw that by its resolution of January 13, the Council had already 
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clearly  indicated its assumption of the duty of safeguarding the protection of minorities in 
Vilna.994 
 
5.6 The Lithuanian Declaration on Minority Rights 
 The Secretariat did not confine itself to rebuking the two governments. Just after the 
last Council session, on the advice of the Military Commission, the Political and Minority 
Sections had begun pressuring Lithuania to ratify a Declaration on Minority Rights 
containing the same obligations undertaken in the Polish minority treaty.995  The league 
focused on ensuring that the Lithuanian minority  treaty draft contained “stipulations which 
must be in conformity  with the stipulation in the various treaties for the protection of 
minorities already  in force, such as those already concluded with Poland, Romania, Czecho-
Slovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state.”996 The league had two main reasons to insist on 
this conformity. First, Geneva’s goal was to make sure that the whole of both the Polish and 
the Lithuanian territory was covered by the general principles of the minority  treaties.997 This 
would have made Article 12, “which is a cornerstone of the Minority  Treaties,” applicable to 
the Vilna district, thus giving any member of the Council of the League of Nations the right 
to direct the Council’s attention to any violation or possible infraction of any  minority 
protection obligation and allowing the Council to take immediate action. For this reason, 
Colban believed that even if Hymans’s “strong letters” to the two governments on March 4, 
1922, regarding the violence in Vilna admittedly  required no action of considerable 
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importance, at  the moment no further action was necessary, because once the Lithuanian 
signed a proper treaty, any member of the Council could pursue the matter further if it 
desired.998 
 The second reason was that this strategy seemed also to satisfy the Polish 
representative who on January 11, 1922, requested that Kaunas confer on Polish minorities in 
Lithuania the same rights that the Polish government had conferred on minorities in Poland 
with the treaty of June 28, 1919.999  After all, on September 14, 1921, Galvanauskas had 
formally declared his government willing to adhere to the recommendation adopted by the 
Assembly on December 15, 1920, and ready  to negotiate with the Council of the League of 
Nations to determine the extent  of its international obligations and methods of carrying them 
out.1000 At its meeting of January 14, 1922, the Council accepted this declaration, which as far 
as Colban was concerned “gives us a sufficient basis for dealing with minorities questions 
concerning Lithuania on the same lines as if a Minority  Treaty  containing the most general 
stipulations of the Polish Minority Treaty were already in existence in Lithuania.”1001 
 The League of Nations was therefore essentially  following a strategy consistent with 
its procedures and based on a mainly  legal approach, which explains its indifference to the 
question of whether Lithuania would surpass the league’s requirements by granting cultural 
autonomy. As Colban had remarked to the Jewish delegate in Geneva, the league was 
unconcerned about how generous Lithuania wanted to be as long as Kaunas signed a treaty 
that met the league’s standards.1002 In this respect Colban was optimistic, because to him it 
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seemed “morally impossible for either government to refuse to apply the minorities 
stipulations to the Vilna district, which both of them claim to be under their sovereignty.” He 
therefore expected it would be a simple matter to obtain final, official ratification from the 
Lithuanian government.1003 
 Nothing was farther from the truth. Having spent over a year building their case for 
statehood and sovereignty over Vilna around granting cultural autonomy to minorities, now 
the Lithuanians were protesting any infringement of Lithuanian sovereignty  by the league.1004 
Immediately  after notifying the league of the rejection of the Hymans Plan on January  14, 
1922, the Council received a note from the Lithuanian government that, unsurprisingly, did 
not mention provisions for national autonomy. Kaunas renewed its commitment to finding a 
solution to the Vilna dispute as soon as Poland’s attitude to Lithuania resumed the form of 
relations between two sovereign, independent states. Meanwhile, Lithuania was prepared to 
fully  abide by all measures the Council recommended for protection of the various minorities 
on the territory of Vilna.1005  Director of the Minority Section Eric Colban reminded 
Galvanauskas “as tactfully as possible” that both recognition of the Baltic states’ sovereignty 
and their admission to the league had been conditional upon their acceptance of certain 
guarantees of protection of minorities. The Lithuanian delegate saw the question in different 
terms, though, and argued that a minority  treaty could not be imposed on Lithuania, as had 
been the case with Poland and Czechoslovakia, because the three Baltic states did not owe 
their creation and independence to the Peace Conference, but to an arrangement they had 
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themselves worked out with Russia.1006  In addition, Galvanauskas explained, these were 
difficult times for the league’s supporters in all the Baltic states because “the league had 
allowed Zeligowski to stay  in Vilna, thereby accepting the Polish fait accompli and ratifying 
the great injustice which had been committed.”1007
 More than a concern to protect Lithuanian sovereignty from the league’s interference 
in domestic affairs or mitigate the Lithuanian public’s negative opinion of the league, 
Galvanauskas’s reluctant reply  reflected his government’s changed attitude to the minority 
question since and because of the dismissal of the Hymans Plan. Disagreement over Vilna 
and the ineffective Belarusian boycott of the Polish-run election of the Vilna diet, together 
with intelligence indicating that different factions of the BNR’ Rada were collaborating with 
Warsaw and Moscow, had radically  shifted Belarusian-Lithuanian relations.1008  After the 
failure of the boycott of the Vilna elections, in January 1922 the Belarusian government split 
into a pro-Soviet faction under Foreign Minister Anton Cvikevich and a pro-Lithuania group 
led by  Lastowski. Conflict in Lastowski’s government became a pretext for ending 
Belarusian autonomy  in Lithuania. As a consequence, Minister for Belarusian Affairs 
Dominyk Semaska resigned in February 1922, and Kaunas decided to exercise greater control 
over Belarusian political activity. At the suggestion of the head of the Department for the 
League of Nations and Poland at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a new office headed by 
Lastowski was set up to counteract Cvikevic’s propaganda. Though Kaunas’s anti-Polish 
collaboration with Belarusian organizations in Vilna remained unaffected, the deterioration of 
284
1006 LNA, 41/ S 346, Confidential Letter, Colban to Rostings, London, January 30, 1922, p. 1.
1007 Ibid.
1008 Liekis, A State within a State? 178–179.
Lithuanian-Belarusian political cooperation in Kaunas had serious repercussions for 
Lithuanian minority policy.1009
 Another crisis over the institutionalization of a minority’s autonomy affected the 
Jewish camp, where the General Zionists, the party that controlled the Ministry of Jewish 
Affairs and Jewish National Council, held out alone in support of it. All other parties—the 
religious Agudah and the leftist Poalei Zion together with the Communists—decided at the 
Second Congress of Kehillot, held February 14–26, to end Jewish national autonomy. The 
religious parties’ leadership  opposed it because it was unsupervised by religious members of 
the community.  Tseirei Zion and the Democrats instead argued that that the poor 
performance of institutions was due to lack of popular support.1010 Even a last attempt by the 
Jewish National Council to seek legalization of Jewish cultural autonomy at the Lithuanian 
Constituent Assembly failed. On April 10, 1922, Soloveitchik resigned from his position as 
Jewish affairs minister because the newly  drafted Lithuanian constitution did not guarantee 
the existence of his ministry or any other institutions of autonomy.1011
 The declaration that Lithuania finally submitted to the Council on May 12, 1922, held 
no provision for national autonomy. The draft stated that all residents of Lithuania, regardless 
of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion, would be assured full protection of life and 
liberty; and that all Lithuanian nationals who were members of minority populations would 





the future, charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational 
establishments.1012 
 Because the document also lacked specific provisions for the Jewish minority, 
President of the Council Dominicio de Cuna objected that since the status of Jewish rights 
had been previously raised as a “special question,” and since Lithuania had obligated itself to 
formulate a treaty in conformity with those already in force, the Lithuanian declaration ought 
to include the same stipulations concerning the special status of the Jews as were contained in 
the Polish minority treaty.1013  
 The league’s sensitivity  to the Jewish question was due also to Jewish diplomatic 
pressure on Geneva for ratification of cultural autonomy. In September 1921, at the Second 
Assembly, the Joint Foreign Committee supported Lithuania’s admission to the league 
because “this state had inserted ample provisions for Minority  Rights in its Constitution and 
in Lithuania the rights of the Jewish Minority have been realized by the Government with a 
solicitude and sympathy which marks that state as a bright example to all Eastern 
Europe.”1014 As the Lithuanians started their démarche, the Jewish Delegation Committee at 
Paris immediately called the Council’s attention to the commitments the Lithuanian 
provisional government had undertaken at the Paris Peace Conference to embody special 
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rights for the Jewish minority  in Lithuania in the country’s basic law. In response to Jewish 
criticism, de Cuna therefore made a formal statement, adopted forthwith by the Council, that 
the Lithuanian government’s declaration to the League of Nations, even if it “will not exclude 
any special arrangements entered into in agreement with the Lithuanian government in 
exceptional cases,” ought to include the same stipulations concerning the Jews’ special status 
as were contained in the Polish treaty.1015 These stipulations were amply sufficient to give full 
effect to the obligation assumed by the Lithuanian government towards the League of 
Nations under the terms of the Lithuanian declaration of September 14, 1921.1016 
De Cuna’s statement was not  enough to assuage the disappointment in Lithuania’s retreat 
from its commitments, which did not spare blame for the league itself. In the United States, 
information received from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in Geneva protested “the attempts 
to induce the Lithuanian government to modify considerably the rights to minority groups, 
made in circles close to headquarters of the League of Nations.”1017  The league allegedly 
wanted to persuade Lithuania to abandon or strictly modify the clause dealing with 
recognition of minority groups, lest the granting and recognition of broad powers for 
Lithuania’s minorities result  in similar demands by other minorities in the Baltic States.”1018 
Manley  Ottmer Hudson, adviser to the Legal Section of the League of Nations and a Harvard 
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professor of international law, did not hide his concern “for these misconceptions that I am 
willing to stop.”1019 Helmer Rostings at the Minority Section reassured him that the league 
was highly  unlikely to try to induce the Lithuanian government to abandon the clause dealing 
with recognition of minority groups. On the contrary, Rostings stressed that a movement 
against far-reaching minority rights had arisen in Lithuania itself, and that at the second 
reading of the Lithuanian Constitution, the chapter concerning minorities seemed to have 
been removed because their representatives had left  the constituent assembly. Still, he was 
confident that at  the third reading, “when they are again present, the relevant chapter of the 
constitution will probably pass.”1020 
 Rostings was right about Lithuania’s increasing domestic hostility  to special minority 
rights provisions, but contrary to his expectation, the situation was destined to worsen, to the 
point where it finally  caused the Lithuanian parliament to refuse to ratify any  declaration to 
be placed under the auspices of the League of Nations. The new Lithuanian Constitution, 
adopted August 1, 1922, contained two paragraphs embodying positive declarative principles 
on minority rights but did not  mention any specific provisions for national autonomy 
institutions.1021 
 Galvanauskas, who did not escape bitter criticism from the Comite des Délégations 
Juives, had to explain that the suppression of the Jewish ministry did not represent a real 
retreat from previous commitments; rather, ratification of a Jewish ministry would have set a 
precedent that could nourish anti-Semitism and endanger the safety of the Jewish community. 
Moreover, a Jewish ministry would have hindered creation of a special ministry for all 
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minorities, which the Lithuanian government intended to create “as soon as the right moment 
comes.”1022  Voldemaras expressed great concern over the League of Nations’ obvious 
disappointment and Lithuania’s loss of prestige in the eyes of the international public over 
this injustice inflicted on minorities, which also would likely severely  jeopardize 
the assignment of Vilna and Memel to Lithuania:1023 
How can we expect  to see our complaints against  Zelikowski's elections for 
the Vilna Diet  taken into account? How can one convince the League of 
Nations and the Great Powers that what Zelikowski is doing is wrong, if 
Lithuania acts in the same way? If we don’t respect the rights of others, we 
will bring upon ourselves the greatest oppression and surrender the only 
weapon in our hand. We should be well aware that if there is no justice in 
Lithuania, there won’t  be any  Lithuania at all. Therefore if we fight for legality 
and justice, we fight also for the independence of Lithuania.1024
 
 Voldemaras’s was a rather isolated voice. The coalition of Populists and Christian 
Democrats that won the elections to the first Lithuanian Parliament, held on October 10–11, 
1922, did not need Jewish support, so Jewish demands had not been met.1025 Tension also ran 
high between Jewish and Polish factions that contested the election results. When the 
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electoral commission that arbitrated the case resolved to remove several seats from both the 
Polish and Jewish lists, several representatives left the parliament in protest.1026 
 
5.7 The Aftermath: Facing the Consequences 
 The Minority Section refrained from pressuring Lithuania, deeming it more prudent to 
wait for the minorities’ representatives to rejoin the parliament in hopes that a more favorable 
atmosphere would facilitate the awaited ratification of the declaration of May 12, 1922.1027 It 
waited in vain. In early December 1923, Galvanauskas notified the Council of the 
parliament’s decision not to ratify the May declaration or any other minority treaty on the 
grounds that Article 73 of the Lithuanian Constitution already  embodied the same rights. 
Galvanauskas, however, renewed Kaunas’s commitment to strictly abide by those provisions 
in a statement that the Council accepted, automatically placing the May declaration of formal 
commitment to protect minorities’ rights in Lithuania under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations.1028 
 Predictably, the failure to ratify the declaration made a deep impression on Jewish 
international public opinion. Lucien Wolf explained to Colban that the Lithuanian public’s 
opposition to overt acceptance of the guarantee of the League of Nations had determined the 
parliament’s final decision “to take note” of the declaration instead of ratifying it.1029 Wolf 
also confided that he was worried about the Lithuanian government’s recent unfriendly 
attitude toward the large Jewish community. In his opinion, these circumstances almost 
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exactly  paralleled those in Poland; hence, the guarantees for minorities imposed on Lithuania 
ought to be the same. He trusted that  if concessions were made along the lines of the 
agreements signed by  Finland, Latvia, and Estonia, “we shall be getting within measurable 
distance of a total demolition of the system of Minorities guarantees in Eastern Europe.”1030 
 Lithuania’s changed view of its minorities was also a consequence of a decision of the 
Conference of Ambassadors: on March 14, 1923, it ratified the de facto frontier the Council 
had recommended on February 3, leaving the Grodno, Lida, and Vilna districts to Poland.1031 
This resolution blindsided the Lithuanians who had, on their own initiative, addressed the 
Conference of Ambassadors on November 18, 1922, with their own request.1032 According to 
the historian Alfred Eric Senn, the Lithuanians believed that  the powers would certainly 
honor and enforce the temporary demarcation line drawn under the Suwalki Agreement that 
the Military Commission had helped negotiate in early  October 1920, which left Vilna to 
Lithuania.1033 
 The Conference of Ambassadors’ unwillingness to even consider such a demand at 
this point was a mystery  only to the Lithuanians. As the British and French saw it, for the past 
two years the league had attempted to give the disputants a chance to settle the dispute 
according to principles of equality  and respect for state sovereignty, going well beyond 
traditional diplomacy based on balance of power and preservation of the status quo. For their 
part, London and Paris had refrained from granting Lithuania de jure recognition, waiting 
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instead to see where the dispute under the league would lead.1034 Thus it was only  consistent 
that, shortly after the dismissal of the Hymans Plan on June 30, 1922, the Conference of 
Ambassadors granted Lithuania de jure recognition within its present borders.1035  As for 
Vilna, the ambassadors based their decision on the Polish border ratified by the Treaty of 
Riga and on the de jure frontier the Council had drawn between Poland and Lithuania on 
February 3, 1923. The status of minorities played a role in this decision as well. After all, 
commitment to securing minority protection was one of the goals of the postwar international 
system. The Conference of Ambassadors cited the fact  that all the territories placed under 
Polish rule after the Treaty  of Saint-Germain were covered by the minority treaty of June 28, 
1919 (with the sole exception of Austrian Galicia, which enjoyed even greater autonomy) as 
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Figure 8: Vilna neutral Zone established by the Council Resolution of February 3, 1923. 
Source: LNA, R 600.
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After the Conference of Ambassadors, tension between Poland and Lithuania increased, and 
diplomatic relations did not resume until 1939. Throughout the interwar years, Warsaw 
considered the Vilna question closed, whereas Lithuania considered itself to be in a state of 
war with Poland because the existing situation had resulted from an act  of violence. The 
Vilna dispute remained a major issue in Lithuania, affecting both domestic and foreign 
policy.1037  Years of anti-Polish propaganda bore fruit, dividing public opinion and political 
circles. The price Lithuania paid was diplomatic isolation—especially  after Pact of Locarno, 
when it became clear that the western powers would not  reconsider the ambassadors’ decision 
and Lithuania gradually started aligning itself with opponents of the Versailles order. The 
league’s attempt to “appease” the Lithuanians by  granting them Memel in March 1924 did 
not keep them from turning to Germany and Soviet Russia as their main interlocutors.1038 
 In the meantime, increasing xenophobia internally  had serious repercussions for 
Lithuanian-minorities relations. In the summer of 1924, the Kaunas authorities decreed that 
all non-foreign business signs in the city had to be written in Lithuanian, thus striking at the 
Jews, whose deputies left  the parliament after the it refused to take action.1039  Nor did 
Lithuanian-Belarusian relations show any sign of improvement after the Ministry  for 
Belarusian Affairs was abolished and the Belarusian flag forcefully removed from the 
building housing that minority’s representatives in Kaunas.1040 
 Even greater was the price Lithuania paid in foreign politics. Despite the Lithuanians’ 
hopes, Soviet and German assistance did not compensate for the loss of French and British 
support. Not surprisingly, by 1928 the Soviets had lost all interest in the Vilna dispute, and 
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Germany forced the Lithuanians to cede Memel in 1939. They regained Vilna that October, 
but only because of the Poles’ defeat and the Russian advance into Poland. Nine months later 
Lithuania was forced to join the USSR, thus losing the independence for over fifty years.1041
 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations rejected all Lithuania’s 
attempts to reopen the Vilna question but showed concern and willingness to deal with 
minorities issues arising in Lithuania and the Vilna region, even when this clearly  meant 
reopening the question of Lithuania’s ratification of the Declaration on Minority Rights. In 
this respect, it is hard to agree completely with Martin Scheuermann’s conclusion that the 
overarching goals of the league’s minority system were mainly political and hardly 
humanitarian, that the task of defining the 1919 settlement and the prestige of the league took 
precedence over meaningful relief for petitioners, or that in consequence the system became 
an end in itself, arguing more about procedures than substantive issues.1042 
 Undeniably, several political considerations and constraints limited the league’s 
freedom of movement, but the league also truly  needed to guard itself from minorities that 
stood always ready  to exploit the system in pursuit of their own agenda, as petitions received 
from several minorities throughout the 1920s well illustrate. On September 23–26, 1923, 
Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, and German activists gathered in Geneva to create the 
Committee of the Oppressed Nationalities and drafted a petition to catch the attention of the 
Assembly of the League of Nations, which was “at  the moment deciding on matters of 
arbitration, security and disarmament to promote stability and world peace, on the situation of 
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the nationalities oppressed by Poland.”1043 The petitioners claimed to speak in the name of 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians and Germans living in territories that the 
Conference of Ambassadors had placed under Polish rule in a decision that, they protested, 
was made in defiance of the Great Powers’ promise to guarantee the right of peoples to self-
government through plebiscites, the conditio sine qua non for any contested territorial 
adjustment.1044  They also lamented that the international obligations for the protection of 
minorities imposed on Poland and the regime of autonomy granted in Eastern Galicia had 
failed to protect the rights of the nationalities the committee represented, which faced 
systematic persecution for any attempt to develop their national life and were prevented from 
developing economic independence from Poland.1045 
 History, they continued, had shown that the Serbian attempt on the life of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand that  sparked the First World War was a Serbo-Croatian reaction to Austro-
Hungarian oppression, and that similar causes were likely to have similar effects in the 
future.1046 The petitioners were confident, however, that postwar international politics was 
now conducted differently  from that in prewar days, and that the right to self-government 
sanctioned by Article 19 of the Versailles Peace Treaty  empowered the League of Nations to 
mediate disputes that could degenerate into armed conflict. Moreover, considering that on 
January 13, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations had resolved not to recognize any 
settlement arrived at outside its mediation or without the consent of all parties concerned, the 
Committee of the Oppressed Nationalities requested that the league revise the decision of the 
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Conference of Ambassadors and that effective international protection be guaranteed until the 
revision was complete.1047 
 The league’s response to this committee’s petition suggests a fine line between 
procedure and the substance of the matter. The Political Section recommended taking no 
action. The question the petition raised did not pertain to the Minority  Section because these 
representatives were questioning Polish territorial sovereignty rights and “the League of 
Nations has nothing to say  on this matter, having no power over international treaties 
concluded outside its jurisdiction.”1048  Only  a German memorandum seemed to address a 
proper minority question, though made no concrete request and was more a report than a real 
petition.1049 Colban therefore reminded the committee’s president  that petitions addressed to 
the League of Nations had to meet certain requirements to receive consideration. Any request 
calling for protection beyond that established in the treaties or aimed at severing the minority 
from the state to which it belonged would be rejected.1050 
 The negative response neither discouraged nor enlightened the persistent committee, 
which petitioned the league along similar lines a year later.1051  Once again the petitioners 
were reminded that “these different petitions have not been, and cannot be acted upon, 
because they  have not been brought up  by  a member of the league, nor do they conform to 
the rules laid down by the Council for minorities petitions.” However, in a meeting with the 
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committee’s representatives Colban promised that any proper petition submitted to the 
Secretariat would receive serious consideration.1052 
 In 1925 the same committee had secured the support of émigrés, who nonetheless had 
no impact on Geneva’s response. On August 25, 1925, a mass meeting in Boston, 
Massachusetts, held under the auspices of the World War Veterans of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, 
and Belarusian descent living in the Greater Boston area and claiming to represent  all 
political parties and aspirations (except the Bolsheviks) resolved to support the petition of the 
Committee of the Oppressed Nationalities and forwarded a copy of their resolution to the 
president and secretary of state of the United States, Lithuania’s representatives in 
Washington and Switzerland, and the press.1053  Colban found that “this resolution, against 
‘atrocities’ of the Polish government towards different minorities,” did not require any 
action.1054
 Instead, the Minority Section devoted serious consideration to the complaints of the 
Committee of Exiled Poles in Lithuania, headquartered in Vilna. These petitioners were 
accusing the Lithuanian government of violating the civil and national rights of Polish-
speaking citizens, who had also become the target of an unfair agrarian reform. They also 
protested minorities’ lack of the right to petition the league. In March 1924, the Polish 
deputies of the Lithuanian Constituent Assembly  who on June 19, 1921, had addressed 
Council of the League of Nations complaining of harsh treatment of the Polish minority in 
Lithuania were summoned to appear before magistrates: the Lithuanian authorities were 
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treating their action as an act of high treason.1055  Moreover, the public census recently 
conducted in Lithuania had been unfair; “many Lithuanian citizens of Polish race do not 
venture to declare their nationality, being influenced by fear of reprisals or persecution.”1056 
Finally, Lithuania did not use the Polish language in either oral or written legal proceedings, 
heavily curtailed the freedom of the Polish press, and constantly hampered the teaching of the 
Polish language in schools.1057 
 Regarding the alleged violation of minorities’ rights to petition the league, the 
Lithuanian government received only a strong warning because the whole problem was 
extremely delicate.1058 In theory, it  was always arguable that minorities were simply abusing 
their ability to petition the league.1059  As for all the other allegations, the Council 
representatives appointed to examine the petitioners’ complaints resolved that whereas the 
Lithuanian government had provided satisfactory explanations, further investigation of the 
press ban and the obstacles to the teaching of the Polish language was warranted.1060
 Mostly, however, the league was occupied with agrarian reform, a problem that “we 
have all round Central and Eastern Europe and minorities have brought before the Council on 
several occasions.”1061 The Minority Section saw agrarian reform as a social measure that the 
country  concerned should itself decide upon; it was not  the league’s business if a country 
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made an economically and socially unwise or wrong move. The league’s only concern was to 
convince itself that minorities got a fair deal on equal footing.1062 The question therefore was 
not whether the compensation was sufficient or adequate, but rather whether whatever 
measure a government decided to adopt was applied equally and not directed against  a 
minority.1063  Following these principles, until June 1925 the league considered action 
unnecessary in all other cases of minorities’ complaints.1064 
 The Lithuanian case was different, though, because the great majority of the 
landowners affected by the reform belonged to minorities.1065 The task was thus to establish 
whether the agrarian reform, considered as a whole, was in any way contrary  to the 
Lithuanian declaration of May 12, 1922. This was perhaps primarily  a question of 
appreciation of facts—especially  the political tendency of the whole reform.1066  For this 
reason, the Council decided for further investigation and placed the question on its 
agenda.1067  After examining the question and the information submitted by the Lithuanian 
government, Colban concluded that  overall, Lithuania’s very far-reaching agrarian reform 
had thrust many into great hardship but was not contrary to its minorities declaration.1068 
 The evaluation did not end with political considerations. Colban also requested the 
opinion of the Legal Section, because a finding that the agrarian reform was contrary to the 
Lithuanian Declaration on Minority Rights that had been placed under guarantee of the 
300
1062 LNA, 41/ S 346, folder 3, Colban to Eric Drummond, Confidential Letter, Geneva, June 28, 1925, 
pp. 3–4.
1063 Ibid., p. 2.
1064 LNA, 41/ S 346, folder 3, Colban to Legal Section, Minute, Geneva, June 23, 1925, p. 1.
1065 Ibid.
1066 LNA, 41/ S 346, folder 3, Colban to Eric Drummond, Confidential Letter, Geneva, June 28, 1925, 
p. 8.
1067 Ibid., p. 5.
1068 Ibid., p. 6.
League of Nations might entail the reopening of discussion on the minorities declaration 
itself.1069 Lithuania was in the meantime invited to furnish the Council with statistics showing 
how the agrarian reform had been put into practice and indicating the legislative provisions 
for, and extent of, expropriation carried out without compensation. The complaints were 
evaluated against this information.1070
  In conclusion, it  is also hard to agree completely with the claim that the league 
prioritized the principle of state sovereignty over minorities’ interests, guarding states’ 
interests at the expense of minorities’ well-being.1071 States’ own ambivalence about using the 
league’s system should also not be underestimated. Drummond would probably argue so 
today, considering an interesting conversation he had with Lithuanian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Dovas Zaunius in April 1926. Drummond was curious to learn why Lithuanian 
minorities in Vilna, if they  were suffering such hardship, did not petition the league. Zaunius 
explained that  his government was reluctant to bring this question up with the league, fearing 
that in doing so it might somehow recognize Polish sovereignty over the territory. And 
anyway, he doubted that petitions lacking strong support  from official Lithuanian 
representatives accredited at the League of Nations would receive serious consideration. 
Drummond, for his part, not only  argued strongly against this last remark but went as far as 
suggesting that Lithuania had used Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the League of 
301
1069 Ibid., p. 8.
1070 LNA, 41/ S 346, Situation of the Polish Minority in Lithuania, Note by the British, Czechoslovak, 
and Spanish Representatives of the Council, Rome, December 11, 1924. On September 5, 1925, the 
Council resolved that the Lithuanian agrarian reform did not violate minorities’ rights. LNOJ 6 
(1925): annex 792, 1454.
1071 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 282.
Nations to broach the issue, thus making it a serious matter by  presenting the case as 
disturbing peace and the good understanding with Poland.1072 
 In January  the next year, Colban made the same offer to the secretary of the Polish 
delegation, Tadeusz Gwiazdowski, who came to him privately  to find out whether the league 
could intervene on the behalf of Polish citizens in Lithuania who had been expropriated 
without compensation under the current agrarian reform.1073  As they were not Lithuanian 
citizens of Polish nationality but citizens of Poland, Colban replied that the league could not 
intervene, because the Lithuanian Declaration lacked a clause similar to that of the Polish 
minority treaty, according to which all people previously resident in Lithuania who might 
have opted for Polish nationality were free to retain their landed property.1074 In his opinion, 
all Poland could do was bring the matter before the league in application of Article 11. 
Colban, however—with Mantoux’s full support—advised Gwiazdowski to think twice before 
going down a road on which Lithuania would likely  find itself reopening the Vilna question 
before the Council, something that Gwiazdowski himself admitted was far from desirable.1075 
 As representatives of the league’s interests, Mantoux and Drummond were certainly  
keen to preserve the recently reached territorial status quo and avoid reopening the Vilna 
dispute before the Council. One might therefore reasonably object that by  advising invocation 
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of Article 11, they were only playing a zero-sum game with the disputants, exploiting their 
mutual hostility. Perhaps this was the case, but if so, even such a cynical conclusion should 
be drawn without losing sight of the remarkable two-year endeavor of the Military 
Commission, Council, and Secretariat to accommodate Poles’ and Lithuanians’ conflicting 
pretensions, aspirations, and ideological intransigence. 
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CONCLUSION
 Though interest in the League of Nations has been reawakened by the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, not even very recent studies 
exploring the significance of the league’s collective security  system have much challenged 
the well-entrenched image of the league as serving Great Power politics and representing, at 
best, a more modern version of the Concert of Europe. This study of the league’s handling of 
the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, however, shows that  the league was able to act independently 
according to its own agenda and strategy, which often were at odds with those of the powers. 
Geneva was unafraid to negotiate and organize a plebiscite when Paris and London saw a 
federalist plan as the only solution to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. After the dismissal of the 
plebiscite, the league produced the Hymans Plan, which departed in many respects from the 
plans of Polish federalists, the three ambassadors, and the powers, and reflected concern to 
reach a settlement that respected the full sovereignty of Lithuania and Poland without 
dismissing the presence of significant Jewish and Belarusian minorities in the multiethnic 
disputed territories. Meanwhile, the Military Commission made it possible for the league to 
appreciate present and prospective developments in interethnic dynamics in the disputed 
territories and their important implications for domestic peace and international security. 
Significantly influenced by the commission’s reports, the decisions of the Council and the 
Secretariat enabled the league to transcend traditional views based exclusively  on balance of 
power and territorial status quo.
 Considering the league a mere reedition of the Concert of Europe does little justice to 
its efforts to meet the challenges of open diplomacy, a remarkable change for aristocratic 
diplomats who until the First  World War had conducted traditional diplomacy benefiting from 
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secrecy but now were accountable to the world for their decisions and actions. The 
importance they attached to the role of publicity in negotiating the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, 
however, stemmed less from their concern to preserve the league’s prestige, as has been often 
argued, than from their assessment of the new diplomacy’s implications. During the 
organization of the plebiscite and the Brussels conference, whenever debate within the 
Secretariat touched on safeguarding the league’s prestige, the question concerned establishing 
the authority  of the league as an impartial and truly international agency rather than 
protecting the reputation of its officials. Creating an international contingent to send to Vilna 
and inviting the Lithuanian and Polish delegations to negotiate at Brussels—a neutral 
location chosen to minimize the international public’s speculation about British and French 
interference and attempts to sway the delegates—reflected this preoccupation and were 
therefore important constituents of the league’s policy  and decisions. In this respect the 
Polish-Lithuanian dispute was no exception. The Council showed the same concern in 1921 
when it decided to entrust the preliminary investigation of the Upper Silesian boundary  issue 
to representatives of Belgium, Brazil, China, and Spain, states not directly involved in the 
dispute.1076 
 Establishing its international image also implied proving its independence from the 
will and influence of the powers. Indeed, the league’s system was ineffective unless states 
were willing to use it.1077 However, this need not mean that the organization therefore did not 
represent a decisive break from the prewar system of Great Power politics, or that  it 
succeeded only because and as long as the Great Powers’ interests coincided with those 
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pursued by the league.1078 Agreement among the powers is traditionally  considered a major 
factor in the league’s success in settling disputes and the reason the first decade of its work is 
usually  seen as the most successful; conversely, the onset of the economic crisis, advent of 
fascist governments, and consequent breakup  of international cooperation explain why  the 
climate of the 1930s was not conducive to peaceful settlement of disputes.1079 Granted, the 
league was able to proceed with settlement of the Aaland Island and Upper Silesian disputes 
precisely because the Supreme War Council had recommended that the status of the Aaland 
Islands be decided by the League of Nations1080 and France and England had agreed at the 
third Paris conference to accept the league’s recommendation on Upper Silesia without 
question.1081  The powers were also quite content to let the league handle the Poles, the 
Lithuanians, and their mutual issues. 
 Nevertheless, the years of the early 1920s had their own problems, and the degree of 
“agreement” between the powers is perhaps debatable, considering the division between the 
French and the British, for example, over the roles of Poland and Germany in postwar 
European stability. Admittedly, the league arguably  was able to proceed with the plebiscite 
and Hymans Plan—which differed little even if significantly from the Foreign Office’s and 
Quai d’Orsay’s plans for Polish-Lithuanian federation—because the league’s decisions were 
not counter to French and British interests. Yet this was not the case for the league’s Upper-
Silesian settlement, which greatly  dissatisfied the powers. Lloyd George and Balfour were 
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disappointed by the meager area assigned to Germany because the British saw a more 
generous allotment of Upper Silesian industrial resources as a practical way to strengthen the 
Weimar Republic and contain French economic hegemony on the continent.1082 The French, 
who instead supported Poland for the opposite reason, were extremely upset that the latter did 
not receive the Silesian industrial area.1083 
 The conclusion that the league’s minority  system was designed to protect states’ 
sovereignty and security at the expense of minorities’ civil and political rights1084 does little 
justice to the organization’s efforts to cope with a fundamental weakness in Wilson’s idea for 
restructuring international society: he had failed to realize how indeterminate a criterion for 
sovereignty national self-determination actually  was and what little assistance it  was in 
delineating frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe.1085 The variety  of settlements the league 
negotiated to address the Upper Silesian, Polish-Lithuanian, and Aaland Islands disputes 
clearly  indicates that  the league went beyond a narrow-minded, state-centric perspective with 
only states’ interests at heart  to evaluate these territorial and national conflicts. The tendency 
to identify the league’s overall approach to minority  questions with its system and machinery 
for their protection has often kept scholars from appreciating the organization’s creativity  and 
novelty. In certain respects the league’s modus operandi anticipated today’s practice of 
conflict management, which perhaps explains why its novelty  and the extent to which it 
broke with the pre–First World War management of the same problems are so easily 
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actives in conflict-ridden areas of the world is so common nowadays that perhaps, when 
reading British Military Commissioner Major Keenan’s analysis of Polish and Lithuanian 
interethnic relations in the disputed territories, or the Military  Commission’s later reports on 
Vilna denizens’ attitude to the Polish elections and their degree of national identity and 
political allegiance, we fail to appreciate how fascinating and modern these texts really are. 
 The newness of the league’s outlook on national and territorial questions might be 
better appreciated if it is compared not with the present but with the pre–First World War 
practice of international management of national and territorial conflicts. The findings of the 
Commission of Jurists appointed to evaluate the Aalanders’ claims to self-determination are 
just as captivating as those of the Vilna Military Commission owing to their insightful 
attention to the economic, social, historical, and political situation of each country and group 
involved in the dispute. The remarkable novelty of these commissions’ work is that all these 
factors were taken into account to shape a political settlement that served the interests of the 
populations concerned rather than exclusively the interests of the powers, as had been the 
case with similar bodies, such as the Peace Conference’s Commission on Baltic Affairs, 
created during the war to carry out similar tasks. 
 Admitting delegates from the disputed territories to assist the powers’ work in 
deciding their destiny and creating their states was also unprecedented. The league was 
uneasy with the Polish request to admit minorities’ representatives from Central Lithuania at 
the Brussels conference because, from the viewpoint of international law, Zeligowski’s 
regime was an illegal political entity. But no legal obstacle prevented the chairman of the 
Council committee appointed to study the Upper Silesian case from inviting Polish and 
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German inhabitants of the region to Geneva to present their views on management-labor 
relations in the disputed zone.1086 
 The decisions regarding the settlement of the Aaland, Upper Silesian, and Polish-
Lithuanian disputes also reflected the league’s ability to evaluate these disputes in terms 
beyond mere questions of the balance of power and territorial status quo. This in turn 
explains why, for instance, the league recommended that Sweden grant cultural autonomy to 
the Aalanders yet instead responded quite cooly to Lithuania’s repeated attempts to present 
cultural autonomy as the solution for the Vilna territory. The league’s different responses 
regarding cultural autonomy reveal its ability to adjust and apply its principles in different 
contexts more than a preference for one or another form of minority protection.  
 Precisely because Geneva viewed minorities as an integral part of the league’s 
security system, it took pains to secure, rather than sacrifice, their democratic and national 
rights. The League of Nations commissions’ careful evaluation of not only the present status 
of interethnic relations but also the trajectory of their future development further attests to 
how seriously the league took its task of guaranteeing enduring peace and security at the 
international as well as the domestic level. This also explains why the league’s goal regarding 
minorities was not assimilation but the promotion of peaceful and permanent domestic 
coexistence within their host states. Geneva acknowledged that institutional arrangements 
meant to guarantee minorities-majority cooperation could take different forms. The Hymans 
Plan and the minority treaty that Lithuania was expected to sign would have granted 
minorities much more than just protection from assimilation. Hymans’s scheme gained the 
support of Belarusian Foreign Minister Cvikevich only because it guaranteed territorial 
autonomy for the Vilna region, which would have entitled the Belarusian population there to 
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70 percent of the delegates in the Vilna diet and consequently significant political power in 
the Lithuanian federal state.1087 
 Hymans’s plan was not an isolated example of a document accommodating minority 
protections and a more generous form of minority recognition. The Geneva Convention, 
drafted in 1922 by German and Polish delegations under the chairmanship of a Swiss 
statesman and with the help of the League of Nations Secretariat, followed the Council’s 
recommendation to partition the region between Poland and Germany. The convention 
secured the continuity  of economic and social existence in Upper Silesia and reduced the 
possible consequences of the partition by setting up a system to guarantee social and political 
peace and economic prosperity through international protection of individual rights. The 
Mixed Commission, created to implement the Council’s recommendations, instituted two 
regional control bodies, one administrative and the other judicial, each composed of German 
and Polish members under a neutral chairman.1088  In the opinion of Georges S. 
Kaeckenbeeck, president of the judicial body, the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia (1922–
1937), the Geneva Convention created the league’s most complete, detailed system of 
minority protection in Upper Silesia.1089  Kaeckenbeeck saw it  as concrete proof that “it 
would be a mistake to believe that the avoidance of discrimination was the only or even the 
chief object of the minority provisions in the Geneva Convention many of which dealt with 
definite rights of minority necessary for the preservation and welfare of minorities as 
such.”1090
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  Kaeckenbeeck’s evaluation of the Geneva Convention cannot be accepted at face 
value before further research has clarified the extent to which it was properly implemented 
and effective in fulfilling its tasks. It certainly confirms, though, that league officials were 
intentionally determined to secure minorities’ long-term existence and political rights as 
much as they  were committed to these populations’ protection. One might therefore offer a 
different reading of a statement by British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain that is often 
quoted in support  of the view that the league’s main goal was to ensure the smooth, speedy 
assimilation of minorities. In 1925 at a Council session, Chamberlain stated that minority 
provisions should be considered only a temporary measure, because those who devised the 
system had certainly not intended to establish amidst nations a community that would remain 
permanently estranged from the national life of its state. On the contrary, the object of the 
minority treaties and the duty of the league’s Council, he argued, was to secure for minorities 
the protection and justice that would gradually prepare them to merge with the community to 
which they belonged.1091  Historian Oscar Janowski’s rather isolated attempt to provide an 
alternate evaluation of Chamberlain’s words seems the most accurate. Janowski argued that 
when the British minister made this admittedly  clumsy but greatly misunderstood statement, 
he probably had in mind the example of England, where local cultural freedoms enjoyed by 
the Welsh and Scots posed no threat to British unity  and national life. He thus most likely 
hoped to see the same kind of peaceful coexistence emerge in East Central Europe and 
longed for the day  when international guarantees would be superfluous because the 
likelihood of ethnic conflicts—not the minorities themselves—would finally have 
disappeared.1092
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 Meanwhile, any evaluation of Geneva’s treatment of minorities that tips the balance 
against the league because it was unable to welcome outside solutions for improvement1093 
should not overlook that the league, by  offering minorities the opportunity to speak against 
their own states, exposed itself to abuse of its procedures. A distinction is warranted between 
the league’s overall treatment of minorities on the one hand, and of their petitions on the 
other. After the dismissal of the Hymans Plan, the local Vilna population’s attitude to the 
Polish elections there was regarded as a key  factor in working out a settlement that would 
guarantee political stability in the region, just  as the Council had based its final resolution on 
Upper Silesia not only on economic and geographic considerations but also on the returns of 
the Upper Silesian plebiscite.1094  When weighing the merits of petitions submitted by 
minorities in Vilna and Lithuania, the league disregarded those concerning the revision of 
borders or advancing political claims but seriously considered, and if necessary further 
investigated, any report denouncing persecutions and violations of a minority’s rights. 
Securing, monitoring, and protecting the safety of minorities living in these territories 
remained on the league’s agenda until 1939. Overall, given that minorities’ political views 
were often altogether self-contradictory  expressions of irreconcilable political agendas, 
concluding that the league neglected their democratic rights just because it was impossible to 
accommodate their requests would be as inaccurate as arguing that the league could not 
appreciate the inherent value of cultural autonomy  just because it disappointed the 
Lithuanians’ hopes of impressing it on the league as the solution to the Vilna dispute. 
 Knowing with hindsight that the EU and US management of the ethnic conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia resulted in the Dayton Agreement of 1995, today it is easier to argue 
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against two other tenets of the success-failure paradigm: that the league failed because it 
lacked a powerful army to enforce its decision, and that  this in turn only added to its 
powerlessness against  states’ unwillingness to yield any portion of their sovereignty.1095 True, 
the league’s overwhelming concern for respect of sovereignty  limited its effectiveness, but in 
the post–Cold War UN’s “New Order,” which gives less and less weight to sovereignty rights 
and focuses more on individual liberties,1096 management of territorial and ethnic wars has 
certainly not been any more successful. Today, post-conflict states are increasingly excluded 
from the traditional rights and protection of international society.1097  States are judged 
according to their protection of human rights, political makeup, and level of social provision 
and wealth distribution.1098  Sovereign rights are consequently  undermined—indeed, 
sovereignty has been partially “suspended” or delegated in states such as Cambodia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In these countries, the UN, NGOs, and the EU 
have taken over the administration, establishing a form of protectorate1099 reminiscent of the 
nineteenth-century idea that civilized nations have the right and duty to lead the uncivilized 
world.1100 Peacekeepers operating within the human security agenda are increasingly taking 
on the task of creating the conditions necessary  for positive, sustainable peace.1101 The UN 
has defined democratization as a “comprehensive approach” covering the spectrum of new 
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peace-building priorities, from “top-down” international regulation of elections, institutional 
development, and economic development to “bottom-up” assistance to develop a democratic 
political culture by building civil society.1102 
 Since and because of the outbreak of ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia, construction 
of civil society is now considered a precondition for the development of consolidated 
democratic institutions in East Central European states.1103 Scholars agree, however, that by 
taking over peace building in Bosnia and Kosovo, NGOs and various EU organizations have 
only further alienated the local population from its own nation building, widening the already 
existing national antagonism and slowing the overall democratization process.1104  Only 
relatively recently has it finally dawned on peacemakers that they need to confer a more 
central place to local actors, either giving more attention to practices rooted in local customs 
and in regional and cultural social contexts, or assigning absolute priority to the capacitation 
of local societies in these politics.1105  These conclusions, generally based on what are 
considered important lessons learnt from present failed peacebuilding experiences should 
perhaps prompt greater interest in investigating the league’s multiple and diverse settlements, 
which instead of excluding minorities engaged them in the decision-making process and the 
administration of ethnically mixed territories. 
 Comparing the league’s management of national and territorial disputes in the early 
1920s with the international system that preceded it allows appreciation of the league’s 
novelty. But setting it against today’s international management of ethnic conflict suggests 
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that lessons from the past hold wisdom for the present. Historian Martin Housden has 
highlighted certain similarities between the league’s notion of security and the UN security 
agenda. The end of the Cold War marked the start  of a new understanding and 
conceptualization of security. Some middle powers like Canada, Japan, and Norway began 
promoting the idea of human security in the early 1990s, which in 1994 was first  defined by 
the United Nations Development Programme as a “people-centered” approach to making 
“freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” into universal concerns. Until the late 1980s, 
security and social development were promoted as parallel but disconnected institutional and 
political structures. Human security  aims to connect these two aims: “It means using 
processes that build one’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social 
environmental economic, military  and cultural systems that together give people the building 
blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”1106  This conceptualization of human security 
informs the broad, eclectic range of policies advanced by the UN, from promoting basic 
education, environmental awareness, microcredit schemes, ethnic conflict prevention, post-
conflict reconstruction, economic development, and social programs aimed at strengthening 
society to ending transnational organized crime.1107 
 The League of Nations too was meant to be more than a mere system of collective 
security based on arbitration and backed by economic sanctions.1108 In the extent to which its 
task was not just to maintain peace in the sense of preventing war, but also to remove the 
very causes of war1109 by addressing emergent social and economic pressures, the league’s 
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system went  well beyond the classical notion of military security.1110 However, the continuity 
between the league’s and the post-1945 understanding of security is far from straightforward, 
and the Great Powers’ “commitment” to human rights today is more apparent than real.1111 
When juxtaposed to the outstanding mishandlings and failures of UN and NGO peacekeeping 
and peace-building operations, the league’s outlook on similar disputes certainly appears 
idealistic and utopian, though not in the way Realist criticism of the league meant. Perhaps 
the liberal principle underlying the creation of the league—namely, that disputes should and 
could be settled by arbitration, conciliation, or some sort of peaceful discussion and not by 
war1112—appears less naïve in light of the Lithuanian government’s, if not the entire 
society’s, support for the Hymans Plan, which the league managed obtain only because the 
whole scheme was built around strong guarantees of Lithuania’s state sovereignty. 
 Admittedly, Geneva’s painstaking efforts to deal with the Polish-Lithuanian 
ideological conflict over Vilna were not duly rewarded. Yet the insouciance with which the 
international community dismissed, for example, the Kosovar Albanians’ request  during the 
negotiations of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 to separate from Serbia and create an 
independent Kosovo certainly did little to help reestablish peace in Bosnia and instead 
contributed to sparking the Serbian-Albanian war in Kosovo immediately thereafter.1113 
Certainly  the league’s great  concern for the political loyalties of a population with a still-
underdeveloped national identity, such as that of the Vilna region in 1920, appears rather 
“naïve” compared to the international community’s blatant violation of the Kosovar 
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Albanians’ right to self-determination, which took no account  of a referendum held in 
September 1991 on establishing an independent republic in Kosovo, in which an 
overwhelming 99 percent of voters—who did not include Kosovo Serbs—favored 
independence.1114  Besides holding to its traditional reluctance to accept claims to self-
determination that could alter the territorial status quo, the international community  opted to 
sacrifice Kosovo’s aspirations to avoid alienating the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, 
considered key to the successful conclusion and implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement.1115 Naïve and useless though the league’s unwavering commitment to avoid any 
concession to Poland in regard to Zeligowski may seem next to the Machiavellian approach 
adopted at Dayton, the latter can hardly  be considered a success, considering the catastrophic 
loss of human life it caused. 
 The Kosovars’s determination to fight for independence, which they eventually 
proclaimed in 2008 in complete defiance of international community’s wishes and authority, 
holds also an important lesson for the international community  and for enthusiastic 
supporters of the Realist principle that “might makes right,” who often hubristically 
underestimate small nations that, despite their weakness vis-à-vis greater powers, can pursue 
their goals with fervent tenacity  and resolute commitment to their ideology. Naïve as it might 
have seemed to E. H. Carr, the league did not make this mistake. On the contrary, in its final 
report before withdrawing from the disputed territories, the Military Commission noted that 
Profoundly convinced of her superiority of civilization and of her numerical 
strength, Poland has failed to estimate Lithuania, her former ally, at her true 
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value. She has appeared to treat her as a vassal in accordance with her 
former traditions. The vigor of the Lithuanian resistance was a source of 
surprise to Poland and has led her to realize that the young Lithuanian state 
is a factor that must be taken into account. Poland will have to realize that 
in this mixed Vilna region, where her influence predominates mainly  by 
reason of civilization, the White-Russian element, though but little 
developed and owning practically no land, is nevertheless the most 
numerous and can no longer be neglected without grave danger to Poland 
herself.1116
Merely  drawing borders does not solve ethnic conflicts, which as Major Keenan noted in 
1920 instead require a broader approach—but neither does military power necessarily 
guarantee diplomatic success. Lack of military  strength to force Zeligowski out of Vilna may 
have hamstrung the league, but NATO’s threat in January 1999 to resort to air raids if Serbs 
and Kosovar Albanians failed to comply with the international community’s demands to end 
hostilities proved similarly ineffective, as Milosevic completely ignored it.1117 
 Perhaps the conclusion that the league failed to establish effective international 
cooperation and maintain peace has been drawn too hastily and lacks historical perspective. 
In little more than sixty years since the EU’s creation, economic integration and intellectual 
cooperation among its member states have progressed remarkably, but this is hardly true of 
political cooperation, which remains obstructed by states’ reluctance to renounce sovereignty 
rights for the sake of coordinating foreign affairs. Perhaps the real question is whether the 
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real idealists were not the league’s supporters but the post-1939 Realists who expected an 
organization entrusted with the major task of guaranteeing international peace and order 
globally, in a world emerging from the collapse of three empires and the aftermath of 
unprecedentedly devastating conflict, to achieve this goal in less than twenty years. 
 Despite the wealth of studies on the League of Nations, it is still too early to conclude 
that it failed to maintain peace. Given the variety  of its policies and responses to different 
territorial disputes and minority  questions, any conclusion about the degree of its success or 
failure should be based on thorough analysis and comparison of all the disputes it negotiated 
between 1920 and 1939. Scholars of international relations and political scientists seem 
dangerously  estranged from the study of past practices of ethnic conflict resolution, focused 
as they  are on searching for answers to current problems in the present rather than the past. 
Unfortunately, historians too show little interest in embarking on the admittedly  monumental 
yet rewarding task of exploring this area of the league’s work. Obviously  this would require 
combining a “top-down” analysis of the league’s management of each dispute with an 
exhaustive “bottom-up” evaluation of the domestic response across all social strata of the 
countries involved, a crucial piece of the puzzle. 
The rift created when debate over the Hymans Plan turned the Lithuanian public 
against its own government’s willingness to accept the plan implies that evaluations of the 
league’s work should not overlook domestic actors’ power to facilitate, hamper, or prevent 
international negotiation. Any  conclusion regarding success or failure must therefore 
acknowledge that external limits the league could not overcome might  have significantly 
impacted the outcome of negotiations.1118  For this reason, this study does not aspire to 
establish whether the failure of the mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute rested with the 
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league or the disputants. More humble in scope, it has instead confined its endeavor to 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that there is ample reason to learn more about  and from the 
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